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ABSTRACT
This thesis deals with the movements of labour from Greece to
the European Community countries in the period after the end of
World War II. In particular, it examines the causes and the
effects of these movements.
Since most of the Greek emigrants in that period moved to West
Germany, this country serves as the main point of reference,
although the analysis covers the other immigration E.C. countries
as well.
The analysis is based on testing the applicability of the
theory on the causes and the effects of international migration
in the particular case of Greece-E.C. migration in the postwar
period. The use of quantitative methods supports the findings of
the investigation in several cases, especially as far as the
causes of migration and remittances are concerned.
The last chapter of the thesis includes some thoughts on the
perspectives of such migratory flows in the future, some
suggested policy measures and the final conclusions.
ABBREVIATIONS
A.R.C.H. : Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity
C.A.P. : Common Agriculture Policy
D.M.	 : Deutsche Mark
D.W.	 : Durbin-Watson
E.C.A.E. : European Community of Atomic Energy (also known as
Euratom)
E.C.S.C. : European Coal and Steel Community
E.C.	 : European Community
E.C.(6) : The European Community of six members
E.C.(9) : The European Community of nine members
E.C.(10) : The European Community of ten members
E.C.(12) : The European Community of twelve members
E.E.C. : European Economic Community
E.F.T.A. : European Free Trade Area
E.S.Y.E. : Greek abbreviation for National Statistical Service of
Greece
F.R.G. : Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany)
G.A.T.T. : General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs
G.D.P. : Gross Domestic Product
G.N.P. : Gross National Product
I.L.0	 : International Labour Organisation
K.E.P.E. : Greek abbreviation for Greek Centre for Research and
Planning .
M.P.C. : Marginal Propensity to Consume
M.P.L. : Marginal Productivity of Labour
NICs	 : Newly Industrialised Countries
0.E.C.D. : Organisation for the Economic Cooperation and
Development
O.L.S.
	
: Ordinary Least Squares
S.E.A. : Single European Act
S.E.M. : Single European Market
U.S.A. : United States of America
INTRODUCTION
The movements of people seeking employment in countries other than
their country of origin has been the subject of analysis and debate for
economists as well as other social scientists for many years and
especially since the 18th century. Historically speaking, two distinct
phases in international migration of labour could be identified. The
first one is the long period before the end of the Second World War
when migration mainly referred to movements usually from Europe to
overseas countries such as the USA, Canada and Australia. The second
one refers to the period after 1945.
The period after the end of World War II, presents several unique
characteristics. Especially as far as the European continent is
concerned, one could argue that the two main characteristics of that
period were the high growth rates Western European economies witnessed
until the early 1970s, and the "internationalisation" of the Western
European economies. The former refers to the impressive economic
performance the Western European economies achieved (after a short
period of reconstruction), which was manifested by the improvement of
all the economic indicators and the attainment of nearly full
employment in some cases (e.g. West Germany). The latter refers to the
developments of the economic relations between the Western European
nations; these relations, after a long period of protectionism and
economic isolation increased to unprecedented levels. This applied to
the movements of goods with the expansion of trade, as well as to the
movements of labour and capital with the increases in migratory flows
and foreign investment respectively.
In particular, movements of labour in the European continent reached
high levels since the late 1950s as compared with other periods. By
historical standards this "Europeanisation" of migratory flows in the
postwar period is a unique phenomenon, in the sense that never before
had intra-European movements of labour been of such size and economid
importance. Since 1945, nearly all the developed Western European
countries became immigration ones, absorbing labour from less developed
European countries, mainly the Southern European ones such as Greece,
Spain, and Portugal.
Empirical evidence has indicated that the motivations of these
movements have been primarily economic, while in the case of the
movements from Eastern to Western Europe in the late 1940s and 1950s
the motivations were mainly political. Workers have migrated from
relatively underdeveloped areas where they were unemployed or
underemployed to developed industrial countries where there was a
shortage of labour and	 wages were high. In addition, empirical
evidence has indicated that these movements have been of considerable
importance for the countries involved (emigration and immigration ones)
in terms of their impact on economic growth and development.
Since the mid-1970s, these movements have been reduced significantly
due to the economic recession that hit the European economies;
furthermore the flow was reversed after 1975 with the increase of
repatriation of the immigrants. Consequently, the stocks of immigrants
in the developed European countries originating from the less developed
ones have diminished considerably.
But migration surfaced again in the 1980s, after the economic
recovery witnessed by most of the developed Western European countries
and the accession of certain emigration countries (Greece, Spain and
Portugal) to the European Community and the consequent implementation
of the Community's free labour mobility principles. One should also
consider the possibility of more immigration after the recent progress
of economic integration in the European Community and the adoption of
the Single European Act which, among other things, provides for the
abolition of all kinds of barriers to labour mobility in the Community
by the end of 1992. Finally the recent developments in Eastern Europe
are an additional factor to take into account. The question, therefore,
is whether massive intra-European movements of labour will be repeated
in the future.
The aim of this thesis is a macroeconomic approach to the causes,
the effects and the perspectives of movements of labour between Greece
and the other E.C. countries. Greece has a long history as an
emigration country; the outflow of labour from Greece, besides its
variations, appeared since the creation of the modern Greek State
(1830s) and continues today. Over the whole period after the end of
World War II, the emigration of (mainly unskilled) labour to Western
Europe and especially to E.C. countries has been of particular
importance. Emigration to Western Europe and West Germany, in
particular, has been identified as a very important issue for Greece,
in the sense that it influenced the economic performance and the
development pattern of the economy. It is indicative that all the
studies about the Greek economy for the postwar period refer to
emigration. As a result, there have been many opinions presented about
this issue by Greek as well as non-Greek authors, forming a fairly
sizable literature on this subject.
In spite of its size though, I have come to believe that the
existing literature lacks a thorough analysis of several aspects of
considerable importance; it is exactly these aspects that this thesis
will be concerned with in order to examine the subject comprehensively.
In particular:
a) For reasons to be analysed in chapter 1, a comprehensive theoretical
framework on international migration does not really exist. Therefore,
an exhaustive listing of all the aspects forming the theory of
migration will be attempted. This effort will include all the so far
known but piecemeal theoretical views in a systematically structured
theoretical approach.
b) Because of the lack of a comprehensive theoretical framework, the
investigations so far concerning the causes of the particular migration
from Greece to Western European countries (especially to West Germany)
in the postwar period have not been based on the analysis of all
factors affecting migration (according to the theory) and the tracing
of the most significant among them with the help of an econometric
investigation.
c) The analyses so far of the effects of migration for Greece and the
other E.C. countries have not been based on a comprehensive theoretical
framework and consequently, on an examination of the extent to which
the theory reflects the facts of this particular case. The issue of
remittances, in particular, both in terms of their determining factors
and their impact on the Greek economy has not been extensively analysed
and investigated quantitatively.
d) Finally, the fall in emigration from Greece and the increase of
repatriation since the mid-1970s has led to a belief that no migratory
flows should be expected in the future. A full discussion of the
perspectives of labour movements though, requires a more careful and
systematic analysis which will take into account the present situation
as well as the expected developments regarding this issue.
Methodologically speaking, the analysis will evolve in the following
direction: It will start with the description of the general and
particular factors which determined emigration from Greece to the E.C.
in the 1960s and 1970s and the characteristics of this emigration, and
it will continue with the analysis of the effects of migratory flows.
Finally, in the concluding chapter (chapter 9) of this thesis, the
analysis will be, in a sense, forward looking by investigating the
perspectives of emigration on the basis of the new framework provided
by Greece's membership in the E.C. which, to a great extent, will be
based on past experience.
The effort of formulating a theoretical approach in the first
chapters of each one of the two parts of the thesis will determine the
framework in which the analysis will be carried out and will be a pool
for references and questions to be answered.
The contents of the thesis include two parts of four chapters each
and an additional concluding chapter.
-In the first part, the causes and the characteristics of labour
movements from Greece to the E.C. countries will be examined.
-In the second part, the effects of these movements will be analysed.
-The concluding chapter, will include a brief discussion on the
perspectives of such movements in the near future, based on the
findings of the analysis in parts one and two of the thesis. Besides
that, it will include the final conclusions and suggestions for
economic policy measures.
There are several problems relating to this study; the primary one
is that studies on migration are faced with a lack of a complete
general theoretical framework. A look at the relevant literature
reveals that most of the theoretical contributions on this subject
refer to particular movements of labour rather than to migration in
general.
A further major problem of the empirical literature is the lack of
reliable data, especially as far as Greece is concerned. This, coupled
with the fact that only very few studies of this subject use
quantitative methods, limits the scope of the econometric
investigation. Out of the many aspects relating to the emigration from
Greece to the E.C. countries in the period after the end of World War
II, three main ones will be econometrically investigated: the
determining factors of emigration (chapter four), the determining
factors of remittances and their impact on the Greek economy (chapter
six).
Movements of labour from Greece in the postwar period refer, to a
large extent, to emigration to West Germany, as we will see in chapter
three. The aim of the thesis, though, is to examine the causes, the
effects and the perspectives of these movements in a more general
European Community framework, although emigration to West Germany will
certainly serve as the main point of reference.
PART ONE
"THE CAUSES AND THE CHARACTERISTICS
OF THE POSTWAR EMIGRATION FROM
GREECE TO THE E.C.COUNTRIES"
6
CHAPTER ONE
"A THEORETICAL APPROACH ON THE CAUSES OF THE
MOVEMENTS OF LABOUR"
7
A. INTRODUCTION.
International mobility of labour is treated by economic theory as
the result of voluntary acts of choice by individuals, in terms of the
country they will be employed in; this distinction from the forced
movements of labour which are clearly outside the purview of economics
is necessary.
In general, international labour mobility is considered as an
important factor, since it influences a series of economic variables
the most obvious case being the supply of labour.
It has already been mentioned in the introduction of the thesis that
international labour mobility has been insufficiently analysed by
economic theory, in the sense that there is no systematic and
comprehensive analysis of its causes and effects. This could be
attributed to three main reasons which could be pointed out before
further proceeding.
The first one is that many economists had come to believe that
migratory movements do not constitute an economic phenomenon. In fact,
these economists claimed that the essential aspect of the phenomenon is
demographic, in the sense of the displacements of populations (Willis,
1974, p. 9). These displacements can be attracted or repelled by
economic as well as by non-economic forces (e.g. political ones) and
moreover, the decision to emigrate is the result of so complex a series
of influences, that isolating precisely their impact is very difficult
and subject to a certain determinism (De Avila, 1954, p. 46). There are
several reservations on this point of view, the most important one
being that emigration could be considered an economic phenomenon simply
because it affects the allocation of resources between countries.
The second one has to do with the Classical assumption of perfect
intra-country factor mobility and perfect international factor
immobility. Classical economists, having the British Empire and it's
transactions with the other metropolitan economies as a reference set,
dealt with migration as a phenomenon which concerned the interior of
empires and which, consequently, represented a simple extension of the
analysis for the domestic labour market on the level of the colonial
powers of that era.
Under this point of view it is quite understandable why Classical
economists assumed that there were no movements of labour on the
international level, since capital appeared to be more mobile than
labour and could be considered as a substitute for it. This could also
explain the progress of the economic literature on internal migration
relatively to that on international migration.
The third (and probably most important) reason is that migratory
flows have different patterns and characteristics to such an extent
that the formation of a general international emigration theory seems
to be impossible. It seems that several theoretical frameworks are
needed for the approach of different migratory flows and (unbelievable
as it may seem) this is exactly the case. Migratory flows may differ in
terms of duration of stay (permanent or temporary), characteristics of
the migrants (skilled-unskilled) as well as on other grounds.
The main objective, therefore and, at the same time, the main
contribution of this chapter, is to integrate the existing literature
on the causes of migration into a general theoretical framework and
then specialise it as far as the postwar intra-European migration is
concerned; the main aim is to end up with alternative theoretical
approaches on the causes of labour migration from the Mediterranean
countries to the E.C. ones (labour migration from Greece to West
Germany (F.R.G.) in particular) in the postwar period which will be
empirically tested in the fourth chapter of the thesis.
Given the relatively limited existing literature, the analysis will
have to include, and in fact be based on, the Classical view on
emigration (perfect mobility of labour within a country and perfect
immobility of labour between countries) and the literature on domestic
labour markets and . internal mobility. This is necessary because all
schools of economic thought have very little or even nothing explicit
to say on international migration; the Marxian, the Neoclassical or the
Keynesian theoretical framework therefore, will have to be derived, to
a great extent, from the doctrines of these schools for the domestic
market.
B. THE CLASSICAL VIEW ON EMIGRATION
1. The Preponderance of the Mercantilistic Views. 
Emigration was the subject of debate in England, until the middle of
the 19th century and the general approach to the problem seemed to be
in sharp contrast with the philosophy of the Mercantilist era. The
contributions of Adam Smith coincided with a rapid increase in
population which marked the death-knell of traditional ideas such as
the prevailing view, in the second half of the seventeenth century,
that the nation's interests were best served by encouraging population
growth. Although the mercantilists were prone to worry about the lack
of sufficient employment, they did not allow this concern to weaken
their desire to achieve a large number of people (Thomas, 1973, p. 1).
With certain exceptions, emigration was regarded as harmful to the
country's interests. Overseas emigration would have to be carefully
controlled so that it would tend to maximise employment at home, and
every effort was to be made to attract skilled immigrants from other
countries. It was a frankly nationalistic creed, and its exponents saw
no reason to deny that the successes of one country were won at the
expense of others.
By the end of the 18th century this system of thought had already
been undermined; a fatal blow was delivered by Malthus in his Essay on
Population. Steeped in the philosophy of individualism and possessing a
new method of thinking about economic affairs, the theorists of the
early nineteenth century reached conclusions sharply opposed to those
of their predecessors. But in one respect there was no difference. The
Classical economists, like the Mercantilists, believed that migration
should be regulated by the State in order to avoid undesirable
increases or falls of the population. It was one of the few exceptions
to the general rule of laissez-faire (Thomas, 1973).
David Ricardo on Say's Law and Emigration. 
The debate on the economic consequences of emigration and capital
exports was, in some respects, part of a great controversy about the
possibility of a "general glut of commodities". On one side was Ricardo
echoing Say's law declaring in his Principles of Political Economy
that:
"...there is no amount of capital which may not be employed in a
country, because demand is limited by production. Alo man
produces, but with a view to consume or sell and he never sells,
but with an intention to purchase some other commodity, which
may be immediately useful to him, or which may contribute to
future production... There cannot, then, be accumulated in a
country any amount of capital which cannot be employed
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productively, until wages rise so high in consequence of the
rise of necessaries, and so little consequently remains for the
profits of stock, that the motive for accumulation ceases..."
According to this reasoning, real wages depended upon the proportion
between capital and labour. If labour and capital emigrated in equal
proportions, the wages of those remaining in the emigration country
would remain constant. If however, proportionately more capital than
labour emigrated and, assuming a more or less fixed capital labour
ratio, the demand for labour would fall. In fact it would be reduced
relatively more than supply and wages in the emigration country would
fall. This way of thinking (which is in line with the wage fund
argument analysed in section C) led to the pessimistic conclusion that
the condition of the workers at home would deteriorate due to
colonisation (Thomas, 1973, p. 3).
This Ricardian doctrine attracted a lot of criticism and, in fact,
proved to be fallacious and misleading. By taking Say's law too
seriously, Ricardo failed to see the three main benefits of
colonisation for the metropolitan countries, namely, the expansion of
the market for metropolitan products, the relief from overpopulation
(here defined as the part of the population that cannot be employed)
and the promotion of foreign investment. If nothing else, the Ricardian
silent assumption that by preventing capital exports the ratio of
capital to population increases and leaves domestic population better
off (which could be attributed to the static nature of the Classical
analysis), fails to take into account that capital may increase without
providing any additional employment or even wage increases.
Surprisingly enough though, even those who critised Ricardo
(Wakefield, Torrens and Merivale - just to mention some of them) never
really went as far as suggesting free labour and capital mobility.
Although living in the laissez faire and trade liberalisation era, they
only spoke of planned and controlled migration and, in fact, were very
skeptical and reluctant as to whether free factor mobility was
recommended. This paradoxical dualism in Classical thinking, suggesting
unrestricted international trade and restricted factor mobility at the
same time, will be discussed and explained in a later part of this
section.
3 John Stuart Mill on Colonisation and Migration. 
The theory of emigration which had won wide approval by mid-century
may be found scattered in J. S. Mill's Principles of Political Economy.
First, he referred to the ways in which a nation can defeat the
tendency to diminishing returns from land. An effective expedient was
to send people abroad to cultivate the open spaces; but he was not sure
whether emigration should be intensive enough to serve as a means of
avoiding undesirable population increases. Second, he advocated
colonisation as a remedy for low wages. Third, he attacked those
opposed to emigration on the ground that it involved a leakage of
capital from the country. In fact, Mill did not hesitate to say that
settlement of the emigrants in the colonies was "the best affair of
business in which the capital of an old and wealthy country can engage"
(Thomas, 1973, pp. 6-7), but in any case, he believed that this venture
shouldn't be left to private enterprises.
Mill was an enthusiastic believer of the "sufficient price" of land;
he believed that the flow of capital to the colonies and the foreign
countries had been one of the main reasons for the decline of profits
in England because too much capital and insufficient labour was send
abroad (op. cit., pp. 6-7).
4,. Marx's Views on Colonisation and Migration. 
The Marxist approach on the operation of the labour markets and the
causes of migration will be analysed in later parts of this chapter. At
this point we should only concentrate on Marx's views on the debate
between the views of Ricardo and his rivals on colonisation and the
international flows of labour and capital.
Marx supported the aforementioned Ricardian views; in fact he
believed that David Ricardo was the only one that saw the light, if
only dimly, in his famous proposition that:
"...the same cause which may increase the net revenue of the
country may, at the same time render the population
redundant and deteriorate the condition of the labourer..."
Marx speculated a lot on this point; in essence his contribution was a
compromise between the two opposite views. The Metropolis as a whole
may in fact benefit from labour and capital flows to the colonies
according to Marx; these benefits though, simply represent the sum of
benefits and losses of capitalists and labourers. So, if the benefits
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to the capitalists outweigh the loses to the labourers, colonisation
may appear to be altogether beneficial while, in reality it implies an
additional burden on the labour class. In later Marxist literature the
overflow of capital from mature industrial countries to colonies became
the main part of an explanation why the system is able to postpone the
nemesis of a breakdown.
The appearance of the Marginalist revolution only a few years after
the publication of "Das Kapital" moved the theoretical spectrum from
the dynamic analyses of economic evolution to the problem of the
allocation of resources under static assumptions and the refinement of
the theory of value (Thomas, 1973, p. 10).
5, The Dualism in Classical Thought (Trade and Migration). 
The already mentioned dualism in classical thought could be
explained in terms of the way Classical writers theorised the world.
When they discussed international trade, they said nothing about
international migration; in order to support their doctrines they used
examples on trade between Britain and other countries (Portugal, Sweden
etc.) assuming that migration would be impossible mainly for reasons of
language. They were dealing with migration, though, when referring to a
larger community of countries. On the one hand, there was the static
theory of international trade, based on the law of comparative costs
justifying the policy of trade liberalisation; on the other, there was
the dynamic theory of colonisation based on the law of diminishing
returns. It would appear that when Classical writers referred to the
theory of international trade, what they really had in mind was
commerce between Britain and the countries outside the British economic
empire; by doing so, it was realistic to assume international
immobility of the population. A progressive increase of productivity,
on the other hand, could be achieved in two ways: the first one was
through specialisation due to free trade with countries outside
Britain's economic orbit; the second one was through planned labour and
capital mobility within the British empire. By doing this, the
classical economists failed to develop a theory of dynamic
interrelations between trade and factor mobility; they believed that
free trade was the best thing that could happen to the world economy
and therefore factor mobility was of minor importance and a domestic
affair within the bounds of the British economic empire, since
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(according to them) it could bring no additional gains to those
provided by free trade (op. cit., pp. 10-14).
This dualism, though, does not necessarily mean that the Classical
view has no explanatory value as far as international labour migration
is concerned. It simply means that a reconsideration of the Classical
views on free trade and labour migration is necessary.
§,. The Classical View Revisited: Trade and Migration. 
As we have seen, the traditional classical theory did not encourage
discussion on the effect of free trade on international labour
movements since these two subjects were kept in different theoretical
compartments. This was left to be carried out by later economists
(1880s-1930s) most of which belonged to the Neoclassical-free trade
school. Their main aim was to bridge the gap between the Classical and
the Neoclassical approach. Their true aims though were quite different;
in fact, according to K. Wicksell the "liberal school was to blame for
the "monopolisation" of several theoretical aspects by the Marxists.
According to the observation made by Jacob Viner (1937, p. 597), the
classical school of economic thought failed to distinguish between
place and occupational mobility. Viner believed that the Classicals
only dealt with internal occupational mobility and neglected mobility
between classes. His views were compatible with the theories of J. E.
Cairnes, F. W. Taussig and B. Ohlin on the "non-competing groups"
according to which the labour force is divided into two main
categories, the unskilled workers on the one hand and the skilled
workers and qualified . professionals on the other. These two groups will
not enjoy the same benefits from free trade in welfare terms (Ricardian
view), nor will they witness the same mobility between countries. In
fact the unskilled labour group will enjoy less benefits from trade and
may prove to be more mobile under the right circumstances. Taking into
account that these contributions coincide and probably use as a
reference point the emigration of unskilled labour from Western Europe
to the U.S.A., while the Classicals were referring to migrations within
the British empire, one could both understand and explain these
developments in economic theory.
C. THE LABOUR ECONOMICS FOUNDATIONS OF THE THEORY
OF MIGRATION.
In order to provide a theoretical framework on the approaches of the
different schools of economic thought to the mechanisms and the
operations of the labour market, we should consider an economy where no
emigration or immigration is to be expected, assuming, that is, factor
(labour in this case) immobility between countries. Labour surpluses
and deficits and the relative notion of optimum population should be
examined together with the particular factors related to the
equilibrium in a labour market such as wages.
I,. The Clusical Approach. 
The cornerstone of the Classical wage theory is the "wage fund
doctrine". It can be easier understood as an argument concerning an
entirely agricultural economy even though Classical economists (besides
Marx whose views will be analysed in the following section) did not
view such limitations to their argument.
The wage fund for the current period consists of the entire output
of the previous period less what is removed for the entrepreneur's
consumption. The fund represents the total amount available for wages
in the present period. The current wage is equal to the ratio of the
fund over the labour force; any factor increasing the size of the fund
(technological improvements for example) will cause a wage increase. A
wage increase though will cause a population increase and therefore, a
labour force increase (denominator) and, finally a fall in wages.
Classical economists (Smith being the exception) adopted Malthus's
views on population growth; this led them to the formation of the "iron
law on wages". Any increase of the wages above the subsistence level
will lead to an increase of the population-labour force and, therefore
to a fall in wages. So wages can increase only on a temporary
(short-term) basis; in the long-run they will return to the subsistence
level. This pessimistic view of the prospects of the working class led
to economics been labeled the "dismal science" and fell into disrepute
after the criticisms of J.S. Mill (Bellante et.al ., 1979, pp. 43-4).
The notion of overpopulation in a Classical framework can be shown
with a static two country model including a relatively more developed
(in terms of economic structure, per capita GDP etc.) country A and a
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less developed one B. In country A sectors with high average and
marginal labour productivity (mainly industry) predominate, because of
the abundance in capital and technology. In country B sectors with
relatively lower labour productivity rates (mainly agriculture)
predominate due to the scarcity of capital and technology. As a result,
wages and income per capita, are higher in country A. A basic element
for the analysis is the size of the population in both countries since,
soon enough, country B seems to witness a relative overpopulation
leading to unemployment (due to the shortages in capital and to the
limitations in substituting labour for capital).
The Marxist Approach. 
While in many areas (particularly value theory) Marxism constitutes
a radical departure from Classical economics, the Marxist wage theory
is very close to that of the earlier classical economists such as
Ricardo. To Marx the wage rate under capitalism is limited, in the
long-run, to the subsistence level. There is a question as to whether
Marx's definition of the subsistence wage (the reproduction cost of
labour) is compatible with the Classical conception of subsistence: is
it a wage solely determined by physical requirements of survival
(Classical view) and therefore invariant over time? Or, is it partly or
wholly determined by the customs of society and therefore subject to
change (Bellante and Jackson, 1979, pp. 44-5)?
The most interesting part of Marx's approach though, as far as our
analysis is concerned, is his view on overpopulation.
In "Das Kapit al !' Marx distinguishes three types of surplus
population (floating, latent and stagnant). The floating one exists
because the number of those employed tends to increase at a lower rate
compared to the scale of production; some of the redundant workers
escape abroad in the wake of exported capital (Thomas, 1973, p. 7). In
the words of Marx:
"It is an inherent contradiction of the movement of capital that
the natural increase in the working masses is inadequate to satisfy
the requirements of the accumulation of capital, and yet is always
in excess of those requirements. Capital needs growing quantities
of young male workers and diminishing quantities of adult male
workers. This contradiction is not a more glaring one than the
contradiction that there should be a complaint of a lack of hands
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at the very time when thousands are unemployed because the division
of labour has chained them to some specc branch or industry"
("Das Kapital", 4th edition, 1928, pp. 708-9).
The latent type of surplus population emerges because, the
application of capitalist methods to agriculture causes a fall in the
demand for farm labour relatively to capital accumulation. The stagnant
part of "the reserve army" is recruited from the poorest workers in
casual employment (a stagnant surplus which forms a self-reproducing
and self-perpetuating element of the working class) (Thomas, 1973, p.
8). Marx believed that for each system of production there was a law
governing population. The corresponding law for capitalism was based on
Marx's central hypothesis that "as accumulation increases, the ratio of
variable to constant capital falls, and that, therefore, the demand for
labour which is governed by the amount of variable capital, declines
relatively to the quantity of total capital. The variable capital
function was conceived in such a way that demand diminished relatively
to total capital, at an accelerating rate, as total capital increased.
Marx had in mind a dynamic process in which there would be interludes
during which accumulation would proceed on a given technical basis,
that is to say, with a stable ratio between the variable and the
constant capital, and employment increasing at the same proportion as
capital. But, as time went on, these interludes became shorter: hence
an accelerating decline in the variable component of total capital"
(op. cit.).
One could speculate on Marx's aforementioned analysis as follows:
Since an expanding capitalist economy needs a reserve army of labour
which undergoes regular fluctuations and not the changes in the overall
growth rates of the working class, problems. Consequently, a call for
immigration (by the capitalists who will press the government to
attract the foreign labour they need) should be expected to arise in
this framework in case an expanding capitalist economy cannot possess
such a reserve army of labour.
I, The Neoclassical Approach, 
The Neoclassical analysis of the labour market is based on the
"purposive behavior" of the individuals. Individuals are assumed to
have their own preferences, wants and desires which they attempt to
satisfy in order to maximise their utility. In a world characterised by
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scarcity though, the individual has to choose. The choice of the
individual between work and leisure is determined by the real wage rate
and his individual preferences. Whereas the classical economists had
viewed the cost of production as the determinant of product price, the
early Neoclassicals (Marginalists) conceived the marginal utility
(demand but also supply) as the determinant of product price. Wages
were conceived to be determined by the demand for labour represented by
the value of the marginal physical product of labour.
Later Neoclassical analysis (A. Marshall in particular) viewed value
(and similarly the wage rate) as being determined by the interaction of
demand (utility) and supply (cost of production itself ultimately based
on utility). The mainstream Neoclassical analysis of the labour market
is based on the competitive labour market model. A labour market is
perfectly competitive if there is a large number of price taking buyers
and sellers, all of them possessing perfect, or sufficient at least,
information and freedom of entry and exit from the market.
The demand for labour in such a market will depend on the marginal
productivity of labour and eventually, on the demand for output in the
commodity markets. Supply, on the other hand, will depend on the
individual preferences of workers between income and leisure. Full
employment, results when the market clears and wages will be determined
by demand and supply and labour markets are the mechanism for the
allocation of labour. In such an economy, any disequilibrium (excess
demand or supply) will be taken care of by a relative change in wages
and workers will be attracted to the relatively high wage activities,
that is the sectors in . which output and hence workers contribution to
output has come to be more highly valued. In such a market, therefore,
wage changes between activities will ceteris paribus reflect changes in
relative scarcities and (by doing so) will indicate the need for the
reallocation of labour. Equilibrium will be restored after labour moves
from lower to higher paid jobs. One can understand therefore, why only
temporary vacancies and unemployment are conceivable in this model;
changes in the relative wages will always clear the market although
this adjustment mechanism may take some time.
The simple Neoclassical analysis is based on the absence of
disequilibria situations leads to full employment with labour
automatically adjusting to changes. Moreover this adjustment is such
that efficiency is always maximised, since the allocation of factors
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leads to a situation where all units of a factor receive the same
return equal to their marginal product.
Evaluating the explanatory value of the theoretical approaches on
the operation of the labour markets in closed economy models is beyond
the scope of this thesis. For the sake of completeness though, rather
than the sake of discussion, one should explore the limits of their
applicability. In this context, the critique to the static general
equilibrium mechanism of perfect competition, generated by the Austrian
school (which is also based on an individualistic approach) should be
examined.
The Austrians tackle the Neoclassical mainstream as far as three
crucial issues are concerned; first, they reject the perfect knowledge
or information assumption; second, they reject the view that the
attainment of the state of equilibrium is certain, although they accept
that the economy may move in that direction. Third, they reject the
perfect competition hypothesis since they are mostly interested in the
forces moving the economy towards equilibrium or, in other words, in
the way economies evolve through time and decisions are made in
conditions of uncertainty and limited information. In fact, in
Neoclassical economics, competition is viewed as a state, whereas in
the Austrian approach it is viewed as a process.
AL The Keynesian Approach, 
One interpretation of Keynes argues that the key feature in the
Keynesian approach to labour economics is the concept of inflexible
wages. In its simplest- version the Keynesian model is based on the idea
that wages will not respond to excess supply; the existing wage rate is
mostly treated as an exogenous (given) variable. Workers will not
easily accept a fall in the nominal wage rate (although they could
possibly accept a fall in the real wage rate). It is clear that the
harmony between employers and employees implied in Neoclassical theory
is rejected by the Keynesian model. The wage rate is determined for a
period of time (and not on an every day basis as in the Neoclassical
model) to a great extent after bargaining between the two parts.
Changes take place after a new round of bargaining and, in fact, these
changes reflect the relative bargaining powers of the two parties.
On a more sophisticated level of analysis though, the rigid wage
assumption seems rather naive; in fact Keynes never adopted this
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assumption. It is true, however, that Keynes' analysis was prone to
such misunderstandings as Harrod warned him (Chick, 1983, pp. 132-133)
In order to understand the essence of the Keynesian labour market
some points have to be made clear:
-Keynes rejects the Walrasian notion of equilibrium in general and as
far as the labour market is concerned in particular. The Walrasian
short-period equilibrium is based on the equality of the expected (ex
ante) prices to the actual (ex post) ones. This can be achieved through
the "tatonement" process carried out by the auctioneer, in the sense
that no transaction takes place before the equilibrium price is
reached. Labour markets are no exception to that rule in the Walrasian
model. In the Keynesian model on the other hand, persons rather than
forces (demand and supply) determine prices. Prices are set by
producers who take into account the expected demand for their output.
Effective demand is in the centre of the Keynesian model in contrast to
the Neoclassical one.
-Keynes viewed the labour market as a particular case; it is indicative
that he never used the term "price" when he referred to the labour
market. The Keynesian analysis accepts the existence of a demand for
labour curve and a supply of labour one; the Keynesian demand for
labour curve is derived from the expected demand for output firms are
faced with (Chick, 1983, p. 138). Besides determining the demand for
labour curve, producers expectations also determine the wage rate.
Given this process, one could ask whether a supply of labour curve is
needed at all in the Keynesian analysis. In fact the only role that the
labour supply function plays in the Keynesian short-run is to
determine, as a residual, the level of unemployment (which in this case
will be of an involuntary nature) (Coddington, 1983, p. 28).
-The possibility of involuntary unemployment (or in other words
short-term equilibrium with unemployment) is the distinguishing feature
of the Keynesian labour market relative to the Neoclassical one. The
level of employment (and therefore unemployment) will be determined by
the availability of jobs (which is determined by the demand of labour
solely) rather than the wage rate. The role of workers in this model is
limited to accepting (or not) a job at the given wage rate and reacting
to real wage cuts which could ceteris paribus, lead to the "right" wage
level (the one that could cause an elimination of unemployment)
(Leijonhuvfud, 1968, pp. 336-337).
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This view of the world as one full of rigidities and market
imperfections allowed Keynesians to include the notion of labour
surplus in their analysis. These rigidities and imperfections may be
"unremovable" or serve some purpose (e.g. long-term contracts, over
wages induce a wage rigidity but may be mutually beneficial to the
parties of the contracts). Kaldor defined surplus labour as:
"... the workers who stand ready to respond to an increase in
demand for labour in the high wage industries without requiring a
change in relative wages" (Cornwall, 1977, p. 67).
The centre of the Keynesian (Kaldorian in fact) analysis lies in the
dual economy model first introduced by A. Lewis (1954) and further
developed by Rams and Fei (1961). In a sense, this model is the basis
of the Kaldorian theory of growth and this facilitates the use of a
general Keynesian framework.
At this point, a very interesting distinction should be made about
the way the Neoclassical and the Keynesian school divide the labour
force. The "non-competing groups" Neoclassical notion is very different
to the "dual labour market" Keynesian one. The former implies two
demand and supply schedules within the same market; the later implies
two distinct labour markets, a primary and a secondary one
corresponding to two distinct sectors within the same country, which
function in different ways (Sawyer, 1989, pp. 82-88).
The "dual economy", in its original formulation model envisages a
"capitalist" sector (manufacturing) with high wages and labour
productivity and capital intensive techniques and a "subsistence" one
(agriculture) with low wages and labour productivity and labour
intensive methods of production. In this model the agricultural sector
operates as a labour pool for manufacturing and, in fact a quite full
pool due to high population growth in the rural sectors. Provided
demand for labour in manufacturing is sufficient (and this will mainly
depend on the demand for the products of manufacturing), labour will
move from agriculture to industry in such a way that the employment
growth rate in the latter exceeds the overall growth of the labour
force. In addition to that, at some stages of development, industrial
output grows more rapidly than total and agricultural output. Employees
from agriculture are attracted by the higher wages in the manufacturing
sector. This scheme implies a relatively high mobility of the labour
force and continuous increases in the labour productivity of
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manufacturing in a virtuous-circle fashion.
One could say though, that sooner or later, productivity and
therefore wages in agriculture will increase and wages across sectors
will be equalised (in a pure Neoclassical fashion). As a matter of
fact, this productivity adjustment process in agriculture could occur
either because the departure of a certain section of the agricultural
labour force facilitates the reorganisation of this sector (employment
of more capital intensive methods for example), or simply because the
marginal productivity of those leaving agricultural employment was
equal to or even less than zero (i.e. disguised unemployment). This
does not reduce this model's validity though, which is based on the
duality of economies and the often observed persistence of wage
differential. In fact this persistent rigid wage structure depends on a
variety of factors such as the existence of a high wage sector (where
employment is determined by the demand for labour, which is determined
by the demand for the products of this sector) and a low wage residual
employment one and the sum of agricultural productivity and residual
labour force growth rates exceeding the growth rate of the demand for
the agricultural goods (Cornwall, 1977, p. 46). This second (and purely
Keynesian in nature) condition is probably the best explanation of the
persisting intersectoral wage rigidities (Boltho, 1982, pp. 14-5).
Besides that, in case the labour reserves of the agricultural sector
fall considerably (as was the case with the U.K. economy in the 1950s),
manufacturing can always attract labour from the other less productive
sectors of the economy (domestic services in the case of the U.K.).
Therefore labour surpluses in the Kaldorian sense (a rapid increase
in industry's demand for labour attracting the supply and leaving wage
differentials unaffected) are feasible under three necessary
conditions:
"1. A labour force with substantial numbers willing to undertake
complex mobility patterns.
2. A rather rigid inter-industry structure.
3. An allocative mechanism in labour markets that does not reflect
some sort of equalisation of net benefits for workers " (Cornwall,
1977, pp. 46-47).
The applicability of the Lewis-dual economy model largely depends on
the characteristics of the labour market of the country in question. It
is dynamic in the sense that it considers the preconditions for the
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transformation of an economy with vast labour reserves in agriculture
to an industrially developed one. But can it apply to countries where
unlimited supplies of labour from agriculture do not exist like the
U.K. in the postwar period? In a way it could; in fact, apart from
agriculture, labour can come from other low productivity sectors
including the relatively less productive industrial ones.
In conclusion, one could argue that although aggregate demand is at
the heart of all Keynesian-Kaldorian growth models, the supply of
labour is a permissive and in fact decisive factor for economic growth,
in the sense that a lack of available labour would stop growth;
provided that labour is abundant, therefore, demand will be the driving
force behind growth. In any case, the penalty for relative labour
shortages in the sense of limited intersectoral or even intrasectoral
mobility is relatively slow rates of growth (Kaldor, 1966 and 1975,
Cornwall 1977).
5, Internal Labour Mobility. The General Equilibrium Approach Versus
the Cumulative Causation One.
Although the literature on the causes of international migration is
limited, this is not the case with the literature on internal labour
mobility. The problem is whether and, in fact, to what extent the
theory of internal labour migration could be applied to the case of
international migration. The existence of borders in the case of
international migration is the least of problems in this case. In fact,
there are more important distinctions between internal and external
labour mobility which •should be discussed here in order to limit the
analysis.
An "internal" labour market is an administered system with rules
about wages and the allocation of labour. In fact, in this market there
is no attachment except the wage between the worker and the employer.
In such labour markets, reductions in demand for output do not lead to
a proportionate decline in employment since employers retain workers in
the face of declining productivity and rising average costs because
they are afraid to loose their skilled workers (implicit contracts
etc). Besides that, senior and skilled workers will be upgraded to
better-paying jobs and vacancies in the lower skilled/lower paying jobs
will be filled by some sort of surplus labour (either from the internal
or the external labour market).
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Having analysed the function of the "closed" labour market in the
Neoclassical approach we should now examine the Neoclassical static
general equilibrium model of migration between two regions A and B
within the same country.
Regions A and B in the Neoclassical analysis have the same
characteristics as countries A and B in the simple Classical two
country model we have already seen. In particular, region A is the more
developed one (predominance of high labour productivity sectors-
industry, abundance of capital and technology and a shortage of
labour), and region B the less developed one (predominance of low
labour productivity sectors-agriculture, scarcity of capital and
technology and labour abundance).
The Neoclassicals added several assumptions to that model (see
Richardson, 1969, p. 295, and 1978, pp. 385-92):
a) If full employment is achieved in region B, the wage level there
will be lower than the one in region A.
b) Wages are equal to the value marginal product of labour.
c) Labour is qualitatively homogeneous (which implies that labour
productivities may differ only due to different capital endowments).
d) Perfectly competitive labour markets.
e) Existence of constant returns to scale.
f) Migration costs equal to zero.
g) Workers move mainly in response to wage differentials.
Under these assumptions labour will emigrate from the low-wage
regions until real wages between regions are equalised, subject to
other conditions of work. More generally, the proposition of Hicks on
the subject is that:
"...differences in net economic advantages, chiefly differences in
wages, are the main causes of migration" (Hicks, 1932, p. 76).
Furthermore the Neoclassicals (Isard (1960), Lutz (1963)) believe
that under these assumptions emigration will restore equilibrium as
follows:
Since wages are higher in region A, labour will migrate towards it.
As a result, labour will become relatively scarce in region B where
capital will flow into labour intensive sectors, wages will rise and
emigration will stop. There are other equilibrating trends not taken
into account in that model though. Income (and therefore wages) in
region B will rise because of emigrants remittances and furthermore the
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increase of income in region A will cause an increase of the demand for
goods produced by region B (Seers and Vaitsos, 1980).
This is a very simplified comparative static model. In fact, it can
be amplified by including other determinants such as amenities, public
services and social benefits for the migrants and by arguing that
migrants respond to differences in expected utility assuming
heterogeneous preferences (Richardson, 1978, p. 108).
The Neoclassical hypotheses can be classified in two main
categories: the deterministic (the rate of migration is determined by
objective economic conditions and individuals are treated as rational
economic beings) and the probabilistic (making allowance for attachment
to a region and exercise of free choice by individuals).
In essence, the Neoclassical analysis of internal migration stands
on two theoretical aspects, namely, the optimum population concept
(although it is not even mentioned explicitly in the model) and the
marginal productivity theory. In the Neoclassical world the defmition
of optimum population refers to the maximisation of real income per
head. With a constant stock of capital, a given level of resources and
no technical progress, per capita income depends upon the opposing
forces of scale economies and diminishing returns and there will be a
single maximum point in the curve relating regional per capita income
to regional population size. Maximum per capita regional income in both
regions will only be achieved if labour moves from one region to
another until the marginal product of labour is equated to the wage
level in and between regions (Richardson, 1969, p. 298).
In spite of the mainstream Neoclassical doctrine of perfect
competition, this model enjoyed monopoly power in the analyses of
internal movements of labour. In fact, empirical research (most of
which concerned the inter-state migration in U.S.A.) revealed that
migration tends to follow "economic opportunity" and (to the pleasure
of Neoclassicals) wage differentials in particular (Bhagwati, 1976,
Hamermesh and Rees, 1984, Hoover and Giarratani, 1985).
The applicability of this model to international migration will be
discussed in the following section of this chapter. What should be
examined here is whether the equilibrating mechanism described in this
model should be unreservedly accepted or whether the cumulative
causation mechanism is in operation.
Neoclassicals do not take into account what Myrdal calls "cumulative
causation" under which the advantages for country A will increase
rather than decrease because of migration. The simple idea is that
there are ways by which success breeds success (and failure breeds
failure) and hence those regions who are initially successful
(unsuccessful) and receive relatively high (low) rewards will continue
to gain (loose) at the expense (benefit) of the initially unsuccessful
(successful) (Sawyer, 1989, P. 421).
According to Myrdal (1957, pp. 26-29), one could distinguish two
kinds of effects resulting from the economic relations between two
regions or two nations, the spread effects and the backwash ones.
Backwash effects are the detrimental effects suffered by poor nations
(regions) as a result of their interaction with rich ones, while spread
effects are the beneficial ones enjoyed in poor nations (regions) of
the same. The main idea is that the play of market forces tends to
increase rather than decrease the inequalities between nations
(regions) (Vanhove and Klaassen, 1980, p. 9). Economic expansion in one
region may have a negative influence on the neighboring nations
(regions) in different ways. Movements of labour, capital, goods and
services do not by themselves counteract the national tendency to
inequality. Migration, capital movements and trade are the media by
which a cumulative process evolves upwards in the lucky nations
(regions) and downwards in the unlucky ones (Myrdal, 1957, pp. 26-29).
Labour mobility in particular, may have negative effects on the country
(region) of emigration at any rate, if the volume of the movement of
labour is considerable (op. cit).
The movement of labour exacerbates the inequality between regions
since migration is always selective, at least with respect to the
migrant's age. This movement by itself tends to favour the rapidly
growing regions and disfavour the others. In general, if emigrants
represent the "best" (in terms of age, education etc.) part of the
labour force, they will be more useful than average in production. The
prosperous regions will be able to offer a higher wage and better
working conditions; this will help them attract more and better high
skilled labour and scientists. The level of services in the prosperous
regions, therefore, will improve even more and this will reinforce the
attraction of the prosperous regions and raise their competitive
position (Sawyer, 1989, p. 423).
On the other hand, the increase of the income accumulation due to
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immigration in the labour importing countries creates external
economies which lead to a further and larger accumulation. Economies of
scale prove to be, once more, the Achilles heel of Neoclassical
economics as also does the implicit assumption of perfect substitution
of labour for capital which is clearly assumed for country B (Seers and
Vaitsos, 1980).
C. The Human Capital Element. 
Although the general idea behind the human capital notion is an old
one, the theory of human capital started developing in the late 1950s.
Until then, the demand for post-compulsory education and skill
acquisition was treated as a demand for a consumption good (Creedy and
Thomas, 1982, p. 98).
The modern approach to human capital is clearly a supply-side one
and focuses on questions relating to the quality of labour (unlike the
earlier contributions which concentrated on the quantity of labour).
The human capital approach views education and training as forms of
investment in the individual, where the earnings foregone during
training represent the costs and the additional lifetime income derived
from using the human capital as the return of this investment (Sapsford
and Tzannatos, 1990, pp. 2-3).
An individual may have skills and training that permit him to earn
income each year. These skills, therefore, which provide a continuous
flow of income to the individual have a value for him just as any form
of property which yields a monetary return has a present value to its
owner (Bellante and Jackson, 1979, p. 105).
In a sense, the human capital approach is perfectly compatible with
the life-cycle income hypothesis, since both human investment and
consumption decisions can be seen as taken simultaneously on a
life-cycle basis. In particular, human investment decisions are, in a
sense over the life-cycle of the individual from birth through
compulsory schooling to the labour market, and ultimately, retirement.
Consequently, government social and economic policies can be related to
the life-cycle (Hartley and Tisdell, 1981, p. 27). But is this approach
of any explanatory value for emigration?
The first reservation on this approach is related to the problem of
whether material capital analysis should be applied to human beings;
the essence of this reservation does not only lie in humanistic
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grounds. It is rather differences such as the non-separability of human
capital and the consequent problems of raising finance for education,
training and other human investments (op. cit., p. 294).
The second reservation is the so called "screening hypothesis" (op.
cit) which raises the question as to whether education serves as a
means of knowledge acquisition (which the worker will use to maximise
his returns) or a screening or certificate device. According to this
hypothesis, education may do little to improve the sldlls of
individuals which would be useful to the employer, but it does provide
a signal to a potential employer that the individual who holds the
certificate or degree possesses intelligence, motivation etc. which
will probably enable him to be a successful employee.
Human capital theorists claim that this approach is of great
explanatory value since not only does it explain an individual's
decision to accept a job offer at a particular moment (as most static
models do) but it can also explain individual decisions and, therefore,
occupational mobility on a dynamic (life-cycle) basis. This is fair
enough; since this model explains human behaviour and reactions over
time (in fact from the end of compulsory education to retirement) it is
dynamic. But is this approach beyond the limits of the analysis of
certain schools of economic thought? Although labeling approaches by
school of economic thought is not a target by itself, one could say,
for the sake of argument, that this approach reflects a strong
Neoclassical perspective. In fact:
"...it tends to ignore market imperfections, encouraging the
estimation of reduced form equations for wages on the assumption
of a competitive labour market and distracting attention away
from estimating demand and supply functions. Besides that it is
also rather lop-sided. References to the determinants of the demand
for training by employees (or the supply of recruits to jobs with
training involved) are in fact confined largely to places where the
reactions of workers must be taken into account in explaining the
strategic position of firms" (Creedy and Thomas, 1982,. p. 100).
Human capital theorists believe that educational policy rather than
direct intervention in the labour market is the most efficient means of
reducing wage differentials. The labour market, indeed, enters the
analysis only indirectly, by determining the marginal productivity of
labour. Skills are acquired prior to entry in the labour market as well
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as whilst working and the distribution of jobs is supposed to be
perfectly malleable, depending on the distribution of human capital
endowments (and thus on the distribution of skills) produced by the
education system.
Another aspect of human capital theory has to do with decisions
about training or (more precisely) about the form of investment in
human capital which is usually undertaken when the individual is in
employment (on the job training with a view to enhancing his/her
productivity through the acquisition of particular skills). This
distinction between general skills (acquired by education) and
particular-specific ones (acquired by on the job training) is very
useful. This approach obviously rejects the aforementioned assumption
that skills are acquired prior to entry in the labour market.
As we will see in the following section of this chapter, the human
capital element combined with the brain drain one have been extensively
used in analysing the postwar migratory flows. At this point though, a
discussion on the relation between the human capital element and the
geographical mobility of labour in general would be very useful.
Human capital theory cannot relate people's choices on where they
should acquire human capital, relatively to where they would seek
employment afterwards. An individual born (and living) in region A may
decide that the best or the most inexpensive thing to do in order to
get highly paid employment easier in region B would be to acquire
education in region A, B, or even C. This scenario may seem to be too
much to assume for young people at the beginning of their
post-compulsory education; on the other hand though, I can see no
reason why it could not be applied to people thinking of university (or
any other higher education institution) education. Such people could
choose as undergraduate or (even more realistic to assume) postgraduate
students whether they should get employment in a certain region of the
same (or other) country.
The second (and more important) question is whether the possession
of human capital influences the geographical mobility of an individual.
I would answer that it does and moreover positively, for two main
reasons:
The calculation of costs and benefits from a decision to emigrate
from one region to another may be different for skilled and unskilled
labour; besides that, it would be quite realistic to assume that highly
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skilled and educated individuals possess relatively better information
and ability to evaluate and process this information on the condition
of the labour market in two different regions than the unskilled ones.
The second reason is that the skilled and educated individual refers
to a small number of particular jobs, which if he does not get in a
certain region may decide to emigrate to another one much easier than
an unskilled individual who probably refers to a wider range of jobs.
One could easily come up with counter arguments and the conclusion
that, under certain conditions, unskilled labour may prove to be more
mobile than skilled, but nevertheless the case for different
geographical mobility these two groups have has been established to a
great extent.
D. A SYNTHESIS: TOWARDS A GENERAL THEORY OF
INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION.
L General. 
At this point I should define the central hypothesis on which the
further analysis will be based: "Potential emigrants are in a sense
utility maximisers; their decision to emigrate and the duration of
their stay (provided that they have a choice on that) depends on
whether they expect that emigration will serve their interests". In
that sense one could say that decisions on migration are taken (as far
as the emigrant is concerned) on the microeconomic level. The
fundamental question is how pursuit of self interest interact i.e.
whether pursuit of individual interests leads to socially desirable
outcomes. Besides that, a person's decision to emigrate is a necessary
but not a sufficient condition for emigration to occur. Since national
borders continue to exist, the consent of both the immigration and the
emigration countries is also needed. Whether this consent will be given
though, depends on the considerations of both groups of countries on
certain macroeconomic indicators varying from the size of the labour
force to the desired rate of economic growth. Besides that, many of the
signals a person needs in order to make up his mind on migration have
to do with macroeconomic indicators (e.g. job availability in the
immigration country). Migration therefore will be treated as a
phenomenon depending on decisions taken on the microeconomic level by
the potential emigrant but, at the same time, determined (to a great
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extent) by the evolution of macroeconomic indicators (Djajic, 1989, pp.
327-39).
Emigration is related, mainly by the Neoclassicals, to the concept
of the optimum size of the population as defined above and
consequently, to phenomena such as over and under population. Although
the Marxist approach also refers to the size of the population, one
could hardly say that it has to do with the optimum population notion
(in the sense that from whose view-point is it optimum?)
If we examine overpopulation as a form of reserve industrial army
(as the Marxist theory does) we will have to distinguish it into three
kinds: floating, latent and stagnant. The floating form expresses
labour mobility in the industrial production which, according to Marx
can be related to emigration in the following way: "In the centres of
modern industry, workers are occasionally attracted and repulsed in
such a way that the number of workers increases in a decreasing rate
relative to the production scale. Overpopulation in this case, is of
liquid form and increases when industry expands. A part of surplus
labour has to emigrate and, in fact, it follows the emigration of
capital" (Nikolinakos, 1973).
The size of the population together with the theory of marginal
productivity are the basis of the Neoclassical theory of emigration
(Richardson, 1978, pp. 370-3). The centre point of the analysis of the
size of the population is the optimum population which can be defined
in different ways assuming alternative maximalistic targets set by a
country. Maximisation, in a sense, may assume government activity in
order to determine the size of the population, although an outside
observer may define optimal without implying government activ:ty. A
country may aim a) at maximising the per head income of the native
population (excluding immigrants); b) at maximising the per head income
of all its residents; c) at maximising the per head income both of its
residents and the residents of the emigration country (Michalopoulos,
1968, p. 130). According to what a country aims at, the optimum
population is that for which the income per head of native population,
all residents or even all residents of both countries is maximised.
Having indicated the optimum size of population we can indicate the
optimum size of emigration. It is the size for which the income per
head of the non-emigrating residents of the emigration country is
maximised (Massel and Yotopoulos, 1971, pp. 292-3).
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Although the notion of optimum population is interesting, it is of
very doubtful use; its main problems have to do with the fact that it
could hardly be included in a positive theory of migration. Since the
optimum population notion has to do with how large the population of a
country should be, without any hint as to how this population size
could be achieved, it remains within the limited framework of normative
economic theory. Although some countries have adopted measures aiming
at influencing the future size of their population (West Germany
encouraging the increase of the fertility rate, India and China
encouraging exactly the opposite) such measures could hardly be seen as
sufficient in filling the gap between a normative and a positive theory
of migration.
Besides that, not all economists seem to agree as to the definition
of surplus labour. Some believe that it is equal to the number of
unemployed, while others believe that it equals the part of the labour
force whose marginal product is very close or equal to zero
(Michalopoulos, 1968, p. 130).
In particular, one could distinguish at least three completely
different definitions of surplus labour and, consequently, three
different theoretical approaches to the causes of migration, namely the
Marxist, the Neoclassical and the Keynesian ones.
2,. The Marxist Approach. 
The Marxist approach on the causes of migration is mainly
constituted by Marx's views on overpopulation and the more recent
contributions of the Neomarxist school of dependence.
It has already been mentioned that the most relative to migration
part of Marx's theory is the doctrine of relative surplus population.
Marx had the 19th century colonial regimes in his mind; as a result,
he viewed emigration as a process following increases of investment in
the metropoles. Such an extension of activity required new supplies of
labour which should be imported because otherwise the variable to
constant capital ratio (and therefore profits) would fall.
The main task for the contemporary Marxist and Neomarxist theorists
on this aspect was to apply Marx's views in a very different world
where the colonial links have been replaced by more complicated ones.
The Neomarxist school of dependence proved to be more successful in
that respect.
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The main difference between the "orthodox" Marxist and the
Neomarxist approach has to do with whether the capitalist world should
be examined as a unique notion (all countries are more or less treated
as the same in terms of having two main classes the, capitalists and
the workers) as the "orthodox" Marxists do, or as a non-homogeneous
group of countries (in terms of characteristics) in accordance to the
Neomarxist views.
In particular, the Neomarxist view on the contemporary world could
be included in the triangle dependence-submission-complementarity which
explains the relations of the countries of the centre (the developed
ones) and the periphery. The dependence of the latter on the former is
both in economic and political terms. One of the effects of dependence
is the submission of the peripheral economies to the interests of the
metropolitan ones and, consequently, the complementary function of the
former relatively to the latter. This complementarity strengthens the
links of dependence and the whole scheme becomes a self-perpetuating
one, forming the so called "vicious circle of dependence". The
aforementioned analysis is extremely brief and, although the Neomarxist
school can hardly be regarded as expressing single views on this
subject, the main analytical directives could be attributed to Amin
(1976), Emmanuel (1974), Frank (1978), Sweezy (1942) and Wallerstein
(1974 and 1979).
In this framework one could explain the process of migration as
follows: A metropolitan country A witnesses an increased demand for
labour caused by an intensification of accumulation. It's labour
reserves (reserve army)- are drained and, if this increased demand for
labour cannot be coped with, it will probably lead to a fall in the
variable to constant capital ratio (the numerator will not increase due
to the labour shortages while the denominator will increase due to the
intensification of accumulation). The fall of this ratio, though, will
lead to a fall in the rate of profits. Given this, the only way to
preserve the variable to constant labour ratio and, therefore, maintain
the rate of profits is to acquire new supplies of labour. If there are
no labour reserves in the internal labour market they will have to be
brought in from other countries. So the metropolitan countries will
have to turn to their periphery and pump in labour. The countries on
the periphery on the other hand will have to submit to the needs of the
metropolis and supply this labour irrespectively of whether they too
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need to maintain the size of their labour force. Their complementary
role becomes obvious especially when the metropoles no longer need the
imported labour which will have to be sent back where it came from
(Jackson, 1986, pp. 19-25).
Movements of labour certainly started long before capitalism; on the
other hand though, it is obvious that they were emphasised during the
long transition period to the completion of the capitalist system.
Differences in development levels are absolutely compatible with
capitalism no matter whether we draw the line between centre and
periphery (Neomarxist approach) or examine it in total ("orthodox"
Marxist approach). By the time capitalism has prevailed, a process of
adjustment of productive relations to the requests of development of
the productive forces will start to operate or as M. Dobb sees it: "...
when there is a labour shortage, capitalism requests to the state to
create and subdue labour..." (Amin, 1977, p. 519).
Unequal development, unequal exchange and dependence are cause to
effect relations. Migration along with foreign investment and
international trade are simply a mechanism of promotion and
preservation of these relations in the world economy (Nikolinakos, 1973
pp. 10-12).
The main advantage and, at the same time, the main disadvantage of
this approach is it's generality, since it does not intend to explain
individual decisions. Since workers do not move from one country to
another against their free will, dependence, submission and
complementarity are too general to explain a person's decision to
emigrate, without being .specified to particular factors relative to the
subject. Although the Neomarxist approach is of great analytical
importance therefore, it is unable to provide by itself a complete
theoretical framework about the causes of international movements of
labour.
1 The Neoclassical Approach. 
Two contributions by Ravenstein (1885 and 1889) formed the first
theoretical analysis of migration and are considered as the ones that
provided the subject with a theoretical base. In fact it is believed
that the 20th century "...has seen no comparable excursion into
migration theory..." (Willis, 1974, p. 8). Ravenstein defined the laws
of migration and the essence of these laws are: migration falls with
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distance; long distance migrants go to the cities; migration takes
place by stages; each migration stream is associated with a
compensating counter-stream; there is an urban/rural distinction in
migration propensities; females predominate amongst short distance
migrants; technological improvements (in transport especially) increase
the volume of migration; and that economic motives (i.e. higher income)
dominate in most migration decisions (Molho, 1986, P. 398).
Ravenstein's propositions were redefined in a more brief way by Lee
(in Jackson (ed.), 1969, pp. 282-7) which did not really modify their
basic conclusions. The Ravenstein model with it's modifications
provided the framework for the mainstream Neoclassical analysis on
migration and the "push and pull" approach which will be analysed in a
following section of this chapter.
Ravenstein's analysis is Neoclassical in the sense that demand and
supply are seen as being mediated essentially by fluctuations in wages.
Relative wages are at the centre of the Neoclassical analysis;
differences in the demand and supply of labour in the labour markets of
two countries is reflected in different wage rates. Under these
circumstances workers will tend to migrate from the relatively low to
the relatively high wage rate country (provided that they can acquire
information about these differences in the information markets) in
order to maximise their welfare in terms of income, and capital will
probably move to low wage countries (assuming that low wage countries
have higher profit rates). Emigration therefore, will occur because of
the differences in real wage rates and will only come to an end when
these differences have been eliminated because of migration; in this
model migration functions as a factor directly affecting the supply of
labour in both countries leading to a convergence in wage rates. Within
this framework, wages provide the principal argument in individuals'
preference functions, whilst the distribution of opportunities for
movement as reflected by the pressure of demand are also conditioned by
prevailing wages (Molho, 1986, p. 398).
This Neoclassical approach is based on two main assumptions; the
first one has to do with the nature of the labour market and the second
one has to do with information.
The Neoclassicals assume perfectly competitive labour markets for
both countries, or in other words, a perfect international labour
market, homogeneous in nature. This view has been criticised since, and
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even those who accept the existence of an international market for
labour, stress the fact that this market is a most imperfect one
(Kindleberger, 1963, P. 438). Within the Neoclassical context,
migration is considered as a disequilibrium phenomenon in the sense
that in an equilibrium condition the "right" wage level will clear the
market and therefore no additional supply of labour (immigration) will
be needed. On the other hand though, migration could be considered as a
factor contributing to equilibrium in the sense that it eliminates
labour shortages and surpluses and therefore, it only occurs as we move
from one equilibrium point to another.
The second assumption on perfect information is quite important,
although one could argue that as long as information is not completely
wrong, then, some of the effects are valid; wage differences can
function as the engine of migration, provided that potential emigrants
are aware of these differences. If this is not the case, this can only
mean that the decision to emigrate will be based on imperfect or simply
mistaken information. In such a case emigration may occur but one may
expect a second decision (to return or not), when the immigrant
realises the actual differences in wages (Katz and Stark, 1989).
One could easily criticise this approach on the ground of the strict
assumptions it is based on. In fact, the full-employment to be attained
at the "right" wage level Neoclassical notion can be easily tackled;
the same applies to their doctrine on the convergence of wages on an
international level (following the Hecksher-Ohlin theorem and the
Stolper-Samuelson factor price equalisation one). Nevertheless though,
the conclusions of the Neoclassical approach deserve some credit.
Neoclassicals consider the potential emigrant as a profit maximis:ng
supplier of his own labour. Therefore, this individual will probably
sell (provided that he is both rational and aware of the possibilities)
in the market where he can get the higher price.
People will probably emigrate if they feel that opportunities are
better in the immigration country; higher wages though are only one of
the components of better opportunity. Wage differences may exist and in
fact influence emigration but only factors such as differences in
unemployment rates and job opportunities may prove to be of greater
importance for the potential emigrant.
A final remark one could make is that most of the aforementioned
analysis seems to be based on short-run and static/current conditions.
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For the sake of completeness we should at least take expectations about
life-cycle incomes into account. Such expectations may determine an
individual's decision to emigrate to a much greater extent than static
wage differences. The decision to emigrate is a very important one for
individuals and, it therefore seems very realistic to assume that it
will be based on long-run (life-cycle) considerations rather than
short-run ones.
The theoretical debate, therefore, should be based on the relative
rather than the absolute applicability and explanatory value of this
theory.
4. Iii Keynesian Approach. 
Job availability, on the other hand, is at the centre of the
Keynesian analysis; imbalances in the labour markets of both countries
in terms of labour surpluses and labour shortages cannot always be
eliminated by a convergence in wage rates. Wage rates in a country are
determined by a series of factors besides the supply and the demand for
labour. Labour, therefore may as well emigrate from one country to
another mainly because employment opportunities are more prosperous in
the latter.
This approach though, implies perfect information on the differences
in employment opportunities just like the Neoclassical one assumes
awareness of the wage differences.
The discussion so far has revealed that the basic precondition for
explaining the causes of international movements of labour is to define
and analyse relative - surpluses and shortages of labour. The
Neoclassical approach is self-constrained in that respect since it
views them as a phenomenon only occurring during movement from one
equilibrium situation to another.
Taking this into account could explain the validity of the Keynesian
approach in spite of the fact that Keynesians are the ones who have
dealt the least with migration. Surprising as it may seem, even if one
accepts that a Keynesian theory on the causes of migration exists
implicitly, one will have to admit that the main analytical tools of
this theory were not really designed for this cause.
The transformation of the Keynesian growth theory into one of
migration can be attributed to a rather simple extension of this theory
by Kindleberger (1968). 1Cindleberger put Lewis' model in an
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international perspective; instead of using a dynamic and a subsistence
sector of the same country, he transformed the model into a two country
one by combining the manufacturing sector of a developed country and
the agricultural sector of a less developed one. By doing so one will
end up with the conclusion that labour will emigrate from the less
developed country to the developed one following increased demand for
labour in the industrial sector of the latter.
Following a purely Keynesian way of thinking, one could view
migration as a self-perpetuating process in the following sense:
Foreign labour is needed because the domestic labour force is not
enough to cope with an increase in aggregate demand; this additional
labour-population though, may cause a further increase of aggregate
demand, so more workers will be needed and so on. In a Kaldorian way of
thinking, although the supply of labour is a permissive factor of
economic growth (aggregate demand being the decisive one), foreign
labour could relax the constraint imposed by the lack of transferable
surplus labour for the dynamic sector (industry) of the economy.
Even with this extension though, the Keynesian approach can hardly
be considered a complete theoretical analysis of the subject.
International migration was brought in to supplement the growth theory
of that school of economic thought rather than the other way around. In
fact the main contribution of the Keynesian approach is that it fills
the enormous gap between the Neoclassical and the Marxist theory. Both
the Lewis model and the Kaldorian theory have strong affinities with
the Marxist theory, in spite of the fact that it's analysis touches
upon the Neoclassical theory although it rejects it's main assumption
on the elimination of wage differentials.
Besides that, the Keynesian approach does not reject the importance
of wage differentials as the Neoclassical one does not reject the
importance of differences in employment opportunities. The debate
between these two schools of economic thought is finally on which of
these two factors is of greater importance for emigration to occur.
5, The Human Capital-Brain Drain Approach. 
A striking feature of the migratory flows since the end of the World
War II is the high proportion of migrants who can be regarded as human
capital. Developed countries were keen to attract qualified manpower
and, in many cases, they erected barriers against the entry of
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unskilled labour.
The emigration of skilled workers started long before the end of
World War II but, (in the 19th century for example) it was
complementary to the exports of physical capital and unskilled labour
(Adams, 1968, pp. 3-8). The postwar wave of migration, in contrast, has
moved in the opposite direction from that of physical capital. In a
sense, instead of proletarian mass migration, population-sensitive
capital formation and portfolio foreign investment, the postwar period
is characterised by professional elite migration, science-based capital
formation and direct foreign investment (op.cit.).
Most of the literature on the human capital movements is on the
effects for the emigration and the immigration countries (Molho, 1986,
Pp. 398-9). In fact two models, a "nationalist" one and an
"international" or "cosmopolitan" one have been developed (Adams, 1968,
PP . 3-5). The first one advocates that skilled manpower migration
deprives the less developed (emigration) countries of the people they
would need in order to develop industrially; therefore several
restrictions should be imposed or alternatively, a compensation
mechanism for the emigration countries (taxing the brain drain) should
be introduced.
The "international" or "cosmopolitan" model on the other hand,
follows a liberal logic and a Neoclassical way of analysis. According
to it, the brain drain simply reflects the operation of an
international market for specialised human capital. Like physical
capital, human capital will have to move from low to high productivity
regions (countries); as long as it is free to seek the highest reward
and as long as it bears the costs of its own movement, it will tend to
flow into uses where its contribution is greatest as long as wages are
correlated with productivity. In other (and in fact Neoclassical)
words, "...resources will be allocated on a world-wide basis in the
interest of maximising world output; they will be allocated on the
basis of optimal efficiency" (Adams, 1968, P. 4). Following this way of
thinking one could say that the migration of human capital also implies
a cost minimisation in the sense that it is cheaper to produce human
capital in the low wage emigration countries.
We could easier embody this analysis in the theory on the causes of
migration, by developing a risk-theoretic human capital model of
migration. Such a model would treat migration as an investment under
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uncertainty and focus on the expected return and associated variability
of returns from migration as the determining variables of the migratory
decision. "By introducing risk or uncertainty, we are in effect
proposing the human capital analog of the job opportunity differential
hypothesis" (King, 1980, P. 47). Here again the debate between the
Neoclassicals (wage differentials) and the Keynesians (job opportunity
differentials) seems to surface. The difference though is that, here
the Neoclassical and the Keynesian hypotheses can be treated as
complementary. People will emigrate because they think, believe or just
hope that they have better chances of getting a job in the immigration
country which will pay better (over their life cycle) than a relative
job in the emigration country (Lee in Jackson (ed.), 1966, p. 287). So,
wage differentials are now a necessary but not a sufficient condition
for movement.
Numerous models have been developed based on the logic of the human
capital-brain drain approach; most of them refer to the intra-state
migration of skilled and educated labour in U.S.A. According to these
models the (expected) returns and costs of migration, which, after all,
determine a person's decision to emigrate could be listed as follows:
Returns: Higher income, better professional opportunities, and better
living and working conditions, relevance of the	 job with the
education and the training this person had, political stability,etc.
Costs: Monetary costs (cost of transportation and 	 establishment)
and non-monetary (psychic) costs (nostalgia, unsafety difficulties in
adjusting etc.)
(The details are elaborated in Greenwood (1975), Singh (1978), Katos
(1977), Todaro (1969) and Sjaastad (1962) among others).
In theoretical terms, the human capital-brain drain approach looks
fairly compact. Although closer to the Neoclassical logic, it combines
the Neoclassical and the Keynesian approaches (an achievement on its
own one could say), since both wage and employment opportunities
differentials are considered as determinants of migration.
The problem with this approach though, is that it can only apply to
that part of the labour force which can be treated as human capital,
that is the skilled and educated professionals. For these people, the
silent assumption of perfect (or at least sufficient) knowledge of the
existing differences in incomes, job opportunities etc. seems more
realistic and the theory more applicable than in the case of unskilled
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labour (for the crucial importance of information see Molho, 1986, pp.
401-5).
It is indicative that the most popular examples and reference sets
for human capital-international migration analysis are reputable
academics (even Nobel prize winners) and famous artists and athletes
who emigrated from Western Europe to the U.S.A. Most (if not all) of
these people though, had visited (and therefore can be assumed to have
been possessing information on) U.S.A. before actually emigrating.
C. The "Push" or "Pull" Factors Approach. 
Like the human capital-brain drain approach, the "push-pull" factors
one is relatively recent; in fact it also appeared after the end of the
World War IL The Ravenstein model (analysed in section D.3), in a
modified form is considered as the most significant contribution based
on the assumption of push and pull (Jackson, 1986, p. 15). In fact,
Ravenstein's original analysis is closer to the push-pull model than
similar models (such as the model developed by Lee) in the sense that
it allows for both negative and positive intervening variables (Lee's
analysis only allows "intervening obstacles" to migration) (op. cit.).
The "push-pull" factors approach did not bring in any new
theoretical elements and cannot be considered as constituting a
separate school of economic thought on international migration; in
fact, it appears to be that this approach has "borrowed" elements of
the pre-existing literature, but nevertheless it structured them in an
original way of analysis.
In the Neoclassical and Keynesian approaches, as well as in the
human capital-brain drain one, the individual and his decisions are in
the centre of the analysis. The evolution of the economic variables in
both the emigration and the immigration countries constitute a bulk of
information, carefully examined and evaluated by the individual in
order to reach a verdict on emigration. Emigration and immigration
countries compete harmoniously in an auction where, the worker, fully
aware of the offers will sell himself to the highest bidder. The model
is therefore based on the assumption of a process of rational decision
making and perfect knowledge of the system (Jackson, 1986, pp. 15-6).
Following this way of thinking, one could end up with the conclusion
that if an individual accepts the offer of the highest
bidder-emigration country and emigrates, the only way he would return
41
to his country of origin would be after a relatively higher offer from
the emigration country.
A careful look at the experience of recent as well as previous
migratory flows reveals the fallacy of this way of thinking; return
migration does not go hand in hand with reversals or even with
convergence in the relations of wages and job opportunities between the
immigration and the emigration countries (Castles and Kosack, 1985, pp.
25-8). In fact, in many cases return emigration coincided with
increases in wage and job opportunities differentials in favour of the
immigration countries (as we will see this is exactly what happened in
the case of the emigration from Greece to the E.C. countries in the
postwar period).
The logic of the "push-pull" factor approach is quite different;
first of all, it is a macro rather than a microeconomic approach.
Emigration may occur as a result of "push" factors prevailing in the
emigration country, such as lack of access to land, lack of employment,
low wages, drought and famine population increase, etc. It may also
occur as a result of "pull" factors exercised by the immigration
countries (in the form of attractive alternatives to the push factors),
or even due to the simultaneous operation of both sets of factors
(Jackson, 1986, p. 13). If a country possesses more labour than it
needs at a particular moment, it exercises a series of repulsive
factors to the excess labour force in order to get rid of it. Low wages
and job opportunities and high unemployment are some of these repulsive
factors.
On the other hand, • countries witnessing labour shortages exercise
attracting forces (high wages and job availability, low unemployment
etc.), in order to pull the necessary additional labour. One could say
that this should be a "push and pull" factors approach in the sense
that repulsive and attracting forces may operate simultaneously if a
country wants to export the labour force another country wants to
import. The problem in this case is what happens if the wishes and the
interests of the two countries do not coincide; in other words, if push
and pull factors work in opposite directions, which will be the most
important ones.
It is obvious that the centre of gravity of this analysis is not on
the individual potential emigrant; his role under the "push-pull"
factors approach is more passive in the sense that, his decision to
42
emigrate will be determined by the interaction of forces exercised by
the two countries. The probability of the emigrant being better off
after emigrating is here only one of the conditions for emigration to
occur (whereas it was the decisive one under the other approaches), the
basic one being the probability of emigration serving the interests of
at least one of the two countries.
The "push-pull" factors approach has received a lot of criticism,
especially from the "brain drain" theorists; this criticism is based on
the ground that it is analytically weak, since it does not properly
take into account the comparative aspects. Those who criticise this
approach believe that from a motivational point of view the decision to
emigrate has always been affected by comparative considerations.
This criticism is fair enough; it is true that the "push-pull"
factors approach is based on absolute rather than comparative aspects
between countries. The "push-pull" factor approach cannot be based on
relative/comparative notions, because it's main aim is to examine
whether migration would occur in the absence of one of these two sets
of factors. It is quite logical to expect that a rational individual
possessing (relatively) sufficient information and being able to
evaluate it will take the comparative rather than the absolute aspects
into account; given this, the validity of the "push-pull" approach is
in serious doubt. But what happens if the sufficient information and
evaluating ability hypotheses are dropped? Should we expect perfect
information and ability to evaluate this information from an unskilled
labourer? Probably not. In such a case the "push-pull" factors approach
may prove to be of more explanatory value than the other approaches.
E. A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE POSTWAR
INTRA-EUROPEAN MIGRATION.
1. The Characteristics and the New Elements of Migration in the
Postwar Period.
The patterns and the characteristics of the postwar intra-European
migration are unique in the sense that never before had the European
continent experienced such flows. During the colonisation era, people
were emigrating from the metropoles to the colonies. Later, in the 19th
century and until the late 1910s, massive emigration from Europe to the
"new" countries (U.S.A., Australia, Canada, etc) took place, the
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driving force being the availability of land in these countries. Since
1914 though, the U.S.A. imposed several restrictions on the numbers of
immigrants they received annually; in a sense, the U.S. became more
interested in quality rather than quantities of foreign labour. All
through these three distinct periods of international emigration,
Europe had been the origin rather than the destination of migrant
labour. However, in the postwar period migratory flows started taking
place among the European states.
In the first postwar years, significant (in size) human flows took
place from Eastern to Western European countries. The problem with
these flows however is that they should be considered as movements of
refugees (that is for political reasons) rather than labour migratory
flows.
Besides these movements, what characterises the postwar period in
Europe is the massive temporary migration of unskilled labour from the
less to the more developed European countries.
The importance of the state as a planner and investor had increased,
particularly since the World War II. In accordance with the Keynesian
doctrines which dominated in that period, the achievement of full
employment and the avoidance of imbalances in the labour market were
considered as tasks for the policy makers. Soon enough most of the
industrially developed Western European countries reached full
employment and, in fact, some of them were faced with shortages of
unskilled and skilled labour.
Generally speaking, after full employment is reached, if demand
pressures persist and intensify, it will be easier for the domestic
labour force to upgrade to better paying jobs; this upgrading though
will be increasingly accompanied by labour shortages in particular
sectors of the economy. These sectors need not be the same in every
country but the nature of the jobs is very similar; they are low-paying
"socially undesirable" jobs or, in other words, jobs in the secondary
labour market (Cornwall, 1977, p. 88). However, although these labbur
shortages may occur in particular industries or occupations, they
signify a general shortage of labour to which, according to Bohning
(1972) there are four possible responses:
1. A country may either undertake a program that would radically alter
the relative wage structure of the economy, allowing workers in
socially undesirable jobs to be paid higher relative wages.
2. It could relax its full employment goal.
3. It could fill the socially undesirable jobs with foreign workers
hired on a temporary basis.
4. It could encourage permanent settlement by foreign workers and their
families.
For reasons which will be analysed in the following chapters the
Western European countries chose the third and fourth (West Germany
with the Turkish immigrants) options.
2 A Re-Evaluation and Modification of the Theoretical Framework. 
At this point, temporary migration should be defined in contrast to
permanent. The temporal character of migration is defined relative to
the remaining period of employment of an individual, his working life
rather than his natural life. In that respect, we could say that
migration is temporary provided that an individual emigrates for a
relatively short period of his working life and returns (or intends to
return) to his country of origin before retirement. Depending on the
age of the emigrant, this implies at least three periods in the
employment of a person on a life basis: the period of employment (or
unemployment) in the emigration country before emigrating, the period
of employment in the immigration country and the period of employment
(or underemployment) in the emigration country after his repatriation.
Although the applicability of the theoretical approaches on the
causes of migration analysed in the previous section of this chapter as
far as the postwar intra-European migration (and the one from Greece to
the E.C. countries in particular) is concerned will be tested in
chapter four, at this point we could say that: the theoretical
approaches on the causes of migration analysed in section D could be
divided into three groups.
The Neomarxist approach is in the first group. The pure Neoclassical
and Keynesian approaches, together with the human capital-brain drain
one are included in the second one, their common characteristic being
that they focus on relative rather than absolute considerations.
Finally the "push-pull" factors one is in the third group.
Besides the already mentioned problem of generality of the
Neomarxist approach, there is an additional one; most (if not all the
determining factors of migration according to this approach (the
international division of labour, dependence etc) are qualitative and
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cannot be expressed in quantitative terms and therefore their
importance cannot be investigated quantitatively. Given these
limitations, the Neomarxist approach will serve as a general (and very
useful indeed) framework rather than a specific theoretical hypothesis
to be tested.
As far as the second group is concerned, the main reservations have
to do with the fact that the approaches it includes refer to the
migration of skilled rather than unsldlled labour. As already
mentioned, the relatively sufficient information and evaluating ability
(of this information), implicit assumptions they are all based on do
not seem to be valid in the case of unskilled labour. Nevertheless this
will have to be further investigated in chapter four.
Although one could argue that the "push-pull" factors approach is
the least complete, it may prove to be of the greatest explanatory
value, since it is not based on specific strict (and subject to
criticism on the ground of how realistic they are) assumptions such the
perfect or even on the partially correct and known information ones.
This approach may explain better the fact that unskilled labour
emigrated, but it will have to be amplified in order to explain the
temporary nature of these migratory flows. This amplification needs to
be done firstly on the grounds of "push" and "pull" factors expressed
in relation to short and medium-run rather than long-run considerations
of the emigration and the immigration countries. This is relatively
easy; the difficult task is the second one, namely the formation of
short and medium rather than long-run considerations from the emigrants
point of view. It is true that the "push-pull" factors approach
stresses the role of the countries involved, but after all, these
factors simply represent signals influencing the decision of a person
to emigrate.
The decision to emigrate temporarily does not need to lie in short
and medium term considerations only. A person may decide to emigrate
temporarily hoping that he will manage to stay in the immigration
country permanently or, plan to return on the basis of long-term
considerations. Whether this will prove to be the case will depend both
on his decision to stay or return after a certain interval and on the
"pull" (stay) or "push" (leave) forces the immigration country
exercises on immigrants. Besides that, an individual may decide to
emigrate temporarily simply because he plans to build up some savings
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abroad which he will use after repatriation. This explanation is in
line with the "life-cycle hypothesis" and will be further analysed in a
separate chapter on remittances (chapter six).
For the case we plan to examine, besides the investigation of
whether comparative or absolute considerations were the decisive ones
for emigration from Greece to the E.C. countries to occur, the "push"
factor hypothesis will have to be tested versus the "pull" factor one.
Last, but not least, one should keep in mind that the debate on the
preponderance of the "push" or the "pull" factors could be seen as a
test of Say's law on emigration. Does demand ("pull" factors) create
its own supply or, is it the other way round? Moreover, is the wage
rate or the availability of jobs in either group of countries that
influences the most a persons decision to emigrate? In other words,
could the Neoclassical (supply-side and wage oriented) view of the
world be tested versus the Keynesian (demand-side and job availability)
one within the "push-pull" factors approach?
As far as the Keynesian approach is concerned, there seems to be no
problem in applying it within this context and especially within the
"pull" factor one Immigration could be viewed as a factor relaxing the
supply of labour constraint, shifting the supply of labour (SL) curve
to the right (and possibly changing its elasticity). So, the only
assumption needed is that the employers now refer to a larger labour
market including both domestic workers and potential migrant labour.
The same, more or less, could be said about the application of the
Neoclassical approach within this context. In such a case though, we
should assume that an individual's decision to emigrate depends on the
outcome of the comparisons he makes between the (absolute) wage rate in
the immigration country and the cost of migration (which is difficult,
if possible, to express quantitatively, but may as well be assumed to
be fixed).
In conclusion, therefore, one could say that the debate between the
Neoclassical hypothesis could be tested versus the Keynesian one within.
the "push-pull" factors approach. This could be easily done by testing
the relative importance/significance of wages and job availability as
explanatory variables in the "push" and "pull" factors models of
migration (chapter four).
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coAPTER	 TWO
ATTERN OF DEVELOPMENT AND THE EVOLUTION
" THE POSTWAR F
OF THE PARTICULAR FACTORS WHICH INFLUENCED THE POSTWAR
EMIGRATION FROM GREECE TO THE E.C. COUNTRIES"
In this chapter, the economic environment in which emigration from
Greece to certain E.C. countries (especially West Germany) evolved in
the postwar period will be analysed. Methodologically speaking, the
analysis will proceed from the general to the specific, that is, the
examination of the particular factors will follow the description of
the postwar pattern of development (especially that for the period
1960-1975 when migration and repatriation mainly happened) of the
countries in question.
The factors influencing movements of labour, differ in each case
both as to their characteristics, as well as to the extent to which
they determine the appearance and the evolution of the phenomenon. An
exhaustive analysis of these factors, though, can contribute a great
deal to the investigation of the causes of emigration under one
condition: that one takes into account the general economic framework
which determines, and at the same time is determined by these factors.
As far as the particular subject is concerned, the investigation of the
causes of migration will have to follow the analysis of the economic
environment in which emigration took place. We should keep in mind,
however, that a full analysis of this subject is both very difficult
(if not impossible) and beyond the scope of this thesis. What could be
done, though, is to limit the analysis of the postwar development to
the aspects concerning the postwar intra-European migration.
A. THE POSTWAR PATTERN OF DEVELOPMENT: THE FUNDAMENTAL
STRUCTURAL CHANGES.
1. The Positive Evolutions. 
The basic characteristic of the postwar period in W Europe is the
extremely rapid economic growth which can be, mainly, measured by the
impressive increase of GDP and corresponding evolutions for the rest of
the macroeconomic indicators. In particular, as far as Western Europe
is concerned, we may observe rates of economic growth which could be
characterised as unprecedented, at least compared to those of the
prewar period (Boltho, 1982, p. 10). The long term trends of GDP
(average annual changes) for various Western European countries can be
seen in table I-1.
The next step is to trace the causes of this rapid growth. The
postwar period is marked by rapid and significant structural changes in
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the economies of the European countries which are related to
development with a cause-effect relationship.
Table	 I-1:
	 Long-term
	 GDP	 trends	 in	 Western	 Europe	 in	 the	 period
1870-1989.	 (average	 annual	 percentage	 changes)
country \ period 1870-1913 1922-37 1953-73 1973-9 1980-6 1987-9
France 1.6 1.8 5.3 3.0 0.89 2.93
F.R.G. 2.8 3.2 5.5 2.4 1.46 3.10
U.K. 1.5 2.3 5.3 2.6 1.33 3.58
Spain - 1.7a 6.1b 2.8 1.83 5.25
Austria 3.2 0.8 5.7 3.1 2.06 3.36
Belgium 2.0 1.4 4.3 2.3 0.94 3.50
Denmark 3.2 2.9 4.3 2.1 2.18 -0.40
Finland 2.8 4.4 5.0 2.3 3.18 4.30
Netherlands 1.9 1.9 4.9 2.5 0.82 2.76
Norway 2.1 3.4 3.9 4.4 3.28 2.85
Sweden 2.8 3.5 3.9 1.8 1.80 2.43
Switzerland 2.1 2.1 4.6 -0.4 1.91 2.50
Total 2.0 2.5 4.8 2.4 1.80 3.01
a. NDP 1922-1935
b. 1954-1973
c. 1926-1939
Sources: a) Maddison, 1977.
b) Boltho, 1982, p. 10.
c) OECD , Country surveys, (various issues).
d) Own calculations.
The basic structural changes of the postwar period could be
summarised as follows:
a) increasing importance of the secondary sector in most Western
European countries (the U.K. being the exception for most of the
period), at the expense of the primary one, especially after the early
1960s,
b) gradual opening of the economies to international trade and
C) the structuring of a new institutional framework on international
economic relations corresponding to the new situation with . the
formation of economic institutions such as the E.C.
Before analysing these three structural changes, it should be made
clear that besides their interrelations, they caused a series of other
evolutions of (relatively) secondary importance.
The postwar period is marked by the fast expansion of the
manufacturing sector in all the Western European countries. It is
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Table 1-2: Percentage distribution of the labour force by sector
of economic activity in Greece, Spain and the EC-9 (1950-88).
1950 1960 1970 1980 1988
E.C.	 (9)
Agriculture 25.00 16.49 9.69 7.43 6.47
Manufacturing 41.50 45.34 45.79 38.55 30.96
Services 33.50 38.17 44.52 54.02 62.57
Spain
Agriculture 52.58 44.39 26.42 18.85 16.1
Manufacturing 27.00 32.38 39.72 36.05 32.0
Services 20.42 22.73 33.86 45.10 51.8
Greece
Agriculture 54.02 48.99 34.89 30.27 27.5
Manufacturing 25.01 23.51 35.09 39.49 28.1
Services 20.97 27.50 31.02 30.24 44.4
Sources: a) Neueponti-Delivani, 1986, p. 42.
b) 0.E.C.D., country surveys, (various issues).
c) Own calculations.
Table 1-3: Percentage distribution of GDP by sector of economic
activity for Greece, Spain and the E.C.(9) (1950-1988).
1950 1960 1970 1980 1988
E.C.	 (9)
Agriculture 16.8 12.4 5.5 4.1 3.8
Manufacturing 41.3 44.8 48.0 43.8 41.2
Services 41.9 42.8 46.5 52.0 55.0
Spain
Agriculture 22.6 13.5 7.5 5.2
Manufacturing 33.2 34.3 35.8 37. 6
Services 44.2 52.2 56.6 57.2
Greece
Agriculture 27.8 23.1 18.2 14.3 13.1
Manufacturing 20.1 25.8 31.3 32.5 30.2
Services 52.1 51.1 49.5 53.2 56.7
Sources: a) Bank of Greece, 1982, pp. 246-248.
b) Donges, 1982.
c) 0.E.C.D., country surveys, (various issues).
d) Own calculations
indicative that agricultural employment is rapidly shrinking (table
1-2) and, at the same time agriculture's contribution to GDP formation
is also falling (table 1-3). It is obvious that manufacturing gains in
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his evolution for Europe is
extent similar to that of the
the postwar period, Greece
importance both in terms of employment as well as in its share in GDP.
Several theoretical approaches on the causes of the fast postwar
growth in Western Europe have been elaborated (Surveyed in Boltho,
1982). Some of them attribute this growth to supply factors and others
to demand ones. For the former the importance of labour supply is
evident. The latter stress the decisive role of demand in the postwar
period; according to them the high growth rates . were the consequence of
the increases in aggregate demand, induced by a series of factors such
as the reconstruction and the expansionary policies followed by most
Western European countries.
The continuous growth of GDP, though, would not have been possible
if factors of production had been scarce. The availability of factors
of production cannot cause growth by itself, but it can facilitate it,
provided that aggregate demand increases too. In the first postwar
years factors of production were abundant; employment in the
manufacturing sector was increasing at an annual rate of 0.6% during
the period 1953-1973 while never before had this rate exceeded 0.4%
(Boltho, 1982, pp. 11-12). The increases of gross investment in
manufacturing were even more impressive; just after the war, the
European countries had adequate and relative cheap technology
(developed by the U.S.A. during the war) at their disposal (Maddison,
1977). This availability of technology initiated investment and profits
and finally the growth of the output of manufacturing. Soon enough
though, the European countries lost their access to the U.S. technology
and turned, almost entirely, to the quantitative increase of their
capital stock (capital widening instead of capital deepening) (Cipolla,
1976).
An increase of the capital stock, even if it is not accompanied by
improvements in technology (although according to Kaldor (1966, 1968
and 1975) the two would be intimately linked), is a positive factor as
far as labour productivity is concerned, since it increases the
capital- jlabour ratio (Denison, 1967). T
shown in tables 1-4 and 1-5.
The Greek experience was to a great
other European countries. In fact, in
witnessed an acceleration of the exodus of the rural population to the
two civil sectors of the economy, an increasing contribution of
manufacturing to GDP formation and an impressive • increase of
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productivity in Greek manufacturing (Negreponti-Delivani, 1983, p.
132). These facts, though, do not necessarily imply parallelisms. The
impressive performance of the Greek economy in terms of its main
macroeconomic indicators took place while the country was at a lower
level of development than most of the other European ones. As a result,
although Greece's GDP and productivity growth rates, in the 1960s, were
among the highest in Western Europe, its per capita income was among
the lowest and labour productivity in the Greek manufacturing only
equal to 43.1-48% of the corresponding one for the industrialised
Western European countries (op. cit., pp. 13-4).
Table 1-4: Gross fixed capital formation as a % of GDP in W. Europe
country 1 period 1928-1938 1950-1970
France 11.8 15.6
F.R.G. 9.7 17.7
Italy 13.6 14.8
U.K. 5.7 12.9
Austria 6.1 18.3
Denmark 8.9 15.5
Norway 12.4 23.7
Sweden 10.5 16.4
W. Europe 9.6 16.8
Source: Boltho, 1982, p. 11.
Table 1-5: Labour productivity (GDP per employee) in W. Europe.
(Annual percentage changes)
country 1 period 1953-5 1953-61 1961-73 1973-9 1980-6 1986-9
France	 4.3	 5.0	 4.6	 2.8	 2.4	 2.2
F.R.G.	 5.2	 5.2	 4.5	 3.2	 2.0	 1.6
Italy	 4.6	 5.5	 5.6	 1.5	 1.2	 1.7
U.K.	 2.2	 2.0	 2.9	 1.2	 1.9	 2.4
Spain	 5.0	 4.0	 6.0	 4.2	 3.2	 3.4
Austria	 4.8	 5.5	 5.1	 2.9	 2.2	 1.4
Belgium 3.3 2.8 4.1 2.3 2.4 1.9
Denmark 2.8 3.2 3.1 1.3 1.7 0.2
Finland 4.2 4.8 4.4 2.5 2.0 3.4
Ireland 3.5 3.4 4.3 2.2 0.5 2.7
Netherlands 3.4 3.1 4.2 2.3 1.8 1.3
Norway 2.8 3.1 2.9 2.2 2.4 0.0
Sweden 2.6 3.0 3.2 0.6 1.4 1.8
Switzerland 2.6 3.1 2.9 0.9 1.6 1.0
OECD (Europe) 3.8 4.1 4.3 2.3 1.4 1.4
Source: OECD, Economic Outlook, (various issues).
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Two very interesting aspects relative to the Greek economy (its
secondary sector in particular) have to do with the structure and the
investment rates of the Greek manufacturing sector. As far as its
structure is concerned, the postwar period, until the mid-1970s, is
marked by the increasing importance of the capital-intensive industrial
sectors relatively to the labour-intensive ones, as far as the
formation of industry's GDP is concerned (table 1-6 ). This was very
encouraging and, to a certain extent, expected for an industrialising
country, since it proves the gradual abandonment of the traditional
production methods and the adoption of modern capital-intensive ones.
Table 1-6: Percentage composition of manufacturing GDP in Greece
by branch (1948-1973) in constant 1954 prices.
Branch	 n Year 1948 1952 1955 1958 1960 1965 1970 1973
A. Food, beverages,
tobacco
	
25.3 22.9 23.3 23.7 21.2 20.8 18.9 16.4
B. Textiles
	
17.5 18.1 16.0 15.2 13.6 14.1 14.5 16.3
C. Footwear and clothing	 19.7 18.6 19.6 15.4 14.3 14.2 9.0 8.7
D. Wood products	 8.0 7.7 7.6 7.8 7.4 6.9 6.3 6.6
E. Paper products	 2.8 3.4 3.9 4.5 5.4 5.8 5.2 4.1
F. Chemicals
	
10.8 11.8 11.2 10.8 13.6 12.1 11.2 12.5
G. Non-metallic minerals	 3.6 3.8 5.2 5.6 5.4 6.1 8.5 6.4
H. Basic metal industry	 0.6 1.1 1.6 1.8 2.0 2.2 7.2 6.9
I. Metal manuf. Engineer &
Electrical Equipment	 9.4 8.7 9.5 10.1 11.4 12.6 12.7 14.0
J. Transport equipment 	 - 1.0 2.2 2.6 3.0 3.0 3.9 5.6
K. Miscallaneous	 2.3 2.9 2.6 2.5 2.7 2.2 2.6 2.7
Total	 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Sources: a) Koutsoumaris, 1963, p. 43.
b) Tsoukalis, 1981, p. 36.
c) Own calculations.
This optimistic conclusion though, on the progress of
industrialisation in Greece is put into question because of an observed
fall of gross investment in manufacturing at a time when any hypothesis
of de-industrialisation would be highly premature, both as a percentage
of GNP (4.97% in 1950, 3.89% in 1970) as well as a percentage of total
gross investment (22.72% in 1950, 17.58% in 1970) (Bank of Greece,
1980, pp. 158-159). This feature differentiates Greece from the other
Western European countries where investment in manufacturing was
continuously increasing in that period and, at the same time is a very
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negative indication for a developing country.
The second, but equally important characteristic of the postwar
period was the impressive increase of the Western European countries
exports. Besides the favorable environment for the expansion of
international trade, determined by the monetary stability (Bretton
Woods system) and the liberalisation of trade (GATT, EC, EFTA), this
was mainly due to purely economic factors (although one could say that
the reverse causation was true). The Western European countries
achieved high competitiveness through increases in productivity, fixed
exchange rates vis-a-vis the U.S dollar or even a combination of these
two factors. This high competitiveness facilitated the expansion of
exports and the emergence of balance of payments surpluses. This fact
initiated high profit expectations for the producers and, consequently,
further investment, productivity and GDP increases (Beckerman W., 1962,
and Boltho, 1982, pp. 17-18 and 32-33). In table 1-7, we can see the
trend in the balance of payments of the Western European countries.
Table 1-7: The W. European balance of payments (average annual sums in
billions of $ U.S. - constant prices).
1950-4 1955-9 1960-4 1965-9 1970-3
Balance of current account 1.4 1.8 -0.3 2.0 4.3
Changes in reserves 1.3 1.1 2.4 0.3 12.7
U.S. balance of current ac-
count with W. Eur. countries -1.0 -1.0 0.9 -0.2 -2.2
Source: Boltho A. (editor), 1982, p. 18.
The main characteristics of the Greek balance of payments in that
period were the permanent balance of current account deficit and the
very slow rate of increase of the reserves, at least relatively to the
other Western European countries. The deficit in the balance of current
account was mainly caused by the structural trade deficit (receipts
from exports as a percentage of payments for imports fluctuated from
25% to 40%) which was by far higher than the surplus in the balance of
invisibles (Bank of Greece, 1980, p. 184). The trade deficit emerged in
spite of the tariff protection of the Greek economy and increased
because of the gradual opening of the Greek economy.
The third (and main) characteristic of the postwar period was the
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development of a new framework on the European as well as the
international level which influenced the economies of all countries
involved. In Western Europe in particular, the creation of the E.C. and
E.F.T.A. had an additional effect, besides the liberalisation of trade
and the integration of the economies of their members,: It gave a
formal character to the postwar division of labour in Western Europe
where two distinct groups of countries emerged. The group of the
industrialised developed ones (where the six founding E.C. members and
most of the EFTA countries could be included, taking into account
existing differences between them), and a second one comprising the
industrialising less developed countries which included countries such
as Greece, Spain and Portugal. One of the basic differences between
these groups was that the former included countries where labour
shortages were already appearing, while the latter included labour
abundant ones (Kindleberger, 1967).
2. The Negative Evolutions. 
The slowdown of the growth rates in Western Europe after 1973 was
sharp and generalised for all the countries. The GDP growth rate fell
to 2.5% for the period 1973-1979 from a 5% in the period 1968-1973
(Boltho, 1982, p. 20). It sped up though after 1982 (table I-1). This
slowdown was accompanied by high inflation rates which, for the first
time, coexisted with high unemployment. This economic recession was, at
the beginning, considered temporary, as was the rapid growth it
followed. Soon enough, though, it became obvious that this was a
structural and, therefore, persistent recession which could not be
tackled by conventional policy measures. In fact, it was a recession of
the postwar capitalist development model in total.
There have been many theoretical approaches on the causes of the
rapid economic growth in the 1950s and the 1960s and the recession of
the 1970s. One of them, better known as the Kaldorian theory of growth
stresses the role of manufacturing. According to that, industry
functioned, until the recession, as the "engine of growth" pulling the
economies of the developed countries to high growth rates (Kaldor,
1966, 1975 and Cornwall, 1976). The causes of the economic stagnation,
therefore, could be searched in terms of industry's inability to
continue acting as the "engine of growth".
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Table 1-8: The evolution of investment (a) in the EC countries (in %)
Country \ period 1965-9 1970-3 1974-9 1980-6 1987-9
France 23.3 24.3 22.5 20.9 21.0
W. Germany 23.6 24.4 21.2 20.8 20.7
Italy 23.8 23.3 20.0 16.9 22.3
U.K. 20.3 20.3 18.8 20.5 21.9
Belgium 23.9 22.3 21.9 18.1 17.9
Denmark 24.5 26.1 22.8 17.3 18.9
Netherlands 25.2 24.3 20.8 19.5 21.6
Spain 22.6 23.0 21.9 10.6 22.2
Greece 26.8 29.4 22.9 20.7 17.2
(a) Gross fixed capital formation as a % of GDP in constant
	
prices
Sources: a) Bank of Greece, 1982.
b) Boltho, 1982, p. 23.
c) OECD, country surveys, various issues.
d) Own calculations.
According to the view taken above, the recession of the 1970s and
the 1980s could be characterised as a recession of the manufacturing
sector. The economic indicators related to manufacturing were moving in
the opposite direction to that followed in the 1950s and the 1960s.
Productivity in most European countries fell by 1.7-2.2 percentage
points per year relatively to the period 1961-1973 (Boltho, 1982, p.
21). This fall of productivity could be primarily explained in terms of
the drop of economic activity in general, provided that the cause to
effect relation is valid in this case. It is true though, that the fall
of productivity in the E.C. countries seems to go hand by hand with the
drop in investment ratios (table 1-8).
The competitiveness of the European goods fell, relatively to that
of their main competitors (U.S.A. and Japan) (op. cit.,pp. 60-63) as a
result of the drops in productivity and the continuous rising trend of
the prices. Consequently exports dropped and balance of trade deficits
appeared; things deteriorated due to the quadrupling of the price of
oil which the European countries had to import. These deficits coupled
with the uncertainty following the breakdown of the Bretton Woods
system undermined producers expectations, causing a further fall in
economic activity.
The recession hit the Greek economy severely; the analysis carried
out for the other European countries could be extended to Greece
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(stressing the fact that the performance of most of its macroeconomic
indicators was much worse) had Greece been at a similar level of
development. The fact that Greece was lagging behind, though, explains,
to a certain extent, the intensity of the recession in its case. After
1973 Greece witnessed low growth rates,drops in productivity and
investment, increases of the balance of trade deficits and very high
inflation rates (relatively to the 1960-1973 period).
Besides the description of the characteristics of the recession,
what really matters are its causes. The answers to this question, are
entirely different for Greece and the other European countries.
The recession in the industrialised Western European countries was
caused by the inability of the manufacturing sector for further
expansion, at least by the early postwar standards (although one could
say that a feedback relationship existed between these two variables)
(Negreponti-Delivani, 1986). Economic development in these countries
was based on industry's ability to expand by absorbing cheap labour
either from the other sectors of the economy, or other countries.
Following a Kaldorian line of argument, one could explain this
absorbtivenessinability for further
countries had reached the
an increasing
secondary one,
to increase at
on the ground that the European
stage of "economic maturity" characterised by
importance of the tertiary sector at the cost of the
since the demand for manufacturing products had ceased
the rates of the 1950s and the 1960s (op. cit.). One
could add other explanations, such as the one related to the falling
rate of profits caused by the increasing power of trade unions, and the
one stressing the role of economic policies as far as forming
favourable expectations are concerned (for a review of these
alternative explanations to postwar European growth and recession (see
Boltho, 1982, pp. 9-37).
This conclusion though, cannot be applied to the case of Greece,
since the Greek industry never really progressed like the Western
European ones. We cannot speak of "maturity" of the Greek industry, in
spite of the fact that the tertiary sector in Greece is increasing in
importance, since industralisation was not completed. The recession of
the Greek economy can be explained to a very large extent, in terms of
its distorted and old-fashioned structure and its dependence on the
developed countries. This dependence, besides its negative impact on
economic development, functioned as a mechanism of transmission of the
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recession in the mid-1970s.
B. THE DEADLOCK.
In the previous part of this chapter a sketch of the postwar growth
was attempted, both for Greece and the E.C. countries. As far as
migration is concerned the analysis will have to focus on the supply of
labour relatively to the ability of these economies to absorb labour.
The emergence of labour shortages and surpluses, especially when they
seem permanent in the medium-run is a disequilibrium factor and a
deadlock for any economy.
In the two following paragraphs this deadlock will be analysed for
Greece as well as the E.C. countries.
1, The Greek Economy. 
One of the basic characteristics of the Greek economy, in the
postwar period, is the high population increase (the average annual
rate of increase was 1% in the period 1951-1961), while the increase of
the labour force is even more impressive (1.2% per year in the same
period), (Hatzoglou, 1963). This increase was by far higher than that
for the E.C. countries (table I-10).
Unemployment rates in Greece in the 1950s and the 1960s were
3.9-5.9% (Babanasis, 1985); these rates were higher than the ones in
the E.C. countries, but one must keep in mind that the official
unemployment data in. Greece were not comparable to those for other
European countries for two main reasons: The first one has to do with
the way unemployment was estimated in Greece (in fact, the estimation
method only changed in 1981; until 1981 only those eligible for
unemployment benefits were included); the second has to do with the
fact that the data on unemployment did not take into account
underemployment in the agricultural sector. Given that this rate of
underemployment was around 25% in that period (Hatzoglou, 1963), it is
obvious that Greece bad massive labour reserves for which productive
employment had to be found.
Not all Greek economists seem to agree with this point of view
though. In fact Pepelasis and Yotopoulos (1962) believe that the
surplus of labour in Greek agriculture was exhausted by 1953 and ever
since there has been a shortage of labour in Greek agriculture,
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particularly obvious in the crop seasons. This point of view, of
course, has been subject to a lot of criticism and, generally speaking,
it is believed that a very large part of the agricultural labour force
(around 60% on aggregate for the period 1972-1981) (Vergopoulos, 1975
p. 20), could have left agriculture without any substantial loss in
terms of aggregate agricultural product (Kindleberger, 1965, pp.
243-4).
As in the other countries in the same period, this surplus of labour
was expected to be absorbed by the expanding manufacturing sector.
These expectations though, were not fulfilled in the case of Greece. In
the period 1960-1970 the manufacturing product increased by 10.2%, but
employment in manufacturing only increased by 1.1% (Tsoukalis, 1981,
pp. 29-31). In addition (and that is the negative indication), the
absorbtiveness of labour of Greek manufacturing,in the postwar period,
showed a negative trend (Koutsoumaris, 1963, p. 68). It is indicative
that, while 82% of those employed in the secondary sector were employed
in manufacturing, by 1981 this percentage had fallen to 66%
(Fotopoulos, 1985, pp. 118-9). The expansion of the Greek secondary
sector in the postwar period, both in terms of production and
employment was to a great extent due to the expansion of constructions.
In table 1-9 (Appendix) we can see the trends in production and
employment in the various sectors and branches of the Greek economy for
the period 1951-1981. The fact that employment in manufacture increased
very slowly relatively to the product of this sector, proves that the
labour absorbtiveness of Greek manufacturing was by all standards
extremely low.
A full analysis of the reasons for this failure of Greek manufacture
to absorb the surplus of labour is beyond the limits of this thesis
since it requires a full analysis of the postwar development model of
the Greek economy. One should attempt, therefore, to approach this
subject briefly.
A plausible explanation for this low absorbtiveness could be the
postwar shift to capital intensive productive units (table I-6). In
fact, such a turn minimises industry's labour absorbtiveness in the
short-run. In the particular case of Greece though, this explanation is
oversimplified, since it does not take into account the nature and the
causes of this shift.
Industry's failure to absorb labour can be explained in terms of the
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dependent character of industrialisation and the structure of
consumption (Fotopoulos, 1985, p. 124). As far as the structure of
consumption is concerned, it seems that the highly uneven income
distribution does not only limit the size of the internal market and
therefore the potential of industrial development oriented to this
market (Negreponti-Delivani, 1983), but in addition, determines the
methods of production (labour or capital intensive) and, therefore, the
size of employment itself (Fotopoulos, 1985). If high-income consumers,
imitating foreign consumption standards, demand luxury products
produced by capital-intensive methods, these goods will either have to
be imported, or domestically produced. A large part of this demand is
satisfied by imports, but at the same time, domestic production tends
to adjust to their requirements because of their high purchasing power.
The intensity of these trends depends on the size of inequalities of
income distribution and in particular on the ratio income of
self-employed/ income of wage earners which is determined by the
structure of employment.
We could, therefore, conclude that the analysis of the structure of
consumption in Greece could help a lot in explaining the structure of
Greek industry and, therefore, its ability to absorb labour; it could
also contribute in explaining the structural trade deficit of Greece.
In conclusion, it could be argued that in the postwar period the
Greek economy was faced with a deadlock consisting of an expanding
labour surplus and the inability of its industry to absorb it.
2. The E.C. Countries. 
In the 1950s and the 1960s Western Europe witnessed an impressive
economic prosperity in terms of GDP growth, which increased the demand
for labour; as a result those unemployed and underemployed were soon
absorbed. The minimisation of unemployment is the distinguishing
feature of the period 1955-1973, with unemployment rates ' ranging
between 1% and 3% of the labour force in most Western European
countries for most of the period (Boltho, 1982, p. 173). By historical
standards this was unprecedented (ICindleberger, 1967); for the first
time not only civil unemployment almost vanished, but underemployment
in agriculture and other low productivity sectors fell considerably.
The effects of full employment were pressures for wage increases and a
redistribution of income from capital to labour (Maddison, 1977,
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p.116).
In table I-10 the trends of GDP, gross investment, labour force and
labour productivity are shown for the periods 1954-1959 and 1959-1963.
The data in this table indicate that GDP growth and increases of the
labour force went hand by hand in all Western European countries except
Italy (the hidden economy in that country being the most plausible
explanation).
Even though the basic characteristics of the labour markets in
Western Europe are more or less the same, the period of economic
prosperity could be divided into two subperiods; the first one lasts
until the mid-1950s and its main characteristic is that most countries
still have labour reserves which increase (in some of them, at least)
by the inflow of refugees from Eastern Europe. The second one lasts
until the late 1960s and is characterised by a rapid economic growth
causing an increased demand for labour (especially in manufacturing and
constructions). The additional domestic supply of labour (especially of
young workers) was extremely limited in that period because of the low
fertility rates during the war (Boltho, 1982, pp. 160-5).
Table I-10: Changes in GDP, labour force, labour productivity, and
gross investment ratio in the E.C. countries.
GDP
	
Labour force
	 Productivity	 Investment (1)
1954-9 1959-63 1954-9 1959-63 1954-9 1959-63 1954-9 1959-63
6.9 5.4 1.6 0.8 5.7 4.6 21.7 23.9
5.7 6.2 1.1 0.1 4.8 6.1 23.0 26.1
3.7 5.2 1.2 1.4 3.6 3.7 24.0 26.1
4.6 5.8 0.1 0.7 4.3 5.1 20.2 21.7
2.0 3.8 0.3 0.5 2.7 3.3 18.0 19.1
2.0 2.6 0.6 0.9 1.8 1.7 16.7 19.3
1) Gross fixed capital formation as a % of GDP
Source: Kindleberger, 1967.
In table I-11 we can see that since the mid-1950's and until the
late 1960s, the natural increase of the civilian labour force
contributed very little to the increase of dependent employment in
manufacturing and services in the E.C. countries. The labour force
required to close this gap between supply and demand had to come from
countries or regions where it was abundant.
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Increase of dependent civil
employment (1)
contribution of: (2).
civil labour force.
unemployed
immigrants
internal immigrants from
agriculture
self-employed
During the reconstruction period (1945-1955), various factors
(mainly political) affected the European labour market,namely the
inflow of refugees. The inflow of refugees from Eastern Germany
increased FRG's labour force by seven million (Kindleberger, 1967, p.
28). Equally important, although smaller in size, was the inflow of
500,000 Poles in France and Belgium (UNECE, 1968). During that period,
the domestic natural increase of the population was marginal in all the
E.C. countries except Italy (table 1-12). The relatively high rate of
West Germany is due to the inflow of immigrants.
The demographic stagnation was obvious in many European countries.
One may derive from table 1-12 that the impressive increase of
employment in the E.C. is due to West Germany where, the supply of
labour seemed to match demand. In West Germany and the U.K., increases
in employment led to increases in the participation rates while in
Italy, exactly the opposite was the case, since employment increased at
lower rates than population (Kindleberger, 1967).
Table I-11: The contribution of the various sources of labour supply to
the civil dependent employment in the E.C. (in %)
1955-60 1960-5 1965-70 1970-5
1.70 1.70 0.80 0.40
0.20 0.08 -0.16 0.19
0.57 -0.04 -0.07 -0.48
0.33 0.52 0.29 0.20
0.64 1.02 0.72 0.41
-0.64 0.12 0.02 0.10
(1) Average annual increase
(2) In percentage points
Source: Boltho, 1982.
These facts lead to the conclusion that, in the first postwar years,
the Western European labour market seemed to provide the framework for
a constant economic growth with low inflation.
In the period 1955-1965 the demand for labour increased in all the
E.C. countries and, at the same time, the weekly hours of work were
reduced. Employment in that period was increasing at an annual rate of
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France EC(6)F.R.G. Italy	 U.K.
Population in working
age brackets	 0.9	 0.6	 0.6
	 0.4	 0.6
Labour force	 0.4	 0.5	 -0.1	 0.5	 0.4
Total employment	 0.4	 0.9	 0.3	 0.5	 0.6
Agricultural employment	 -3.7	 -4.0	 -3.5	 -2.3	 -3.5
Independent civil employment 	 -1.0	 -0.4	 0.6	 -0.4	 -0.2
Dependent civil employment	 2.0	 2.1	 2.6	 0.7	 1.7 .
1.5% for manufacturing and 2% for services while, at the same time,
unemployment fell to very low rates (Boltho, 1982). This excess demand
for labour was partly satisfied by the natural increase of the
population. Demographic growth in that period was by far higher than
the one in the previous decade (table 1-13).
Table 1-12: Labour force and employment in the E.C. (1950-55).
(average annual percentage changes)
France W.GermanyItaly U.K. E.C.(6)
Population in working
age brackets	 1.4	 1.0	 0.1	 0.6
In particular:
15-24 years old	 -1.0	 2.2	 -	 0.3
25-54 years old	 0.2	 0.6	 1.1	 -0.2
55-64 years old	 0.1	 1.8	 0.5	 0.8	 0.8
Total employment	 0.1	 2.7	 0.4	 0.9	 1.0
Source: OECD, Labour force statistics, (various issues).
In France, the increase of young employees was impressive (the end
of the colonial wars could be an explanation); in West Germany, on the
other hand, in spite of the inflow of refugees, the percentage of young
employees in the labour force fell.
Table 1-13 Labour force and employment increases in the E.C.(6)
(1955-1965) (average annual percentage changes).
Source: OECD, Labour force statistics, (various issues).
The continuous increase of the labour force was by no means enough
to meet the demand for labour in the civil sectors of the economy
hadn't it been accompanied by internal (intersectoral) migration. The
exodus of rural population doubled in the period 1960-1970 (Cipolla,
1976, pp. 364-6). The continuous expansion of industry and the
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consequent absorption of labour from agriculture, reduced
underemployment in the agricultural sector (Clough and Rapp, 1980, pp.
621-5).
The rural exodus could have been even more impressive had the
national agricultural policies and the E.C.'s CAP (after 1958) not
supported the farmers income. This support prevented many "marginal
farmers" from leaving agriculture and seeking employment in the two
other sectors of the economy.
The evolutions in West Germany, in particular, are of great interest
since (as we will see) this country absorbed the greatest part of the
Greek emigrants. From diagram I-1 one can derive the relation between
GDP and labour supply increases. Many factors contributed to the rapid
postwar growth of this country such as its monetary policy, the
Marshall plan funds, its fiscal policy, the extensive accumulation of
capital, the competitiveness of its products and its public investment
(Boltho, 1982, pp. 528-544 and Krengel, 1963).
These factors supported aggregate demand and consequently GDP
growth. GDP growth though, was also facilitated by the elastic labour
supply which kept wages at low levels, preserving, therefore, high
profit and investment rates and, consequently further increases in
aggregate demand and GDP.
The sources of labour supply in FRG can be seen in table 1-14; in
the early 1950s, the natural population increase, the unemployed and
the refugees were the main sources. Immigration appeared at low rates
until 1960 and proceeded extremely rapidly ever since and until the
recession. Already, by 1961 immigration was the main source of labour
supply; this fact had many repercussions for the German economy. The
main advantage of recruiting immigrants instead of refugees was that
the number of immigrants was controllable and could function as a means
of economic policy. In the face of labour shortages the German
government in cooperation with the German employers proceeded to the
recruitment of immigrants.
In table 1-15 we can see the labour shortages in the W. German
manufacturing sector in spite of the massive inflow of immigrants.
The economic recession after 1973 in the E.C. countries was
manifested by a sharp deceleration of economic growth. The inability
for further expansion of the traditional manufacturing sector which, as
we have seen, could be seen as one of the main causes of the recession,
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influenced the labour markets of the E.C. countries as well. After the
impressive increase of the period 1955-1965, employment was stabilised
in the period 1965-1973 and started to fall constantly, after 1973, in
spite of the considerable reduction of weekly working hours. Only
dependent employment continued to increase, although at much lower
rates. It is quite impressive that in the period 1973-1979, when
employment was constantly falling, the supply of labour was increasing
faster than ever before. As a result, unemployment rose dramatically
and by the late 1970s it had reached unprecedented, by postwar
standards, levels.
The case of West Germany is particularly interesting. The fact that
this country's supply of labour fell in the late 1970s can only be
explained in terms of the reversal of the migratory flow. This country,
therefore, appears to be the only one to have a labour supply fastly
adjusting to demand for labour conditions.
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Table 1-14: Sources of labour supply in West Germany (1951-1964).
(Average annual changes in 000s)
1951 1955 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964
Natural population increase +255+375 -35	 -46	 -90	 -52	 -28
Unemployment reserves +148+293+241 +90 +26 -31	 +14
Refugees +127+161 +56+125+116 +49	 +2
Foreign workers -	 +8+112+196+154+144+128
Statistical difference -7	 -2	 +53 -21	 -14	 -13	 +5
Employed workers +523+835+427+344+192 +97+121
Self-employed -89	 -37 -109	 -55 -131 -153 -100
Total employment 612 +872+536+399+323+250+221
Source: Kindleberger, 1967, p. 31.
Table 1-15: Labour shortages in the W. German manufacturing.
Month/year
% of industrial firms
declaring production
foregone due to labour
shortages
% of industrial firms
Month/year	 declaring production
foregone due to labour
shortages
10/1954 10 10/1959 50
7/1955 24 4/1960 56
10/1955 26 7/1960 62
4/1956 21 10/1960 54
7/1956 20 4/1961 50
10/1956 18 7/1961 52
4/1957 15 10/1961 58
7/1957 20 4/1962 51
10/1957 34 7/1962 54
4/1958 9 10/1962 48
7/1958 13 4/1963 38
10/1958 13 7/1963 46
4/1959 18 10/1963 48
7/1959 42 4/1963 53
Source: Frobel et al, 1980.
In the period 1967-1968, unemployment in West Germany rose as a
result of a short economic recession. Things deteriorated after 1973
when the number of unemployed reached 1,350,990 people (5.9%
unemployment rate); 149,914 of them were immigrants (immigrants
unemployment rate 7.7%) (Hatzipanayotou, 1977, p. 60).
3. Conclusion. 
The general conclusion of the first two sections of this chapter
could be that labour movements from Greece to the E.C. countries in the
postwar period were the effect of the pattern and the progress of
economic development for each country separately.
Table 1-16: Labour force and employment growth in the E.C., 1973-1979.
(average annual percentage changes)
France GermanyItaly U.K. EC(9)
Population in working
age brackets 0.7 0.3 0.8 0.3 0.6
Labour force 0.8 -0.3 1.2 0.5 0.6
Total employment 0.3 -0.8 1.0 0.1 0.1
Agricultural employment -3.6 -3.7 -2.4 -2.0 -2.9
Independent civil employment -0.2 -1.3 1.2 -0.5 -
Dependent civil employment 0.8 -0.4 1.9 0.2 0.5
Source: OECD, Labour force statistics, 1968-1979.
As far as Greece is concerned in particular, it has been shown that
the pattern of its postwar development could not guarantee full
employment through an absorption of the labour force domestically. A
strategy for economic development focusing on the achievement of full
employment might have altered this conclusion (Papandreou, 1962), but
such a strategy was never adopted. Some economists claim that
emigration simply proves the failure of the emigration countries to
keep their labour force and employ it domestically (Hoffman-Nowotny
H.,1979, pp. 86-90) or, in other words that emigrants vote with their
feet by leaving their country of origin (Tsoukalis, 1981).
As far as the E.C. countries are concerned, given their level of
aggregate demand, one could conclude that their postwar development was
based, to a great extent, on the availability of labour which was
ensured by the inflow of foreign workers. Labour shortages could have
thrown the development process into reverse; the "import" of . labour
therefore, was necessary since the domestic "reserves" had already been
exhausted.
People do not emigrate simply because there are labour shortages and
surpluses in different countries. The factors determining the departure
of an emigrant from his home country have to be combined with those
determining the demand for labour in the immigration ones (Nikolinakos,
1974, p. 7). In addition, emigration is directly connected to the
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relations between the two groups of countries. Given the high
dependence of the Greek economy and the special relations this
dependence implies, one could say that the necessary (by country)
combination of factors causing migration had been achieved.
Studying the causes of emigration from Greece is in essence the same
thing as studying the underdevelopment and the dependence of the Greek
economy in total. Migration functioned as a way-out mechanism given the
deadlocks for Greece as well as the E.C. countries. Irrespectively of
whether these deadlocks could have worked out in a different way, the
evaluation of migration as an alternative should logically follow the
analysis of its effects. One should mention though, that exporting
labour as a means of reducing unemployment and underemployment has the
advantage of immediate effectiveness. Since the deadlock had already
emerged, emigration followed as the natural consequence.
C. THE EVOLUTION OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY AND INCOME IN
GREECE AND THE E.C.
It has already been mentioned in a previous section that migration can
possibly occur as a result of differences in economic activity between
two countries. It really seems rather reasonable to expect labour to
move from a country witnessing low economic activity rates to another
witnessing higher ones.
This analysis, of course, is based on several assumptions in the
absence of which the aforementioned conclusion may be false. These
assumptions could be summarised as follows: The country witnessing the
higher growth rate does not have, at the same time, surplus labour
which cannot be absorbed, at least in the medium run because, otherwise
immigration is very unlikely to occur before the surplus labour is
absorbed. Initial (before the emergence of differences in economic
activity) lack of emigration is assumed as well. Another assumption has
to do with the very nature of economic growth, and particularly, with
faster growth causing a higher increase in employment.
In the previous section it was stressed that these two conditions
did not apply in the case of the Greek economy relatively to those of
the E.C. countries. One could therefore, conclude from the beginning
that, in the case of emigration from Greece to the E.C. countries, the
relatively higher GDP growth rates Greece achieved, narrowed the
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GDP/per head gap between it and other E.C. countries but, did not
necessarily imply higher employment increases potential.
The evolution of a country's GDP though, is not only related to
employment increases. The continuous increase of GDP of a country could
be interpreted as a sign that the welfare for this country's residents
is improved through an increase of their incomes, especially when GDP
increases faster than the population, despite the fact that one could
argue that using the GDP per head as an indicator of welfare is subject
to various caveats; As far as migration is concerned though, it is not
at all certain that an increase of per capita income will reduce the
expatriation trend, especially if this increase worsens income
distribution for the potential emigrants. Such increases in per capita
income may leave potential emigrants indifferent or even worse off. It
is very possible, therefore, that the national income is unevenly
distributed to such an extent that any increase of it does not imply a
higher income for the low income residents of the country, where
emigration is mainly recruited from, after all.
The Greek economy in the postwar period represents an extreme case
of uneven income distribution, deteriorating almost constantly
althrough the period for the lower income groups as shown by the
evolution of indicators such as the Lorenz curve and the Gini
coefficient (Negreponti-Delivani, 1981, pp. 162-70).
Having limited the analysis to the way GDP growth and movements of
labour between two countries are related, the next step will be to
examine the postwar GDP trend for Greece as well as the E.C. countries.
The GDP of Greece reached its prewar level as late as 1951 (Psilos
and Westebbe, 1964, pp. 3-5); ever since and until the recession
Greece's growth rate has been very high and in particular the highest
among the OECD countries after Japan (Tsoukalis, 1981, p. 27). In table
1-17 the growth rates of GDP in total, per capita and by sector is
shown for Greece,Spain, Portugal and the E.C.(6) for the period
1960-1973.
Several points can be derived from table 1-17: the growth rate in
Greece in the 1960-1973 period was higher than the corresponding one
for the E.C. countries (almost double), as well as the one for
countries at a similar level of development with Greece like Spain and
Portugal. The same could be said as far as per capita GDP is concerned.
This high GDP growth in Greece seems to be the effect of the impressive
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increases of the manufacturing product which, contrary to the case of
Spain and Portugal, shows a constant increasing trend, while at the
same time, the agricultural product increases at diminishing rates.
This could be considered absolutely natural for a developing country
(especially if it starts from a very low point) although the growth
rates are very high even at developing countries' standards.
Greece continued to have higher growth rates than Spain, Portugal
and the E.C. countries in the period 1973-1979 After the second oil
shock though, Greece had to adopt restrictive economic policies and,
consequently, growth rates fell to very low levels. This stagnation
continues more or less until today although most of the other Western
European countries seem to recover modestly since 1983 (table I-18).
In particular, as far as growth rates in Greece and West Germany are
concerned from table 1-19 (Appendix) we can derive the following:
-During the 1950s, GDP was increasing at very high rates in both
countries and in fact the German rate is higher for some years (the
last year this happened was 1962).
-In the 1960s and until 1973 (1968 being the only exception), the
growth rates in Greece are much higher than the West German ones.
-In the period 1966-1967 West Germany witnessed a short recession
expressed by a very low growth rate for 1966 and a negative one for
1967. It recovered in 1968 though.
-In the period 1973-1979 growth slows down for both countries, although
the deceleration for Germany is more pronounced.
-Finally for the 1980-1989 period the deceleration continues and gets
more obvious for Greece.
The fact that Greece's rate of growth was higher than FRG's (at
least until 1979) does not imply a superiority of the Greek economy,
since it starts from a lower point in terms of development level. In
addition, this catching-up of Greece's per capita GDP with the German
one was not accompanied by a convergence in terms of economic
structure. The German economy in the postwar period represenied the
model economy for Western Europe; the Greek one on the other hand,
managed to solve very few (if any) of its structural problems (to
which in fact some new ones were added) and, generally speaking, failed
to qualify for the group of the industrially developed nations in spite
of it's rapid economic growth.
It is true though, that during the 1960s the agricultural income in
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Greece was lagging far behind the corresponding one for the E.C.
countries (table 1-20). This is a very interesting observation since
most Greek emigrants were employed in agriculture before emigrating and
ended up as employed in the civil sectors after doing so.
Table 1-17: Average annual GDP growth rates for Greece, Portugal, Spain
and the E.C.(6) (1960-1973).
1960-65 1965-70 1970-73
Greece
GDP (per capita) 7.3 6.7 7.2
GDP total 7.9 7.3 7.8
Manufacturing GDP 9.1 10.0 12.1
Agricultural GDP
	 6.4 2.4 1.9
Portugal
GDP (per capita) 5.7 6.6 8.9
GDP total 6.3 6.2 8.6
Manufacturing GDP 9.1 8.3 11.5
Agricultural GDP	 2.2 1.3 0.0
5_p_ain
GDP (per capita) 7.5 5.3 6.0
GDP total 8.6 6.4 7.2
Manufacturing GDP12.1 7.8 11.0
Agricultural GDP
	 2.9 3.5 3.8
E.C.(6)
GDP (per capita) 3.8 4.0 3.8
GDP total 4.8 4.7 4.5
Sources: a) OECD, Main Economic Indicators, (various issues).
b) Scammel, 1985, pp. 52-55.
c) Seers and Vaitsos, 1982.
Table 1-18: GDP growth rates in selected W.European countries.
(1973-79 and 1980-89)
Country X period 1973-1979 1980-1989
Belgium 2.3 1.8
Denmark 1.7 1.8
France 3.0 2.0
W. Germany 1.9 1.8
Italy 2.1 2.8
Luxemburg 0.7 2.7
Netherlands 2.6 1.7
U.K. 1.1 1.6
Greece 3.6 1.4
Portugal 2.2 2.7
Spain 3.0 2.8
Source: OECD, country surveys, (various issues).
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The improvement in their income can therefore be shown indirectly
since:	 Ycf > Yaf > Yah
where: Ycf: Income in the civil sectors in the foreignland
Yaf: Income in agriculture in the foreign land
Yah: Income in agriculture in the homeland
Table I-20:The agricultural income in Greece and the E.C. countries in
1962. (Greece = 100)
Country Income index Country Income index
Greece 100 Netherlands 440
Italy 160 Belgium 390
France 242 Denmark 260
F.R.G. 210 Ireland 155
U.K. 294 Luxemburg 263
Sources: a) Eurostat, Annuaire de statistiques agricole, 1964.
b) Triantis, 1965.
D. THE EVOLUTIONS IN THE LABOUR MARKETS OF GREECE
AND THE E.C. COUNTRIES.
1. Unemployment and Job Vacancies. 
As already mentioned, the unemployment rate in Greece was higher
than in the E.C. countries in the 1950s and the 1960s in spite of the
fact that (the extremely high, in the case of Greece) underemployment
was not included in that rate. The evolution of unemployment, and its
rate of increase for the postwar period are shown in table 1-21.
From table 1-21 (Appendix) it can be derived that during the 1950s
the number of unemployed was fluctuating; since 1956 though, it started
to increase continuously. In the period between 1962 and the appearance
of the recession the unemployment rate was falling but this trend was
reversed after 1975. These trends could be explained, to a great
extent, by the trends of emigration and repatriation as well as the
structural inability of the Greek economy to absorb labour.
The unemployed in Greece can be distributed according to their
previous employment, since those who had not been previously employed
did not appear (at least until 1981) in the official unemployment
statistics. In table 1-22 (Appendix) the unemployed are distributed by
professional group (or professional background as it is otherwise
defined) (ILO).
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From table 1-22 a very important point could be derived: In the
period 1958-1985, the greatest part of the unemployed originated in
manufacturing. In particular, craftsmen and industrial workers
constitute 60-80% of those unemployed. The unemployment rate in
industry during the 1960s was as high as 8.6% of the industrial labour
force (Nikolinakos, 1976, p.86). This rate was even higher for sectors
such as food and beverages and tobacco (46.4%) due to their particular
problems (traditional structure, inability to increase exports and
increasing competition from imported goods). This aspect seems
paradoxal at first sight for an industrialising country. It could be
explained in various ways though. A possible explanation could be the
(already mentioned) inability of the Greek industry to absorb labour. A
second one could be that the data of table 1-22 are not realistic; it
is true that it has often been argued that many of those unemployed
that had declared a previous industrial employment were candidate
emigrants who believed that by doing so, it would be easier for them to
find a job in the foreign land (Nikolinakos, 1973 and Lampos, 1979).
This seems to be a realistic explanation for the period of massive
emigration, but a very questionable one for the period after the
appearance of the recession. As a matter of fact, emigration after 1975
falls and the unemployment in manufacture could be due to repatriation.
Finally, the high unemployment rates in the traditional industrial
sectors could be explained in terms of the declining importance of
these sectors (table 1-6).
As far as the regional distribution of unemployment is concerned
there is very little to be said, at least for the first postwar
decades. It seems that Athens, Thessaloniki and the other urban centers
witness higher unemployment rates than agricultural areas (Glitsos,
1980). This is due though, to the fact that the large number of the
underemployed in the agricultural sector were not considered as
unemployed by the Greek statistics. Another explanation could' be the
massive internal migration to the urban centers where almost all the
activity of manufacturing and services was concentrated. Since the
mid-1950s the fall in internal migration and the rise of repatriation
caused high unemployment rates in the agricultural areas as well
(Negreponti-Delivani, 1986).
As far as unemployment in the E.C. countries is concerned, one could
say that, in spite of the rapid postwar growth, unemployment rates were
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high in the 1950s (8% on average in the period 1950-1955)
(Kindleberger, 1967). After 1952 though, unemployment started to
decrease and this trend accelerated in the late 1950s. As early as the
early 1960s it was already clear that unemployment in most E.C.
countries had fallen to very low levels (Boltho, 1982), (below 1% in
West Germany and Holland).
Unemployment in most Western European countries was very low all
through the period 1965-1973; since the late 1960s though, the first
signs of the forthcoming recession started to become obvious. In table
1-23 the evolution of unemployment is shown for some E.C. countries for
the period 1965-1975.
Just after the appearance of the recession, the number of the
unemployed in the E.C. countries started to increase. Besides the
fluctuations of the unemployment rates in some E.C. countries, the
overall rate for the E.C.(9) in the mid and late 1970s has been
increasing. In table 1-24 the evolution of unemployment is shown for
the E.C.(9) for the period 1974-1980.
These developments in unemployment, in spite of the relative
recovery in terms of GDP growth rates after 1976, prove the structural
character of the recession as far as the absorbtiveness of labour by
manufacture in the E.C. countries is concerned.
Unemployment had hit the "less competitive" groups of the labour
force. Youth unemployment rate was well above the average rate; In
fact, it was more than double in most E.C. countries and by 1979 it had
already reached 13% (13.3% in France, 24.6% in Italy, 11.9% in the
U.K.) (Boltho, 1982, p. 180). The same, more or less, goes for
immigrants unemployment rate which was much higher than the national
average for the E.C. countries.
The trends in the German labour market are of particular interest;
in table 1-25 (Appendix) one can see the unemployment and the job
vacancies unfilled in West Germany for the period 1954-1986.
From this table the following conclusions could be derived:
-During the 1950s unemployment in FRG was high, but rapidly decreasing.
At the same time the number of the jobs offered and therefore, the job
vacancies unfilled was increasing.
-In the period 1960-1974 (1967 and 1968 being the exception)
unemployment was kept at remarkably low levels and for every unemployed
person there were 3-5 job vacancies unfilled.
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-The 1967-1968 recession was a very short one and things had already
improved by 1969 (Hatzipanayotou, 1982, pp.37).
-The recession after 1974, on the other hand, proved to be long and
persistant.
Wages and the Weekly Hours of Work. 
According to the theory, differences in wages between two countries,
is considered one of the most important factors influencing movements
of labour; labour tends to move from low to high wage countries.
Table 1-23: Unemployment in the E.C. countries (1965-75) in %.
Country \ period 1965-1970 1970-1975
Belgium 2.3 2.3
France 1.8 1.6
F.R.G. 1.2 1.2
Italy 3.5 3.2
Netherlands 1.0 1.1
Source: Balassa, 1975, p. 194.
One needs to have a complete picture of the labour markets of Greece
and the E.C. countries before trying to examine the evolution of wages.
Such a picture could include points such as:
-In most of the E.C. countries, labour markets seemed to function in
accordance to the demand and the supply of labour (Boltho, 1982, and
Frobel et al, 1981.). In Greece, on the other hand "the minimal
bargaining power of the trade unions until 1975 (due to the post civil
war police state and the dictatorship) in addition to the high state
intervention to the wage formation, form the characteristics of an
imperfect labour market" (Mouzelis, 1979). As a result, wage increases
were lagging behind productivity increases until 1974; after 1975
though, Greece witnessed the opposite relationship between wage and
productivity increases (KEPE, 1976, p. 6).
From table 1-26 and figure 1-2 (Appendix), one can derive that real
wages in Greek manufacturing were increasing, until 1973, at a much
lower rate than in the E.C.(9), although labour productivity in Greek
manufacturing was witnessing substantial increases (German Development
Institute, 1975, pp. 52-60), while, at the same time, inflation
remained very low (Tsoukalis, 1982, p. 150).
The ratio Greek/E.C. hourly (real) wages in manufacturing varied
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from 1:2.7 to 1:3.2 during the 1960s (Maillat, 1968, pp. 10-14 and
Hatzoglou, 1969, pp. 300-304).
This ratio remained the same during the 1970s (even after 1974 when
wages increased dramatically in Greece) (Hassid, 1980, p. 302) but it
changed to a 1:2.2-1:2.6 one in the 1980s (ILO, Annual Labour
Statistics). This was mainly due to the gradual and continuous
depreciation of the drachma vis-a-vis all the European currencies after
1974 and especially vis-a-vis the dollar. Consequently, although the
hourly wages in Greek manufacturing seem to have increased faster than
in the E.C. countries since 1974 (table 1-25), this is only true in
nominal drachma values; in U.S. dollar values the hourly wages in Greek
manufacturing have remained the same. This is shown in table 1-27 where
the evolution of hourly wages in the major Greek manufacturing (the
firms employing more than 10 people) are given both in drachmas and
dollars; in addition to that one can see the relation between the Greek
and the German figures both as a ratio and a difference. From table
1-27 (Appendix) one could derive the following conclusions:
-Real wage increases in the major Greek manufacturing during the 1960s
do not exceed the corresponding German ones, although both GDP and
productivity growth in the Greek industry in that period were by far
higher than the corresponding ones for West Germany.
-The modest wage increases in West Germany for 1967 and 1968 were due
to the short recession and the consequent increase in unemployment for
this country in that period.
-Until the appearance of the recession,the ratio wages in Germany/wages
in Greece had been increasing; since 1974 it has been falling.
-Since 1981, hourly wages in Greek manufacturing have been rapidly
increasing in drachmas and falling in U.S. dollars due to the rapid
depreciation of the drachma and it's devaluation in 1982 vis-a-vis the
U.S. currency.
As far as migration is concerned, one should take into account that
the relation between these two countries' wage rate could only
indirectly influence a person's decision to emigrate since most of the
emigrants were recruited from agriculture. This relation could be of
high importance if people had to chose between being employed in Greek
or German manufacturing. The number of weekly working hours
corresponding to a certain job, in combination with the intensity of
this job and the wage rate, form the terms of employment. In
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particular, had wages been equal in two countries, people would
emigrate if the same income from wages could be acquired by fewer or
less intensive hours of work.
In table 1-28 (Appendix) the weekly hours of work for Greece and
West Germany are given for the period 1954-1987. As shown in this
table there are fluctuations in the weekly hours of work for both
countries, which could be attributed to the way they are estimated.
E. THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK OF THE POSTWAR EMIGRATION
FROM GREECE TO THE E.C. COUNTRIES.
L. Organising the Migratory Flows. 
"Organising migration in general, aims in essence at regulating the
different stages of migration in order to provide alternative
employment opportunities to those emigrating" (OECD, 1978, pp. 37-41).
This can be achieved provided that a certain amount of cooperation
between the emigration and the immigration countries exists. In the
case of Greece,
the state intervention consists of some (general in nature) policy
measures on supervising emigration and taking care of the Greeks
working abroad. The main characteristic of the Greek emigration policy
is the absence of any regulation as far as controlling the outflow of
emigrants is concerned..." (Zolotas, 1977, p. 470).
The organisation of intercontinental migration was appointed to the
Intergovernmental Commission of Migration from Europe (for the
immigration countries) and the Ministry of internal affairs (for
Greece). Such an arrangement though, did not exist for intra-European
migration and this institutional vacuum had to be covered by the
bilateral agreements on migration as well as the E.C. framework.
2. The Bilateral Agreements on Migration. 
One of the main characteristics of the intra-European postwar
migration were the direct negotiations between the emigration and the
immigration countries in order to organise the migratory flow. The main
point of these negotiations was the provision of procedural facilities
to the immigration countries so that they could recruit the necessary
number of emigrants (Nikolinakos, 1977, p. 37).
What the two countries had to do was determined by contracts with
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the form of interstate treaties. In the postwar period Greece made four
such agreements, namely with France, Belgium, West Germany and Holland.
The French-Greek migratory agreement (13/3/1954) was accompanied by
two administrative rules, attached to the agreement, on the terms of
entry of immigrants and their families in France and remittances.
(Papastamkos, 1982, P. 43). The Belgian-Greek one (12/7/1957) had to do
almost exclusively with the employment of Greeks in the coal mines of
Belgium (op.cit, p. 48).
The migratory agreement between Greece and West Germany (30/3/1960)
was revised two years later. This agreement proved to be the
institutional basis of the emigration of Greeks to West Germany. It was
exactly the same (in terms of contents) as the agreements Germany
signed with other countries such as Italy, Spain, Portugal, Turkey,
Tunisia, Maroc° and Yugoslavia in that period.
Finally the Dutch-Greek agreement (13/9/1966), was never ratified
since most of it's provisions have been already included in the
association agreement Greece signed with the E.C. (op.cit., pp. 58-59).
The main characteristics of these agreements were the following
(Zolotas, 1966, P. 6).
a) There is no ex-ante limitation to the number of Greek emigrants
immigration countries wish to import.
b) The Greek government has to collect the applications of Greeks
wishing to emigrate to that country and give them to the other
country's authorised institution.
C) The final selection of emigrants, in quantitative as well as
qualitative terms was carried out by the special recruiting agencies
these countries had established in Greece.
These points, indicative of the weak bargaining position of Greece,
determined to a very great extent both the evolution and the
characteristics of the emigration of Greece to the E.C. countries. One
should take into account though, that only the German-Greek agreement
was of importance (60% of the emigration of Greeks to this country, was
according to that agreement). The other agreements soon proved to be
dead letters (in fact the Dutch-Greek one was never applied) either
because these countries preferred immigrants from other emigration
countries or simply because they were signed just before the appearance
of the economic recession. Most of the Greek emigrants to these
countries moved either after individual invitations or through the
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embassies of these countries in Greece (op. cit, p. 64).
After the appearance of the recession, in the early 1970s, things
changed as far as the bilateral migratory agreements were concerned.
The agreement between Greece and West Germany which was applied for 13
years (and had a decisive influence on migration between these two
countries), was one of the "victims" of the recession. In 1973 the
emigrant selection commissions in Greece suspended their operations and
in 1976 the agreement ceased to apply after the definite break up of
the German commission of migration from Greece. The rational of this
decision was that
"... even in case of economic recov
be able to offer employment to a
(Hatzipanayotou, 1982, p. 63.)
The German government adopted
cry, West Germany will never again
large number of foreign workers"
two additional measures in order to
reduce the number of foreign workers: The first one was to restrict the
interegional mobility of immigrants, especially if the region of
destination had a certain percentage of immigrants in its total
population (over 12%). The second one was the intensive control given
to German employers in order to eliminate illegal (without a permit)
employment and inflow of foreign workers which was very common in the
late 1960s (Giannopoulos, 1979, p. 172).
In addition to these, a series of secondary measures were adopted
(such as "voluntary" repatriation), aiming at reducing the number of
immigrants to the level of 1.5 million people by 1977 (Hatzipanayotou,
1982, p.65).
3. The E.C. Framework. 
a. The association agreement between Greece and the E.C.
The association agreement between Greece and the E.C. was signed in
Athens (9/7/1961), and was applied in 1/11/1962. Besides the provisions
on trade liberalisation and a financial protocol, provisions on the
free mobility of labour were included as well.
These provisions were exaggerated both as far as their contribution
to the emigration of Greeks to the E.C. countries was concerned and
furthermore, as far as to the extent these provisions could influence
migration at all. Some economists believed that these provisions would
establish free labour mobility, and, consequently, cause an increase of
interegional migration according to differences in wage levels and
81
employment opportunities (Pepelasis and Yotopoulos, 1963, p. 20).
Others believed that Greece would have achieved the freedom of
establishment for its emigrants since 1974 had this association
agreement not been "frozen" after the imposition of the dictatorship in
Greece in 1967 (Bohning, 1972, p. 2).
Both these points are not realistic though, at least as far as
interpreting the association agreement is • concerned; article 44
provided that free labour mobility between Greece and the E.C. should
be established and by combining articles 6 and 44 one could derive that
free mobility could have been achieved by 1974. From the meaning and
the letter of the agreement, one can therefore only derive that the
references to free labour mobility were an expression of wishes rather
than a real perspective framework for migration (Kostopoulos, 1986, p.
121).
On the basis of the above, one could conclude that the postwar
emigration of Greek workers to the E.C. countries strictly evolved
within the frame of the bilateral migratory agreements, at least until
they effectively ceased to apply after the appearance of the economic
recession (Papastamkos, 1982).
b. The Community framework on labour mobility.
Briefly speaking, the adoption of the free labour mobility principle
in the E.C. was considered as a necessary condition for the creation of
a common labour market, in contradiction with the national ones. If one
examines this principle in economic terms, one will conclude that its
implementation, through an increase of the employment opportunities in
a wider geographic area, is an asset for the reduction of unemployment
and underemployment in the poorer regions of the E.C. Besides its
economic dimension though, free labour mobility can be examined in
social terms as well; in this case free labour mobility could be seen
as a mechanism for the achievement of better living conditions provided
by the equalisation of the supply and the demand for labour in the E.C.
labour market. In addition, free labour mobility is expected to
contribute to the attainment of equal rights on employment for all
workers in the Community; this factor could contribute decisively to
political integration. (Hassid, 1980, p. 291)
The provisions for the free mobility of workers were included in the
three founding treaties of the European Communities (E.S.C.C., E.E.C.
and Euratom). The difference in the provisions of these . treaties was
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that, while the E.S.C.C. and the Euratom ones referred to particular
groups of workers (skilled miners and steel workers as well as the
people employed in the atom energy industry), in the case of the E.E.C.
the application of these provisions was general and, in fact, free
labour mobility was one of the four basic liberties of the Community
(Papastamkos, 1982, p. 29). Free mobility in the Community treaties and
the Community law in general, has a different meaning compared to the
one in the national law: " Free mobility from the internal law point of
view covers and ensures the right of the citizens of a state to move
freely within that country and establish themselves at any point they
wish to. In that sense, the individual right of free mobility expresses
both the personal freedom and the recognition of a person's dignity.
Free mobility according to the Community law, on the other hand means
free mobility of workers within the geographical area the Community law
applies, free choice of the job to be undertaken, free undertaking of
an actually offered job and equal treatment of domestic workers and
community immigrants in terms of wages and working conditions. With
this meaning, free mobility only refers to the factor of production
"labour" and gives to Community employees the right to undertake
employment wherever it is offered" (Papastamkos, 1982, pp. 30-31).
In keeping with the concept of a common market as opposed to a
customs union, the Rome Treaty provides that freedom of movement can be
limited on the grounds of public safety, public security and public
health. Chapter 1 (title III) of the Rome Treaty (articles 48-51) deals
specifically with the free movement of labour in the Community. More
generally, articles 48-51 have to do with the freedom of movement and
establishment of persons in order to provide services with no
discrimination in terms of origin and nationality (Swann, 1982). The
free movement of labour provisions cover all persons who undertake any
form of dependent employment (Hassid, 1980, p. 292) It is clear that
this definition leaves out not dependent employment, that . is self
employed persons. According to the Treaty of Rome, article 48
stipulates that "Freedom of movement for workers entails the abolition
of any discrimination based on nationality between workers of the
member states as regards employment, renumeration and other conditions
of work and employment subject to limitations justified on grounds of
public policy, public security or public health. This article does not
apply to employment in the public service. (Commission of the European
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Communities, 1982, p. 9) Articles 49 and 51 authorize the council to
introduce its various additional rules as necessary to make equality of
treatment effective in practice. The Treaty also contains a series of
provisions which were important during the transitional period, namely,
the 12 years following the entry into force of the Treaty. This was the
period to be used by the institutions to implement the Treaty's various
provisions within the time limits laid down.
By July 1968, a year and a half before the end of the transitional
period, restrictions to immigration from E.C. members on the grounds of
national preferences and work permits had been abolished. The only
requirements was a five year residence permit, but these were
automatically renewable; Community over non-Community preference was
retained. As far as the application of the free mobility is concerned,
several measures were adopted by the E.C. the most important being
regulation 1612/68 which replaced all the former measures on this
aspect and created a framework for the establishment of a common policy
adopted by all member states aiming at the abolition of barriers to
free mobility (Hassid, 1980, p. 293).
Finally, one has to take into account that the social policy of the
E.C. deals with the free movement of workers and in particular with the
social security for migrant workers, the promotion of workers
geographical and occupational mobility and several other aspects aiming
to avoid discrimination against emigrants.
The institutional framework of the E.C., in spite of the fact that
it has covered many sectors, has proved to be inefficient for the
attainment of free labour mobility. This inefficiency is not proved by
the fact that intra-E.C. migration did not increase, because the
Community never really intended to organise massive intra-E.C.
migratory flows (Commission of the E. C., 1982, p. 6). The proof of
this inefficiency lies in the fact that the E.C. provisions are often
violated (in which case the European Court of Justice has to deal with
these violations) and in the fact that more than thirty years after the
Rome Treaty, labour mobility in the E.C. is still determined by the
member states' choices on how liberal their immigration policies should
be and not the basic principles and the framework of the E.C.
This could be explained on the ground that the application of the
Community framework on migration coincided with the appearance of the
economic recession and the rise of unemployment. This may explain the
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lack of progress in the free intra-E.C. labour mobility, but it
certainly does not justify it, irrespectively of the fact that an
institutional framework created in a period of economic prosperity is
very difficult to apply during an economic recession. The
non-application of the free labour mobility in the E.C. (besides
others) proves that the E.C. is still far from being a common market,
in spite of the impressive progress in trade liberalisation. The
(relatively recent) "Single European Act "which aims at a creation of a
"Single European Market" where labour should move freely, by the end of
1992, may prove to be a very important factor for the perspectives of
labour movements in the E.C., provided that this target will be
attained.
c. Greece's accession to the E.C. and the arrangements on labour
mobility.
A few months after the restoration of Democracy in Greece (summer
1974), a process that led to the Greek application for full membership
started. During the negotiations, the issue of migration was raised
and, in fact, in a rather unorthodox way. Initially the Commission made
clear that no significant emigration from Greece was to be expected
and, therefore, the Community framework could be applied with no
problem immediately after the accession of Greece. Surprisingly, the
governments of the immigration E.C. countries (mainly the French and
the West German ones), given the economic recession of that period
seemed to react to the immediate application of the free labour
mobility right to the poorer Mediterranean countries (Boltho, 1982, pp.
10-15). One should keep in mind though, that Greece at that time ranged
only sixth among the Mediterranean "suppliers" of emigrant labour for
the Community (Werner, 1978, p. 95); what the Germans and the French
probably had in mind was the perspective of other countries taking
advantage of the provisions that would apply for Greece (Commission of
the E. C. 1976, p. 17). Meanwhile other Mediterranean countries such as
Spain and Portugal (traditional labour "exporters" as well) had already
applied for full membership to the E.C. These reservations of Germany
and France were finally adopted by the Council and the Commission.
The negotiations ended on the 21-12-1978. In the Treaty of
accession, signed in May 1979, there were certain articles relevant to
this aspect; Article 45 of the accession Treaty provides for a
transitional period of seven years for the application of the most
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important E.C. regulation (1612/68) on - labour movements. The equal
treatment of Greeks, wishing to undertake employment in another member
state, would come into force on the 1-1-1988. In other words, the free
movement of labour from and to Greece was subject to a seven year
transitional period while, at the same time, the general transitional
period provided by the Accession Treaty was a five year one. In fact,
the transitional provisions for Greeks already working in E.C.
countries were more restrictive than the ones individual member states
had before the accession of Greece; it is indicative that the W. German
government, through its embassy in Athens, declared that, despite the
Accession Treaty, Greek immigrants will enjoy the same rights as the
other Community workers in West Germany (in newspaper "Express",
14-11-1980) simply because otherwise they would have ended worse off
and, in fact, in a less favourable position than the non-E.C.
immigrants (e.g. Turks) (Mitsos, 1984, p. 175).
There were certain positive arrangements for Greece on the social
security sector. Almost all E.C. arrangements in that field (family
grandings being the exception) were adopted. Finally, certain articles
on social security of the agreements, Greece signed with countries like
Belgium, West Germany, France and the Netherlands in the past,
continued to be valid since their provisions were most favourable for
the Greek immigrants compared to the E.C. ones (Mitsos, 1984, p. 176).
A total evaluation of the results of the negotiations of accession
would demand a full knowledge of the bargaining positions of the two
sides on a day by day basis. We could nevertheless reach the two
following conclusions I
1. The seven year transitional period for the free movement was a
rather "painless retreat" for Greece; the social security provisions
were clearly a success for Greece.
2. On the other hand, the fact that Greek immigrants were not fully
assimilated with the other Community ones, reflects the weak 'bargaining
power of Greece, especially if we take into account the fact that the
initial views of the Commission were more favourable than the final
arrangements included in the accession Treaty. We must keep in mind
though, that the final E.C. views were expressed by the E.C. Council
and not by the Commission (Mitsos, 1984).
CHAPTER THREE
"THE EVOLUTION AND THE CHARACTERISTICS OF MOVEMENTS
OF LABOUR FROM GREECE TO THE E.C. COUNTRIES"
A. THE EVOLUTION OF EMIGRATION.
1 The Pre-War Emigration from Greece. 
Greece has a long tradition as a labour exporting country. The
country has witnessed massive outflows of labour since the beginning of
the 19th century. The U.S.A. were the main receiving country for the
Greek emigrants; between 1900 and 1940 90% (443,298 out of 491,501) of
the Greek emigrants moved to U.S.A. (Poulopoulou-Emke, 1986, pp.
318-20). These outflows of labour were indeed impressive in relative
size (approximately 10% of the population), since the population of
Greece in that period did not exceed five million people on average
(although, between 1900 and 1920 the Greek population tripled after the
liberation of Macedonia, Epirus and Thrace). The main causes for these
migratory flows were the relative (or even absolute in some cases)
poverty of Greece in terms of low per capita income and few job
opportunities in relation to the favourable perspectives for higher
income and employment in the U.S.A.. The fluctuations in the numbers of
people moving were due to the U.S. changing migration policies (as
expressed in the relevant laws) and to a very lesser extent to what was
happening in Greece.
Emigration in the First Years After World War IL
After the end of World War II and until 1959, the number of
emigrants from Greece was at a relatively constant scale of
20,000-30,000 people per year. More than 50% of these people emigrated
to non European countries (U.S.A., Canada, Australia) (Zolotas, 1966,
p. 100). Since 1954, though, a small increase in emigration was
witnessed due to increasing emigration to Belgium, which desperately
needed workers for the coal mines, in that period.
Intercontinental migration was still dominant all through the 1950s,
but emigration to the European countries was constantly increasing
(table 1-29). In the same period emigration to Australia was increasing
as a percentage of total emigration from Greece (in absolute figures
the increase was negligible). The shift of migration from the overseas
to the European countries though, was becoming more and more obvious.
Table 1-29: The emigration of Greeks to European and non-European
countries in the 1950s
Year Total
Non-European countries
%
Europe
%
1950 12,514 10,206 81.5 2,008 16.4
1951 38,218 34,166 89.3 2,746 7.1
1952 17,928 11,637 64.9 4,291 23.9
1953 23,814 10,250 85.0 2,564 10.7
1954 50,441 30,720 60.9 14,720 29.1
1955 29,787 19,776 66.4 6,068 20.4
1956 35,349 23,147 65.6 7,780 22.0
1957 30,428 14,783 48.6 13,046 42.9
1958 24,521 14,842 60.5 6,567 26.8
1959 23,684 13,871 58.6 6,713 28.3
Sources: a) National Accounts of Greece (various issues).
b) Nikolinakos, 1976.
c) Zolotas, 1966.
I TliQ Shift of Emigration to Western Europe and F.R.G. in Particular. 
During the 1960s, the flow of emigrants from Greece changed
direction from the overseas countries to Western Europe. 1960 was a
turning point since in that particular year more than half of the Greek
emigrants chose to move to Western Europe. Contrary to the overseas
emigration, the European one was temporary in nature. Emigrants
themselves seemed to believe that emigration was temporary while, on
the other hand, immigration countries did not seem to intend to
integrate immigrants . into their population and labour force on a
permanent basis. According to OECD though, immigration countries had to
change their attitude towards the average duration of stay of the
immigrants soon enough; this could be explained in terms of their
having found out that the frequent alternation of the labour force
(continuous inflows-immigration and outflows-repatriation of foreign
workers), had a negative effect on their total output. This was due to
the fact that new immigrants had a low productivity, and needed a
certain amount of time to get used to the production techniques of the
immigration countries (OECD, 1978).
The E.C. countries absorbed the greatest part of the Greek emigrants
in the period 1960-75. West Germany in particular, was the main
recipient, as shown in table 1-30. One could derive very interesting
conclusions from this table; the preference of Greeks for Western
Germany is obvious. In fact, it seems that emigration to the other
(besides Germany) E.C. countries was rather insignificant in size. It
has already been mentioned that West Germany had the most substantial
labour shortages amongst the E.C. countries. It was these shortages
that determined the development of migration. A short period of
economic recession in Western Germany in the late 1960s caused a large
drop in the emigration of Greeks to that country. By the time the
German economy recovered, immigration from Greece picked up again.
Table 1-30: Emigration to Western Europe, the E.C. and the FRG
(1960-75).
Year	 Total	 Western Europe	 E.C.	 West Germany
Emigration %
1960 47,768 27,227 57 25,317 53 24,271 50.81
1961 58,837 40,009 68 35,890 61 31,107 52.86
1962 84,054 60,518 72 57,997 69 53,056 63,16
1963 100,072 74,053 74 72,052 72 64,583 64.53
1964 105,569 79,176 75 78,121 74 73,343 69,47
1965 117,167 87,875 75 85,531 73 80,569 68.60
1966 86,896 53,000 61 51,268 59 45,494 53,35
1967 42,730 15,382 36 14,100 33 9,730 22,77
1968 50,866 23,398 46 22,381 44 20,201 39,71
1969 91,552 62,255 68 61,339 67 59,449 64,93
1970 92,681 68,583 74 67,657 73 65,285 70.44
1971 61,745 42,604 69 41,986 68 40,052 64.85
1972 43,397 29,075 67 28,642 66 26,683 61.48
1973 27,488 15,108 55 14,293 52 12,838 46.70
1974 24,448 11,001 45 10,268 42 8,259 33.78
1975 20,330 10,165 50 9,555 47 7,338 36.00
1,055,600 699,445 66.2 676,397 64 622,258 58.95
Source: a) National Accounts of Greece (various issues).
b) Own calculations.
One should take into account that other (besides Greece) countries,
"exported" labour to the E.C. ones, as well. Greece ranged third in
that period after Italy and Spain, with Turkey, Portugal and Yugoslavia
following. If one examines emigration as a proportion of total
population, Greece ranks second in 1965 (2.64%), after Italy (2.95%),
followed by Spain (2.15%), Portugal (1.37%) and Turkey (0.58%). By the
end of the 1960s Portugal had climbed to the first place followed by
Greece (Zolotas, 1977, p. 100).
B. THE CHARACTERISTICS OF EMIGRATION.
1. The Emigrants' Origin ja Sector And Region. 
a. Emigrants' origin by sector.
The recruitment of emigrants in Greece was traditionally (since the
19th century at least) from the agricultural sector. There seems to be
a differentiation as far as the postwar period is concerned; the
increasing importance of immigration for the industrial regions of
Western Europe shifted the demand to craftsmen, industrial workers and
unskilled labour from the urban centers. In addition to that, the
overseas countries which had always been attracting mainly peasants,
started to reveal a preference for skilled or semi-skilled labour. From
table 1-31 one can derive that only 7.7% of the emigrants in 1963 were
employed in agriculture before emigrating; 54% of them were craftsmen
or industrial workers. It should be kept in mind though, that the
distribution of table 1-31 refers to the latest profession of the
emigrants, or even the profession they would intend to have, had they
stayed in Greece. Many of those declaring industrial employment
therefore, were peasants who had moved to the urban centers in search
of employment, a little while before emigrating. In addition to that,
many of those declaring "without employment" originated in agriculture
as well. Finally, what is impressive is that a considerable proportion
of the emigrants belonged to the "artisans and professionals" group
which included engineers, surgeons, dentists and school-teachers
(Triantis, 1965, p. 214).
A large part of the emigrants who found a job in Germany, consisted
of underemployed or people who had never worked in Greece. In table
1-32 one may see the distribution of emigrants between employed and
unemployed before emigrating.
Another basic characteristic of emigration for that period was that
80-90% of the emigrants were in the "productive age brackets" (14-44
years old (ESYE, 1967)). Furthermore, as far as the distribution by
of the conclusions one could derive from table 1-30 into question for
the period 1960-1974; according to table 1-33 most of the emigrants
come from agriculture. Even though the proportion of the
peasant-emigrants seem to fall over time, this could be attributed to
the increase of internal migration which functioned as a waiting room
for external emigration.
Table 1-31: The Greek emigrants by their profession before emigrating.
1962 1963
Profession Emigrants	 % Emigrants %
Farmers, fishermen, etc. 6,203 7.3 7,719 7.7
Workers in mining etc. 25 0.3 69 0.0
Craftsmen, industrial workers 47,267 56.2 54,070 54.0
Employed in transportation
and communications 680 0.8 795 0.8
Clerical staff 1,213 1.4 1,561 1.5
Salesmen 394 0.4 490 0.4
Employed in personal services 1,246 1.5 1,540 1.5
Professionals and engineers 1,131 1.3 1,212 1.2
Managers etc. 86 0.1 126 0.1
Not classified 23,571 28.0 25,244 25.2
Total 84,054 100.0 100,072 100.0
Sources:	 a) Triantis,	 1965, p. 213.
b) Own calculations.
Table 1-32: The employment status of emigrants before emigrating (%)
Status	 1960	 1961	 1962	 1963	 1964	 1965	 1966
Employed	 63.6	 63.3	 71.9	 74.8	 60.9	 55.3	 46.3
Unemployed 36.4 - 36.7	 28.1	 25.2	 39.1	 44.7	 53.7
Source: Valsamidis, 1968, p. 36.
Table 1-33: The distribution of Greek emigrants by profession before
emigrating (1960-1979) (in %).
Profession-Year 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74
Farmers 52 65 77 71 65 62 62 44 52 66 61 50 49 43 32
Craftsmen &
ind. workers 27 20 11 12 23 18 22 31 30 22 26 33 29 28 32
Others 21 15 12 17 12 20 16 25 18 12 13 17 22 29 36
Source: KEPE, 1976.
b. Emigrants' distribution by region.
As shown in table 1-30, 1,055,600 Greeks emigrated (gross
emigration) in the period 1960-1975; they represented 12% of the
country's total population according to the 1971 census (Glitsos, 1980,
p. 15). Emigration was not evenly scattered among Greek regions (in
fact, neither was population). Eastern Continental Greece and Macedonia
are the two extreme cases (the former contributed only 6.1% of the
emigrants and the latter 24.8%).
In some Greek districts, in particular, the emigration rate was
extremely high; the district of Drama "lost" 50% of its population in
the period 1960-1974 (Glitsos N., 1980, p. 16). Conclusively, one could
say that the less developed regions of the country (Macedonia, Epirus,
Thrace, Peloponnese) were the main "emigrant suppliers" (Nikolinakos,
1973, p. 88).
Not everybody seems to agree with that point though; B. Kayser
believes that emigration was recruited from regions at the intermediate
stage of development (e.g. Crete) and not the least developed ones
(e.g. Epirus). Another version of the same (more or less argument)
stresses the fact that it is the peasants of the highly commercialised
regions that emigrate and not those of the isolated ones (Vergopoulos,
1975, pp. 275-86).
Both these arguments could be tackled by the data of table 1-34.
Besides that, one could argue that they do not take into account the
simple fact that emigration from Greece started in the 1830s and since
then emigrants tend to come from the isolated or depressed areas of the
country. These areas had been deserted by their population long before
the 1960s and, therefore, appeared to be low contributors to the
postwar emigration, at least relatively to the areas that had not
already lost such a high part of their population.
The other interesting point that could be derived from table 1-34 is
that Athens had a relatively high emigration rate as well. One could
conclude, therefore, that emigration absorbed the unemployed of the
urban centers and the underemployed of the agricultural areas.
Another very interesting point is that unemployment and emigration
did not always go hand in hand; it is true that several regions
emigration and high unemployment at the same time. Others like Crete,
Continental Greece (Sterea) had low unemployment and high emigration
rates (Glitsos, 1980, p. 29). Generally speaking, it seems that
emigration evolved independently of unemployment; in all Greek regions,
emigration during the 1960s was 1.5-8.5 times higher than it had been
in the 1950s, although unemployment rates were the same in both
decades. These conclusions support the argument for "pull" factors
being more significant than the "push" ones for emigration to occur.
Table 1-34: The regional distribution of emigration (for each region in
total and urban areas in particular) (in %).
Percentage of emigration
Region	 Total for region	 Urban areas
Eastern Continental Greece 6.1 6.5
(Athens) (6.9) (6.9)
Central and W. Macedonia 16.2 6.3
Peloponnese & W. Continental Greece 9.8 5.8
Thessaly 9.1 4.5
Eastern Macedonia 28.4 19.7
Crete 6.9 4.9
Epirus 20.4 7.8
Thrace 21.9 8.5
Aegean Islands 16.5 10.0
Total 12.0 6.7
Source: Glitsos, 1980.
The Regional and Sectoral Distribution of Greeks in
Immigration Countries and the Duration of their Stay. 
The Greek emigrants were established in the richest industrial
regions of Western Europe. In the case of West Germany in particular,
which absorbed the greatest part of Greeks as we have seen, most Greek
immigrants were established in the most prosperous regions like
Nordrhein-Westfalen (34.9% of the Greeks), Baden-Wurttemberg (25.3%)
and Bayern (17.5%), although one could find Greek immigrants . all over
the country (Vanhove and Klaassen, 1980, pp. 68-74).
As far as the sectoral distribution is concerned, the data of table
1-35 for Germany could be considered representative of the other E.C.
countries as well. The fact that a considerable part of the Greek
immigrants was employed in metallurgy and other industrial sectors does
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not necessarily imply that they were hired as skilled workers.
Generally speaking, foreign workers were principally assigned secondary
posts (unskilled labour), at least as far as the first year of their
employment was concerned.
By 1973 the movements of Greek immigrants to a higher skill category
were as follows:
from unskilled to semiskilled 45%
from unskilled to skilled
	 2%
from semiskilled to skilled	 1% (Hassid, 1980, P. 304)
Since the late 1960s the immigration of Greeks began to transform
itself into a permanent and family type one (Paine, 1974). The already
established male immigrants managed to get an establishment permit for
their families rather easily. As a result, by 1972, women represented
43% of the total employment of Greek immigrants; the corresponding rate
for the other nationalities was lower (31% for the Spaniards and 30%
for the Portuguese) (Hatzipanayotou, 1977, p. 17).
Table 1-35: The distribution of Greek immigrants in FRG by sector of
economic activity (31/1/1973).
Sector Men Women Total
Agriculture etc. 377 176 553 0.2
Mining 2,869 158 3,027 1.1
Metallurgical industries 78,178 54,883 133,061 49.6
Manufacturing 45,483 43,527 89,010 33.2
Constructions 10,508 555 11,063 4.1
Public services 2,991 6,617 9,528 3.5
Services 2,761 5,728 8,489 3.2
Commerce, banks, insurance 6,584 659 2,423 0.5
Total 151,435 116,973 268,408 100.0
Source: Hassid, 1980, p. 305.
These two points, (the fact that most Greek immigrants were employed
as unskilled labour, and the high female participation in the labour
force) are of great importance, since they determined the vulnerability
of the Greek immigrants in case of unfavourable evolutions in the
immigration countries leading to high unemployment. There has been
evidence (see Boltho, 1982, pp. 170-1) that, in the postwar period,
unskilled and semiskilled workers are the first to be fired when the
demand for labour falls, especially if they are immigrants. As far as
the women are concerned, the evidence (op. cit. pp. 171-2) suggests
that they usually found employment in the labour intensive industrial
sectors (textiles, footwear) which were already facing problems due to
the increasing competition from the Newly Industrialising Countries
(NICs), besides the other disadvantages such as sex and nationality
discrimination they had to live with.
Table 1-36: Unemployment in West Germany (1966-1977).
Immigrants	 Greek immigrants
Total unemployment
	 unemployed unemployed
Year Number % Number % Men Women Total %
1966 141,428 0.7 2,522 0.2 365 0.2
1967 576,074 2.7 28,977 2.7 5,150 3.2
1968 459,853 2.2 8,187 0.9 887 0.6
1969 243,212 1.2 3,639 0.3 - - 293 0.2
1970 197,784 0.9 4,228 0.3 361 0.2
1971 206,472 1.2 11,849 0.6 1,533 0.6
1972 268,461 0.9 21,407 1.0 _ - 2,988 1.1
1973 286,576 1.3 17,206 0.7 696 1,292 1,988 0.7
1974 561,762 2.6 71,301 2.8 3,106 4,068 7,174 3.0
1975 1,114,048 4.9 179,007 7.4 9,181 10,799 19,980 . 8.7
1976 1,350,990 5.9 149,914 6.7 7,337 9,135 16,470 7.6
1977 1,248,918 5.5 105,000 5.1 .. _ 8,780 5.0
Source: Hatzipanayotou, 1977, p. 59.
In conclusion, one could say that the (by sex, sector, and skill
level) composition of the Greek immigrant labour force in the E.C.
countries, although not a problem in a period of economic prosperity,
was a very negative factor in case of economic recession.
C. THE REVERSAL OF THE FLOW.
L. Emigration from Greece During the Economic Slowdown. 
It has already been shown that one of the main symptoms of • the
economic recession of the 1970s was the increase of unemployment;
unemployment hit the domestic labour force as well as the immigrants in
the E.C. countries. Immigrants' unemployment was a function of total
unemployment in the immigration countries, as well as their
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competitiveness as a group of the labour force. This lack of
competitiveness coupled with the discrimination and the prejudice they
were faced with, caused their higher unemployment rates relatively to
total unemployment rates for the immigration countries.
Things were even worse for the Greek immigrants who, in fact,
witnessed higher unemployment rates relatively to the total labour
force as well as relatively to the total immigrant labour force for
reasons which will be analysed in the following sections (table 1-36).
This has been obvious particularly since 1974.
The impact of the recession on output and unemployment was dramatic;
emigration from Greece to the E.C. countries fell and, at the same time
repatriation increased to such an extent that it surpassed emigration
(table 1-37).
Repatriation from the E.C. countries had been subject to many
fluctuations in the period 1968-1976; this could be attributed mainly
to the developments of repatriation from West Germany, especially in
the period 1966-68.
L The Repatriation from West Germany. 
One of the first policy measures the German government adopted after
the emergence of the recession, was to impose restrictions on the
inflow of foreign workers. This policy, implemented from September 1973
to June 1976 proved to be very successful in increasing the employment
opportunities for the native labour force (Giannopoulos, 1979, p. 168).
The German government in particular, under the pressure of the
unfavourable situation in the labour market and despite its
declarations for equal treatment of the immigrants, imposed a series of
restrictions on the employment of foreigners and their unemployment
benefits. The first step to this direction was to eliminate immigration
from the Southern European countries it had signed migration agreements
with; in November 1973 the operation of the immigration selection
committees was suspended. A few months later it was generally accepted
that West Germany could not employ large numbers of foreign workers in
the near future. Consequently, the selection committees ceased
operating definitively; in fact, the one in Greece did so in January
1976 (Hatzipanayotou, 1977).
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The German government adopted, since 1975, two additional special
measures to reduce the number of the immigrants. The first one was to
forbid interregional migration, especially when the region of
destination already had many immigrants (more than 12% of the region's
population). By doing so, the Germans were in essence forbidding the
unemployed immigrants to search for employment. The second measure was
the severe control and the penalisation of illegal (without a permit)
inflow of new immigrants, while in the period of economic prosperity
the	 German	 authorities	 were rather elastic	 on	 that	 aspect
(Giannopoulos, 1979, p. 168).
Table 1-37: Emigration/repatriation of Greeks to and from the
E.C. countries (1968-1976).
Year emigration/repatriation Year	 emigration/repatriation
1968 3.43 1973 1.10
1969 7.95 1974 0.59
1970 3.86 1975 0.36
1971 2.99 1976 0.36
1972 1.78 1977 0.39
Source: Yannopoulos, 1979, p. 192.
According to the declarations of several German politicians, the
target set was to reduce the number of the immigrants substantially by
1977; it is true, though, that the German government never went as far
as adopting measures forcing immigrants to leave. In fact, voluntary
repatriation was promoted although it seems that immigrants were
psychologically pressed to leave, through the creation of uncertainty
about their future (Hatzipanayotou, 1977, pp. 65-67). In many cases the
only thing the German authorities had to do was to refuse renewal of
the work permits to the immigrants. The German government used
repatriation in order to reduce its labour force, in the same way it
used immigration when an increase of the labour force was needed.
After the appearance of the recession, the economic policy in West
Germany, seemed to be adjusted to what trade unions demanded, as far as
immigrants were concerned; German trade unions were always opposed to
immigration (Castles and Kosack, 1985, pp. 118-27) and, in fact Mr.
Schwab, the chairman of the German confederacy of trade unions (D.G.B.)
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went as far as saying that:
"...the fact that the governments of certain emigration countries are
trying to solve their unemployment problem by exporting labour to West
Germany is unacceptable... "(Hatzipanayotou, 1982, p. 31).
This declaration is indicative of the climate for immigrants and
reveals indifference or ignorance of the immigrants' contribution to
the postwar "German economic miracle" and of the fact that the massive
inflow of immigrants was due to Germany's attraction policies followed
for at least 15 years.
Table 1-38 Emigration, repatriation and net emigration of Greeks to and
from West Germany (1966-84).
Year Emigration Repatriation Net emigration	 (1)
1966 78,233 44,157 34,076
1967 55,396 58,093 -2,697
1968 20,589 73,828 -53,239
1969 53,107 29,043 24,064
1970 87,884 24,394 63,490
1971 94,307 30,259 64,048
1972 51,083 48,060 3,023
1973 36,102 48,807 -12,705
1974 29,960 48,732 -18,772
1975 18,196 65,709 -47,513
1976 16,004 58,200 -42,196
1977 15,276 48,000 -2,724
1978 14,400 36,300 -21,900
1979 14,787 29,247 -14,460
1980 15,811 22,318 -6,507
1981 18,536 15,782 2,754
1982 12,838 18,137 -5,299
1983 9,950 18,938 -8,988
1984 9,200 16,520 -7,320
(1) Net emigration = Emigration - Repatriation
Source: Hatzipanayotou, 1977, p. 72.
Consequently migration to West Germany declined and repatriation
increased, as we can see in table 1-38.
3. The characteristics of repatriation. 
a. Repatriation by sex.
48% of the returning migrants were women; (Giannopoulos, 1979, p.
169) This simply reflected the composition of the postwar emigration
from Greece (high woman participation) and the vulnerability of women
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to unemployment due to their low competitiveness in the labour market.
If one accepts Bohning's (1984, pp. 80-86) maturity stages of a
migratory flow, where women follow the men to emigration with a time
lag, it is logical to assume that they are the ones to leave first when
things are no longer prosperous. In fact, in the case of the Greek
emigrants, the repatriation of emigrants' wives and other female
relatives preceded the repatriation of male emigrants.
b. The employment of the returning emigrants to Greece.
Even though there are no precise data on the employment of returning
migrants to Greece, it is indicative that in 1974, only 6.6% undertook
dependent employment; the rate for 1975 was even lower, 5.9% (King,
1980, p. 26). Most of them used their savings from abroad to buy flats
and stores which they rented out and tried to make a living out of it.
8% of them were employed in agriculture (which had supplied 30% of the
emigrants) (op. cit. p. 118), and only 10% of them undertook employment
in manufacturing (OECD, 1979). Returning emigrants seemed unwilling to
undertake dependent employment when it was offered to them (Kayser,
1977, p. 131) and to take advantage of the retraining schemes the Greek
government offered. The main reasons for both were their dislike for
the rough conditions of industrial employment (which in fact had
exhausted many of them abroad), their desire to become "bosses" and the
particularly low wage level, relatively to the one in the immigration
countries, although self-employment did not really guarantee a
substantially higher income (Nikolinakos, 1973, p. 84).
Table 1-39: The regional distribution of repatriation (1974 &
(in %).
1975)
Region Year	 1974 1975
Eastern Continental Greece and Islands 8.8 9.7
Central and West Macedonia 30.8 31.4
Eastern Macedonia and Thrace 28.8 33.0
Thessaly 10.3 8.3
Epirus 13.5 10.5
Peloponnese 4.4 4.0
Crete 3.4 3.1
Total 100.0 100.0
Source: Hatzipanayotou, 1977, p. 70.
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As a result, most of them preferred self employment, especially in
the tertiary sector. Their savings were used to finance the creation of
small commercial and other units (small stores, taxis etc.) at a time
when the market was saturated by such units, besides the fact that
their productivity was extremely low.
4 The Regional Distribution of Repatriation. 
A considerable part of returning emigrants (74%) went to Macedonia,
Thrace and Epirus, which, after all, had contributed the most to
emigration (table 1-39). For the vast majority of those returning, one
could simply say that they returned to the regions they had left from.
In the period 1971-1977 repatriation was quite substantial as a
percentage of total population, fluctuating from 1% of total population
in Peloponesse, W. Continental Greece and Crete to 5.5% in Eastern
Macedonia. Generally speaking, repatriation caused a population
increase for most regions of 2-3.6% (Glitsos, 1980, p. 16).
Between 1974 and 1976, 43.7% of the returning migrants went to
Macedonia which had a 46.2% contribution to emigration in the 1960s
(Giannopoulos, 1979, p. 169). This means that in the medium run the
negative effect of emigration on the region's labour force was
neutralised by repatriation. This was true for all Greek regions, more
or less. By the mid-1970s therefore, it seemed that repatriation was
distributed among regions at rates relative to the emigration ones. By
1979 though, it was already obvious that the truth was quite different;
repatriation had contributed to the increase of urbanisation. This was
due to two main reasons: the first one was that after 1977, returning
emigrants started to prefer Athens (mainly) and Thessaloniki as their
new place of establishment; the second one was that many returning
emigrants decided to move to the urban centers after a short stay in
their regions of origin (in fact, after finding out either that there
were more employment opportunities in the large cities or that the
small firms they owned had a better chance in the conurbation areas)
(Glitsos, 1980, p. 19).
D. SOME RELATIVELY RECENT DEVELOPMENTS.
1 The "Migratory Paradox"
The migratory paradox in Greece has to do with the inflow of foreign
workers in the country, at the same time Greeks were emigrating to the
B.C. ones. Immigration to Greece was caused by emigration from Greece;
in the early 1970s Greece started to witness a labour shortage problem,
especially as far as rough and unhealthy jobs were concerned. In
addition to that, many foreign-owned firms established in Greece, were
using foreign employees (especially managerial and scientific staff as
well as highly skilled workers). The main point of the paradox is that,
in spite of the labour shortage in Greece, emigration proceeded until
the recession.
By 1980 28,237 foreign workers (29.5% of them were women) were
employed in Greece; this number represented 1.2% of the labour force
for the urban areas of the country. 64.2% of them were ethnic Greeks
from Cyprus, Turkey and Albania. Foreign employees from the E.C.
countries represented 22.6% of the immigrants in Greece
(Hatzipanayotou, 1982).
From table 1-40, it can be derived that 51.8% of the immigrants in
Greece came from Europe, 4.7% from America, 28.5% from Asia and 4.3%
from Australia. As far as sectoral distribution of immigrants in Greece
is concerned, and according to a 1982 survey (Hatzipanayotou, 1982 p.
26), 25.6% of the immigrants in Greece were employed in commerce and
tourism, 25.3% in manufacturing, 15.5% in services, 15.3% in
transportation and telecommunications, 9.8% in banks and insurance
companies and 8.5% in other sectors.
A final interesting point is that by 1981, 77.1% of the immigrants
were established in Athens, 5.1% in Thessaloniki and only 12% in the
remaining 46 districts of the country (op. cit., p. 28).
The data so far only refers to foreign workers officially and
legitimately established in Greece; one should take into accoUnt
though, the foreign sailors working in Greek ships. This phenomenon
first appeared during the dictatorship and continued ever since. Most
of these foreign sailors come from African and Asian countries and they
are payed much less than the Greek ones. Consequently more and more of
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them are hired and, for the first time in the history of the Greek
navigation, the unemployment of Greek sailors has risen to
unprecedented standards.
Table 1-40: A. Working permits for foreign workers in Greece by
continent of origin (1973-1982) (1)
Year	 Total Europe Africa America Asia Australia Not classified
1973 18,609 11,549 1,133 2,037 2,500 741 449
1974 22,903 14,171 819 2,339 3,422 867 1,292
1975 25,462 14,105 1,200 1,874 6,151 600 1,532
1976 26,032 11,047 1,212 2,668 7,717 840 2,548
1977 27,502 11,816 1,475 2,878 7,667 898 2,687
1978 28,231 12,608 1,474 3,220 7,935 1,039 1,955
1979 27,188 12,897 1,944 3,181 7,322 910 934
1980 27,823 14,330 2,150 3,101 6,682 840 720
1981 27,071 14,239 2,049 2,662 6,804 588 729
1982 21,286 11,175 1,886 1,660 5,975 439 151
B. Foreigners working in Greece (1973-1987).
Year	 Total Europe Africa America Asia Australia	 Not classified
1973 6,982 3,968 526 912 1,001 325 250
1974 19,376 12,155 546 1,910 2,688 715 1,362
1975 19,764 10,365 503 1,494 4,635 528 2,237
	 .
1976 23,118 9,746 694 2,306 6,637 772 2,963
1977 28,854 12,659 843 2,925 7,607 1,080 3,740
1978 29,706 13,437 949 3,259 7,955 1,187 2,919
1979 29,838 14,615 1,020 3,488 7,862 1,306 1,549
1980 28,628 14,216 1,180 3,405 7,919 1,354 554
1981 30,016 14,411 1,488 3,384 8,919 1,277 537
1982 30,261 15,675 1,420 2,999 8,620 1,304 243
1983 28,736 -
1984 26,864
1985 28,156
1986 28,000
1987 28,854
(1) Besides those having a permit, there was a considerable number
of foreign employees without working permits.
Sources: a) Statistical Handbook of Greece, (various issues).
b) Kioulafas and Zaragas, 1990, pp. 240-1.
The Background on Intra-Community Migration and Emigration from
Greece to the other E.C. Countries after 1981. 
Besides the theoretical background and the E.C. free labour mobility
principle, the institutional framework which was finally adopted,
reflected the conflict of interests between the six founding members of
the E.C. On the one hand, Italy needed to direct its surplus labour to
other E.C. countries through migration and was interested in
establishing a Community attitude where Community emigrants would have
a priority relatively to the non-E.C. ones. On the other hand the other
five E.C. members (and particularly France and Germany), were in favour
of the idea that the employment policy should . continue to be exercised
at the national level rather than an E.C. one. The relevant literature
suggests that intra-E.C. labour movements seem to have been influenced
by the same factors that determine migratory flows on the international
level, rather than by the E.C. framework.
A careful examination of the intra-E.C.labour movements, indicates
that in periods of excess demand for labour, when the Community labour
force is not adequate to cover the labour shortages that follow
industrial expansion, the institutional framework of the E.C. hardly
influences migratory flows. In such cases, restrictions on the inflow
of non-E.C. workers cease or are considerably relaxed and immigration
evolves irrespectively of the E.C. framework. (Commission of the E. C.,
1982) The importance of the E.C. institutional framework on movements
of labour lies in its ability to influence migration when the • demand
for labour is limited. In these cases non-E.C. immigration may surpass
intra-Community migration„ (Papastamkos, 1982, p. 124) This is more due
to the restrictions on non-E.C. immigration, rather than to a
significant increase of intra-E.C. immigration. In this case the fall
of the non-E.C. immigration is outweighted by an increase of the
intra-E.C. labour movements. The size and the direction of intra-E.C.
migratory flows depends on factors such as the ability of some
countries to absorb labour from others, the skill level of the migrants
and the differences in wage levels. A final determining factor is, of
course, the existence of labour reserves in the emigration countries.
Prior to the Mediterranean enlargement of the E.C., Italy and
Ireland were the only emigration E.C. countries; one should keep in
mind, though, that emigration from these countries to the other member
states, more or less came to an end in the 1960s.
Especially after 1973, the intra-E.C. migration only refers to
certain skilled workers as well as scientists who move from one country
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to another to take advantage of differences in wages. This kind of
movements are usually temporary and they are far from been considered a
significant in size migratory flow (Denton, 1969).
Table 1-41: Greek immigrants in the E.C.(1) countries in 1981.
Country	 Number of immigrants	 %
F.R.G. 299,300 84.72
France 7,860 2.22
Netherlands 4,090 1.15
Belgium 21,230 6.00
Luxembourg 236 0.06
U.K. 20,000 5.66
Denmark 550 0.15
Total 353,266 100.00
(1) Italy and Ireland are not included in this table, but the
number of Greek immigrants in these two countries is negligible.
Sources: a) Eurostat.
b) Own calculations.
As far as Greece is concerned, one could note the following points:
according to the National Statistical Service of Greece, in 1981
706,532 of the people who emigrated from Greece were still living in
immigration countries all over the world; 353,266 (50%) of them were
established in the E.C. countries. In table 1-41 we can see the
distribution of the Greek immigrants in the E.C. by country. (Mitsos,
1984, p. 179) The number of Greek workers in the E.C. countries
continued to fall during the 1980s, and by 1986 there were only 310,266
Greek immigrants in the 9 E.C. members (ESYE); the number of Greeks in
Spain and Portugal is negligible. In spite of the rapid repatriation in
the 1970s, West Germany is still the main immigration country for the
Greeks. In table 1-42 we can see the evolution of emigration,
repatriation and net emigration of Greeks to West Germany for a period
covering a few years before and a few years after the accession of
Greece to the E.C.
From table 1-42, one can derive that emigration althrough the period
is constantly declining, but this decline is more obvious in the period
after the accession of Greece to the E.C. This indicates that, as in
the case of the other emigration E.C. countries, the accession to the
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E.C. and the application of the Community framework was not followed by
an acceleration of emigration. One could say that this conclusion is
altered by the data on repatriation and net emigration. It seems that
repatriation is declining (it rises after the accession though) and net
emigration is rising in the 1970s, becomes positive in 1981 and
declines ever since. The decline of repatriation could be explained on
the ground that the persisting negative migration in the 1970s reduced
the stock of the Greek emigrants in West Germany.
Table 1-42: Emigration, repatriation and net emigration from Greece to
FRG. (1977-84)
Year Emigrat. % change Repatriat. % change Net emigrat. % change
1977 15,276 -0.04 48,000 0.17 -32,734 -0.30
1978 14,400 -0.05 -0.002 36,300 -0.24 -0.120 -21,900 -0.33
1979 14,787 0.02 29,247 -0.19 -14,460 -0.34
1980 15,811 0.06 22,318 -0.23 -6,507 -0.55
1981 18,536 0.17 15,782 -0.29 1,754 0.73
1982 12,838 -0.30 -0.105 18,137 0.14 -0.050 -5,299 -2.02
1983 9,950 -0.22 18,938 0.04 -8,988 -0.70
1984 9,200 -0.07 16,520 -0.12 -7,320 -0.19
Sources: a) Greek Ministry of labour.
b) Own calculations.
CHAPTER FOUR
"AN ECONOMETRIC INVESTIGATION OF THE DETERMINING
FACTORS OF EMIGRATION FROM GREECE TO THE E.0
COUNTRIES IN THE POSTWAR PERIOD"
A. INTRODUCTION.
Having examined the evolution of emigration from Greece in the
postwar period, we will now investigate which of the factors
influencing emigration according to the economic theory were the
decisive ones in the particular case of emigration from Greece to West
Germany. West Germany could indeed represent the E.C. as far as
emigration from Greece is concerned, having absorbed the vast majority
of Greek emigrants.
The econometric model to be used will be estimated according to the
O.L.S. method.
The aim of this chapter is to construct an econometric model
containing as independent variables all the factors that are assumed to
have determined emigration from Greece to West Germany, and to estimate
and test this model. The program used will be the GIVE time series
econometric package.
As already mentioned, there has been a debate on the preponderance
of "push" and "pull" factors as far as determining migration is
concerned. The significance of these two sets of factors will be tested
separately before constructing a final eclectic model containing both
"push" and "pull" factors as independent variables.
B. THE "PUSH" AND "PULL" FACTORS MODELS.
We could define the two hypotheses as follows:
HO : The push factors are superior to the pull ones in explaining
migratory flows from Greece to West Germany.
H1 : The pull factors were superior to the push ones.
In terms of econometric investigation, testing these two hypotheses
simply means constructing two models, the first one containing the push
factors and the second model the pull ones as independent variables,
emigration from Greece to F.R.G. being the dependant variable in both
models. The next step should be to compare these two models and
determine the one which is superior, according to certain economic and
econometric criteria. The superiority of one of these models will give
an answer as to whether the HO or the H1 hypothesis is valid.
Testing the two hypotheses will be carried out by the encompassing
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test for non-nested variables provided by the GIVE econometric package.
1, The "Push" Factors Model, 
In order to construct a model of emigration including only the push
factors as independent variables, we should first present the
theoretical equation, that is an equation where migration is expressed
as a function of the push factors analysed in chapter one. This
equation could be as follows:
Mt -,- f( Wemt, Uemt, Yemt, Hemt, GDPemt, JVUemt) where:
Mt	 = Number of emigrants in period t,
Wemt = Wage level in the emigration country in period t,
Uemt
	
= Unemployment " "	 If	 ff	 If	 If	 If ,
	
W N	 If	 If	 If	 If	 IfYemt = Income	 ,
IfHunt	 = Hours of work	 If" "	 If	 If	 If
GDPemt = GDP
JVUemt = Job vacancies " " i,	 n	 n	 r,	 tr ,
The logic of including these explanatory variables in the equation
and the expected signs of the estimated coefficients could be analysed
as follows:
- Wages in the emigration country can influence the size of emigration
according to the theory, in the sense that the higher wages are, the
less incentive people will have to emigrate; this is based on the idea
that emigrants are "pushed" to emigrate by the low wage level in their
country of origin.
- Income and GDP could be seen as a proxy for the welfare level in the
emigration country. As in the case of wages they are expected to be
negatively related to the number of people emigrating. In particular,
the income level in the sector where emigrants mainly come from is more
indicative of their welfare status before emigration.
- The number of hours of work per week is expected to be positively
related to emigration, in the sense that the more hours people have to
work, the more likely it will be for them to seek employment elsewhere;
- Finally, the number of job vacancies unfilled in the emigration
country, represents the employment opportunities people are faced with
in their country of origin; therefore, they should be negatively
related to emigration.
Following the logic of the aforementioned equation and, given the
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limitations of the availability of data in Greece (e.g. there is no
data for job vacancies unfilled), I came up with the following general
"push" factor model of emigration from Greece to West Germany (F.R.G.)
for the period 1960-1986:
Mt = 227.12 + 0.76 Mt-1 - 3.88 APCgrt - 3.88 APCgrt-1 + 0.001 GDPgrt +
(0.85)	 (4.38)	 (-2.14)	 (-2.04)	 (0.54)
0.001 GDPgrt-1 - 51.22 Wgrt + 44.46 Wgrt-1 + 0.33 Hgrt - 2.35 Hgrt-1
(0.95)	 (-1.48)	 (1.37)	 (0.05)	 (-0.40)
- 1.14 Ugrt - 13.68 Ugrt-1 + Ut
(-0.18)	 (-2.05)
(t-ratios in brackets)
R2=0.86 , F(12, 12)= 13.64 where
Mt and Mt-1	 : Number of people emigrating from Greece to FRG in
periods t and t-1 respectively,
APCgrt and APCgrt-1 : The per capita productivity in agriculture in
Greece, in real terms for periods t and t-1 respectively (used as a
proxy of per capita agricultural income, since the majority of reek
emigrants came from agriculture - chapter three),
GDPt and GDPt-1 : GDP in Greece, in real terms in periods t and t-1
respectively,
Wgrt and Wgrt-1 : Hourly wages in manufacture (as a proxy of the
general wage level) in Greece in periods t and t-1 respectively,
Hgrt and Hgrt-1 : Weekly hours of work in Greek manufacturing in
periods t and t-1 respectively,
Ugrt and Ugrt-1 : Unemployment rate in Greece in periods t and t-1
respectively,
Ut :error term
The linear form of the model was preferred on the grounds of its
better fit in relation to other possible forms (e.g. log-linear). As we
can see, this model includes a series of non-significant (critical
value for t=2.13) explanatory variables, as well as variables with the
"wrong" (according to economic theory) signs.
A "smaller" and better model was therefore needed. After dropping
the non-significant variables, I finally came up with the following
model:
Mt = 40.24 + 0.8 Mt-1 - 0.57 APCgrt-1 - 30.00 Rt + Ut
(3.97) (6.77)
	 (-2.98)	 (-2.38)
(t-ratios in brackets)
Means: Mt (35.74), Mt-1 (35.96), APCgrt-1 (39.78), Rt (31.88)
R2
 = 0.835, F(4, 20) = 38.90 where:
Mt	 : Emigration from Greece to FRG in period t in 000s
Mt-1	 • II.	 If	 II	 IIIf	 I I	 II	 t4 "	 "
(the fact that emigrants are measured in thousands explains the large
size of the constant term)
APCgrt-1 : Greek agricultural productivity per capita in period t.
Rt	 : Repatriation from Greece to FRG in period t.
Ut	 : Error term.
Further to the discussion on the general model, the inclusion of
these variables in the model and the signs of their coefficients are
justified as follows:
1. The fact that emigration in period t is greatly determined by
emigration in the previous year and, in fact, with a positive relation,
makes a lot of sense; the more people leave in a certain year, the more
should be expected to follow in the next one, influenced by word of
mouth by those who left before.
2. In the same way, repatriation in period t influences emigration
adversely, in the sense that an increase in repatriation could be taken
as a signal of unfavourable conditions in the immigration country for
potential emigrants. One could argue though that repatriation may be
endogenous (i.e. repatriation and emigration may both be influenced by
some third variable).
3. The per capita agricultural productivity in Greece (defined as GDP
in agriculture / agricultural labour force) is a quite satisfactory
proxy of the evolution of income in agriculture, which after all,
contributed the most to the emigratory flows, as we have seen. It is,
therefore, acceptable to assume that a fall in per capita agricultural
productivity in period t-1 may cause an increase in emigration in the
next period, as the model implies.
The fit of the model seems to be quite satisfactory (i. =0.835, F =
38.90 and t-ratios higher than the critical value 1.721 at a 95%
confidence level).
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The size of the slope coefficients and the short and long-run
elasticities imply that:
Mt-1: An increase of emigration by one unit in period t-1 causes an
increase of emigration by 0.8 units in period t. Using the elasticities
(short-run 0.80, long-run 0.85), we could say that a 10% increase in
Mt-1 will cause a 8.0% increase in Mt in the short-run, or a 8.5% one
in the long one.
APCgrt-1: An increase in per capita agricultural productivity of Greece
by one million drachmas (constant 1970 prices) in period t-1, causes a
fall of 0.67 in emigration in period t (short-run elasticity -0.63,
long-run -2.56).
Rt: An increase of repatriation by one unit in period t causes a fall
of emigration in the same period by 30 (short run elasticity 26.7,
long-run 43.8).
Testing 1121 model. 
The model was tested for autocorrelation, ARCH (Autoregressive
Conditional Heteroscedasticity), Normality, Heteroscedasticity and
Omitted variables; testing for mis-specification was not possible
because of insufficient degrees of freedom. In particular:
The test for autocorrelation revealed the absence of autocorrelation
of the first, second and fourth order.
For 1st order autocorrelation : F(1,20) = 3.42, Cr. value = 4.30
"	 2nd "	 II	 : F(2,19) = 3.14, Cr. value = 3.47
"	 3rd "	 ,,	 : F(3,18) = 3.05, Cr. value = 3.16
II	 4th	 II	 II	 . F(4,17) = 2.05, Cr. value = 2.40
(all critical values at .a 95% confidence level).
The test for ARCH revealed the absence of Autoregressive Conditional
Heteroscedasticity: F(1,19) = 3.72 (Cr. value = 4.32 - conf. level
95%).
The test for normality indicated that the residuals are normally
distributed (Chi(2) = 1.101, Cr. value = 5.991 - conf. level 95%)..
The tests also indicated the absence of Heteroscedasticity in the
residuals (F(6,14) = 1.51, Cr. value = 2.74 - conf. level 95%).
Finally the RESET test indicated no omitted variables (powers of the
existing variables) (F(1,20) = 0.34, Cr. value = 3.47 - conf. level
95%).
The results of the above tests indicate that the regression
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estimators are "consisten t" and that the use of the OLS estimation
method is justified.
Although all the possible variables were tested before coming up
with the final "push" factor model, I also performed the F-test for
adding them from the data set. This test indicated that none of them
was significant. I also attempted to include a Dummy variable Dt
representing the legislative framework of emigration from Greece to
West Germany (taking the value of 1 when the bilateral emigration
agreement was in operation and 0 when it was not). Although this
variable seemed to be significant when tested separately, it gave rise
to statistical problems; the F-test and the Chow test for adding it to
the final "push" factors model revealed that the inclusion of this
variable did not significantly affect the results.
2. The "Pull" Factors Model. 
Following the same procedure as in the case of the "push" factors
model I came up with the following general "pull" factor equation (the
linear form proving to be the best one once again):
Mt = 24.02 + 0.24 Mt-1 + 14.17 Dt + 4.39 Dt-1 - 0.02 GDPfrgt
(0.04) (0.45)	 (0.97)	 (0.24)	 (-0.83)
- 0.01 GDPfrgt-1 - 1.41 Wfrgt + 4.47 Wfrgt-1 + 0.09 Hfrgt -
(-0.35)	 (-0.20)	 (0.58)	 (0.00)
- 0.93 Hfrgt-1 - 2.09 Ufrgt + 1.42 Ufrgt-1 + 0.13 .TVUfrgt -
(-0.13)	 (-0.10)	 (0.82)	 (2.97)
- 0.02 JVUfrgt-1 + Ut
(-0.23)
R2 = 0.952, F(15,9)=11.91, D.W.=1.85,
where all the variables are the same as in the "push" factor model but
relate to FRG.
The logic of including these explanatory variables in the model and
the expected signs of the estimated coefficients, according to the
theory, is more or less the same as in the "push" factor model. In
particular:
- GDPfrg, Wfrg and JVUfrg represent factors positively related to
immigration in the sense that people are attracted by high wages income
level and availability of jobs in the immigration country.
- Ufrg and Hfrg should be negatively related to immigration since
potential immigrants are discouraged by high unemployment and a hard
(in terms of hours of work) working schedule.
- Mt-1 and D should be positively related to immigration, Mt-1 for
reasons previously analysed and D because a favourable legal framework
is, after all, a permissive factor for immigration to occur.
Here again, the non-significant variables and the "wrong" signs
indicated the need for a smaller and better model such as the following
final equation:
Mt = -36.61 + 0.21 Mt-1 + 0.13 JVUfrgt + 2.60 MUt + Ut
(-3.30) (2.19)
	 (6.07)	 (2.55)
Means: Mt (38.60), Mt-1 (38.47), JVUfrgt (41.16), MUt (3.37)
R2
 = 0.909, F(4,20) = 70.61
where Mt and Mt-1 are the same as in the "push" factors model JVUfrgt =
job vacancies unfilled, in 000s, in FRG, in period t,
MUt = The unemployment rate of Greek immigrants in FRG in period t,
Ut = Error term.
The inclusion of these variables in the model and the signs of the
estimated coefficients is further justified as follows:
1. Job vacancies unfilled are an indicator of the absorbtiveness of the
W. German economy in foreign labour. The positive relation between Mt
and JVUfrgt seems therefore, to make a lot of sense. (Short-run
elasticity 0.010, long-run 0.015).
2. The unemployment rate of Greek immigrants in West Germany, is an
indicator of the job vacancies made available for the new immigrants
because, as we will see, Greek immigrants losing their jobs were
replaced by their new comer compatriots.
The coefficient of MUt (unemployment of Greek immigrants in West
Germany) is now positive, this indicating that an increase of the
unemployment of Greeks already established in West Germany by one unit
led to an increase of emigration by 2,638.28 units (shortLrun
elasticity 29.7, long-run 37.64). This seems surprising at first sight
but it can be explained on the basis of the particular characteristics
of the movements and employment of Greeks in that country. As already
mentioned, when the bilateral migratory agreement was in force,
immigrants were employed in a predetermined firm, usually under a one
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year contract, paid the wage of an unskilled worker and usually
undertook hard and, in many cases, unhealthy jobs. (Matzouranis, 1974)
Their wish to earn as much money as possible (a great part of which was
remitted to their families), their fear of a possible sacking and their
hope that a renewal of their contract could lead to a raise in their
pay, contributed to their intensive efforts in the job; as a result,
they were usually surpassing their productivity norm. (op. cit.)
Besides this increased productivity, immigrants appeared to be very
reluctant as far as trade unionism was concerned because of their
insecurity; (Nikolinakos, 1975) these unfavourable work and pay
conditions led a number of immigrants to break their contracts and
search for employment elsewhere or, simply, to choose to live on
unemployment benefits for a while (as long as they were entitled to
them) rather than be forced to leave the country.
In most cases, however, immigrants came to be unemployed because
their employers did not renew their contracts but preferred to renew
their labour force by bringing in new foreign workers who had the
"advantage" over the old ones that they could be paid less and probably
work harder without developing any new trade unions, or participating
in existing ones.
No matter who decided to break off or not renew the work
relationship (contract), however, the immigrants that came to be
unemployed had to be replaced by new immigrants. Therefore, the more
old immigrants were unemployed, the more new immigrants had to be moved
in order to replace them.
3. Finally, the same as in the "push" factors model could be said for
Mt-1, only in this case, with reference to German employers.
The fit of the model seems to be very satisfactory indeed; ?R =
0.909, F(4,20) = 70.01 and all t-ratios well above the critical value
1.721 at a 95% confidence level).
The size of the slope coefficients implies that:
a. An increase of immigration by 1 unit in period t-1 "causes" an
increase of immigration by 0.2 units in period t.
b. An increase of the unfilled job vacancies by 1 in period t "causes"
an increase of immigration by 0.13 in the same period.
c. An increase of MU by one percentage point in period t "causes" an
increase of immigration by 2,600 people in the same period.
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Testing thg model
As in the "push" factors model case, the insufficient number of
degrees of freedom made the mis-specification test impossible. Testing
the model was, therefore, limited to tests for autocorrelation, ARCH,
Normality, Heteroscedasticity and omitted variables.
The test for autocorrelation of the residuals revealed the absence
of autocorrelation of the first, second and fourth order;
For 1st order autocorrelation : F(1,20) = 3.69, Cr. value = 4.35
" 2nd "	 .	 : F(2,19) = 1.99, Cr. value = 3.52
" 3rd	 "	 II	 : F(3,18) = 1.46, Cr. value = 3.16
" 4th "	 If	 . F(4,17) = 1.05, Cr. value = 2.96
(all critical values at a 95% confidence level).
The absence of ARCH of the residuals was also indicated by the
F-test (F(1,19) = 0.31, Cr. value = 4.38 - conf. level 95%).
The test for normality indicated that the residuals are normally
distributed (chi(2) = 1.326, Cr. value = 5.991 - conf. level 95%).
The F-test also showed the absence of heteroscedasticity of the
residuals (F(6,14) = 1.256, Cr. value = 2.85 - conf. level 95%).
Finally the RESET test indicated no omitted variables (powers of
existing variables) (F-test(1, 20) = 0.806, Cr. value = 4.35 - conf.
level 95%).
As in the case of the "push" factors model therefore, the estimators
were found to be "consistent" and the use of the OLS method
justified.
The F-test for adding variables from the data set revealed that no
other variable was necessary.
C. TESTING THE TWO HYPOTHESES.
The investigation of which of the two models is superior in
explaining emigration from Greece to West Germany in the period
1960-84, was carried out by the encompassing test. According to this
test, model 1 is tested against model 2 (push and pull factors models
in our case) using a series of tests as can be seen in the following
table:
-Push Versus Pull
Factors model
Form Test Form Pull versus Push
Factors model
-6.104 N(0,1) COX N(0,1) -1.500
3.999 N(0,1) Ericson N(0,1) 1.263
10.824 CHI(2) Sargan CHI(2) 4.270
9.334 F(2,21) joint model F(2,21) 2.394
3.467 F(2,21) cr.values F(2,21) 3.467
Under the null hypothesis that Model 1 encompasses Model 2, the
Cox-test and the Ericsson IV test is distributed as N(0,1).
The Sargan-test is a Wald-test of the restricted against the
unrestricted form of the model, and so is a test of the validity of
using Model 2's instruments when estimating Model 1 (and conversely).
The F-tests test each model against the joint one (the one including
all the variables of both models).
The above table reveals that the "pull" factors (Hi) hypothesis is
valid or, in other words, that "pull" factors are superior to the
"push" factors in explaining emigration in that particular case.
A final point, in fact amplifying the so far conclusions on the
relative significance of "push" and "pull" factors in determining this
particular emigration is that, an effort to form a joint model
including both sets of factors resulted in the "pull" factors model as
already estimated.
CONCLUSIONS OF THE FIRST PART.
Since the end of World War II millions of people have emigrated from
the less developed European countries seeking employment and better
living conditions. Almost all the developed European countries absorbed
immigrants during that period. "For a long period of time it seemed
that foreign labour was a structural necessity for the immigration
countries" (Todaro, 1969).
Just after the end of the war, many economists expressed fears that
Europe could not employ all its labour force and a repetition of
emigration to U.S.A. should be expected. West Germany, in particular,
was considered as the main problem, having received 8 million refugees
from Eastern Germany (Nikolinakos, 1978). Even when full employment was
obtained in most countries, this was considered a temporary effect of
reconstruction. Besides that, there was a reluctance as far as
employing foreign labour was concerned and no country had made its
policy on immigration clear from the beginning (Vanhove and Klaassen,
1980).
Emigration evolved in absolute accordance to the increasing demand
for labour by the Western European manufacturing. Immigration policies
followed in order to regulate rather than determine the inflow of
foreign workers. Many of the social implications of migration were, in
fact, due to this lack of planning The causes of the postwar
intra-European migration, (including the particular one from Greece)
were a combination of "pull" factors from the immigration countries and
"push" factors from the emigration ones.
The "pull" factors had to do with the rapid growth of the developed
European countries and the consequent increase in the demand for
labour. The "push" ones, on the other hand, although present, were not
decisive neither as far as the structure nor even as far as the size of
migration was concerned. The "push" factors are usually defined in
terms of the "pull" ones; wages in the emigration countries can
initiate migration (this was not the case for the particular emigration
from Greece as we have seen) only if they are lower (and therefore
exogenously determined) than the ones in the immigration countries.
The econometric investigation was illuminating and indicated the
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preponderance of job availability in West Germany. In other words, it
indicated the preponderance of "pull" factors relatively to the "push"
ones; this means that Greece could hardly determine or even influence
the characteristics of migration. This, should be expected since only
those with a permit from the authorities of the immigration countries
were allowed to emigrate. The market therefore, was clearly demand
determined.
The full understanding of the causes of migration requires the full
understanding of underdevelopment and its causes in the contemporary
world; inequalities in the rates of natural increase of the population
in Europe, caused a problem in the distribution of the factors of
production relatively to the development level of each country. The
less developed European countries therefore, witnessed a surplus of
labour which couldn't be employed in the short-run. For this surplus
labour and for the short-run period, the dilemma was between
unemployment and underemployment in the homeland or industrial
employment abroad. By the time recession hit the Western European
industry causing a fall in it's demand for labour, the emigration
alternative simply ceased to exist.
Conclusively, one could say that the evolution of migration between
Greece and the E.C. countries verified Joan Robinson's theorem: "...in
each period, the laws governing International Economic Relations, are
formed every time in such a way as to serve the interests of the
stronger country..." (Roumeliotis, 1978, p. 18).
DATA APPENDIX
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Table 1-21: The evolution of unemployment (U) in Greece (1950-88).
Year
U
in 000s
U
rate
Percentage
change of
U rate Year
U
in 000s
U
rate
Percentage
change of
U rate
1950 160 5.0 - 1970 49 3.6 -0.07
1951 179 4.4 -0.12 1971 30 4.7 0.30
1952 54 - - 1972 24 3.7 -0.21
1953 76 - 1973 22 3.5 -0.05
1954 55 - 1974 27 2.0 -0.42
1955 121 - 1975 35 2.1 0.05
1956 41 1976 29 3.1 0.47
1957 89 - - 1977 28 1.6 -0.48
1958 87 - - 1978 31 2.0 0.25
1959 99 - 1979 32 2.1 0.05
1960 93 5.8 1980 37 2.6 0,23
1961 80 5.9 0.01 1981a 149 4.0 0.53
1962 79 5.6 -0.05 1982 215 5.8 0.45
1963 76 5.3 -0.05 1983 299 7.4 0.27
1964 71 4.9 -0.07 1984 315 8.1 0.09
1965 70 4.6 -0.06 1985 303 7.8 -0.03
1966 70 5.3 0.15 1986 289 7.4 -0.04
1967 89 4.0 -0.24 1987 292 7.4 0.00
1968 78 3.9 -0.02 1988 304 7.7 0.03
1969 71 3.9 0.00
a: after 1981 the method of estimation of unemployment in Greece
changes; according to the pre-1981 method of estimation the rates
would be 1981: 2.7, 1982: 3.2, 1983: 3.8, 1984: 4.2, 1985: 5.2
(Dretakis, 1987).
Sources: a) ILO, Annual Labour Statistics, (various issues).
b) Negreponti-Delivani, 1981.
C) Babanasis, 1986.
d) Lalonde and Papandreou, 1986.
e) Own calculations.
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Diagram 1-2: Hourly wages in manufacturing for Greece, Spain, Portugal
and the EEC (9) in the period 1960-80.
1970=100
°In local currencies
Source: Table 1-26.
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Table 1-27: The evolution of hourly wages in the Greek and W. German
manufacturing firms employing more than 10 employees (1960-85).
-
-
In Greece	 In W. Germany
Year in drs	 d(1)
	 in $	 d(2)	 in $	 d(3)	 (3)-(2)	 (3)/(2)
(1)	 in %	 (2)	 in %	 (3)	 in %
--
1960	 6.69	 -	 0.25	 -	 0.63	 -	 0.38	 2.52
1961	 7.63	 14.05 0.27	 8.00	 0.73	 15.87	 0.46	 2.70
1962	 7.98	 4.58	 0.27	 0.00	 0.80	 9.58	 0.53	 2.96
1963	 8.42	 5.51 0.28	 3.70	 0.87	 8.75	 0.59	 3.10
1964	 9.33	 10.80 0.31	 10.71	 0.94	 8.04	 0.63	 3.03
1965	 10.13	 8.57	 0.34	 9.67	 1.03	 9.57	 0.69	 3.02
1966	 11.40	 12.53 0.38	 11.76	 1.10	 6.79	 0.72	 2.89
1967	 12.74	 11.75 0.42	 10.52	 1.15	 4.54	 0.73	 2.73
1968	 13.67	 7.29	 0.46	 9.52	 1.20	 4.34	 0.74	 2.60
1969	 15.06	 10.16	 0.50	 8.69	 1.34	 11.66	 0.84	 2.68
1970	 15.95	 5.90 0.53	 6.00	 1.63	 21.64	 1.10	 3.07
1971	 17.35	 8.77	 0.58	 9.43	 1.91	 17.17	 1.33	 3.29
1972	 18.94	 9.16 0.63	 17.24	 2.13	 11.51	 1.50	 3.38
1973	 22.04	 16.36	 0.83 15.87	 2.58	 21.12	 1.85	 3.53
1974	 27.87	 26.45 0.92	 26.02	 3.89	 50.77	 2.97	 4.22
1975	 34.74	 24.65 1.08	 17.39	 3.94	 1.28	 2.86	 3.64
1976	 44.66	 28.55 1.22	 12.96	 4.11	 4.31	 2.89	 3.36
1977	 53.99	 20.89 1.48	 21.31	 4.78	 16.30	 3.30	 3.23
1978	 66.74	 23.61 1.83	 23.64	 5.72	 19.66	 3.89	 3.12
1979	 80.50	 20.61	 2.18	 19.12	 6.68	 16.78	 4.50	 3.06
1980	 102.40	 27.20	 2.36	 8.25	 7.49	 12.12	 5.13	 3.17
1981	 130.25	 27.19 2.23 -5.50	 5.82 -22.29	 3.59	 2.61
1982	 173.87	 33.48	 2.50	 12.10	 5.95	 2.23	 3.45	 2.38
1983	 207.56	 19.37	 2.45 -2.00
	 5.95	 0.00	 3.50	 2.43
1984	 262.21	 26.32 2.37 -3.26	 5.56	 -6.55	 3.19	 2.34
1985	 314.20	 19.82 2.31 -2.53	 5.29	 -4.85	 2.98	 2.29
1986	 354.10	 12.69	 2,37	 2.59	 6.18	 16.82	 3.81	 2.61
1987	 388.20	 9.63	 2.96	 24.84	 18.96	 44.98	 6.00	 3.02
Sources: a) ILO, "Annual labour statistics", (various issues)
b) OECD, "Country surveys", (various issues)
C) I.M.F. "Balance of payments statistics yearbook",
(various issues).
d) Own calculations.
Table 1-28: Weekly hours of work in the Greek and German manufacture
(1954-1985).
Year
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
W.	 Germany(1)
48.7
48.8
47.8
46.4
45.5
Greece
	 (2)
-
-
-
-
-
(1)-(2)
-
-
-
-
-
1959 45.6 44.0 1.6
1960 45.6 44.2 1.4
1961 45.3 44.7 0.6
1962 44.7 44.1 0.6
1963 44.3 43.4 0.9
1964 43.6 43.9 -0.3
1965 44.1 43.8 0.3
1966 43.7 43.3 0.4
1967 42.0 43.6 -1.6
1968 43.0 43.7 -0.7
1969 43.8 43.8 0.0
1970 43.8 44.6 -0.8
1971 43.0 44.1 -1.1
1972 42.7 44.6 -1.9
1973 42.8 43.4 -0.6
1974 41.9 43.8 -1.9
1975 40.4 42.7 -2.3
1976 41.4 41.9 -0.5
1977 41.7 41.0 -0.7
1978 41.6 41.8 -0.2
1979 41.8 41.2 0.6
1980 41.6 40.7 0.9
1981 41.1 39.5 1.6
1982 40.7	 ' 38.6 2.1
1983 40.5 38.5 2.0
1984 41.0 38.2 2.8
1985 40.7 39.3 2.4
1986 40.4 39.1 1.3
1987 40.1 39.2 0.9
Sources: (a) ILO, Annual Labour Statistics, various issues.
(b) Own calculations.
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PART TWO
"THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF EMIGRATION
BETWEEN GREECE AND THE E.C. COUNTRIES"
CHAPTER FIVE
"A THEORETICAL APPROACH ON THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF
EMIGRATION"
A. GENERAL.
A careful look at the existing literature reveals that, as in the
case of the causes of international movements of labour, a complete
theory on the economic effects of these movements does not exist. This
could be explained in a number of ways:
-The first thing one could say is that the effects of migration differ
considerably from case to case, which makes the application of a
general theoretical framework very difficult. Besides that, much of the
existing work is mainly descriptive and the fact that the authors have
used different, often implicit theoretical structures does not
facilitate the application of a single theoretical framework.
-Second, one has to take into account that migration influences a
series of economic variables, either directly or indirectly, but in any
case, as one among other factors; this makes the separability of the
particular effects of migration very difficult.
-Last but not least, one should keep in mind that most of the relevant
literature refers to the effects of migration on the immigration rather
than the emigration countries. This could partly be attributed to the
relatively recent interest economists have shown for the less developed
countries (as most emigration countries are), besides the lack of
reliable statistical data in many cases, which discourages potential
scholars on the subject.
Even this limited literature though, seems to "suffer" from two main
problems; first, most of the existing theoretical approaches on the
effects of migration fit in the frameworks of the main schools of
economic thought in terms of the analytical tools they use, only to a
very limited extent. They could be easier divided into groups according
to whether they consider migration beneficial or detrimental to both
emigration and immigration countries rather than to Marxists,
Neoclassicals, Keynesians etc. It is true, though, that libertarians,
taking a (more or less) Neoclassical line of argument stress the
benefits from migration and interventionists, taking a Keynesian or a
Neomarxist one, the losses but, in analytical terms, one can hardly
distinguish them. Second one should keep in mind that migration has
turned out to be a political issue both in the emigration and the
immigration countries; this has unfortunately led to the appearance of
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essays and articles which are distinguished for their sentimentalism
and bias rather than their intellectual value.
At this stage two points should be made: the first one is that the
precise effects of a certain emigration process, largely depend on its
characteristics, namely the numbers, the age and the skill level of the
emigrants. They also depend on the structural characteristics of the
emigration and immigration countries and hence it may be difficult to
generalise, unless if one takes the Neoclassical approach. The second
one is that the effects of emigration depend on the economic
conjuncture on the national as well as international level. Another
point to be taken into account is that the effects of an initial
temporary migration may differ considerably from the effects of an
eventual permanent one. Since the migratory flow from Greece to the
E.C. countries has been of a temporary nature, (chapter three) the
analysis will mainly refer to the possible effects of a temporary
migratory flow.
As in the case of the theory on the causes of migration (chapter I) I
will try to get around this lack of a complete theory on the effects of
migration by "borrowing" theoretical elements which could be applicable
to migration. For example, the theoretical approach on the determinants
of emigrants remittances will be based on the assumption that
remittances represent a transfer of money which can be saved (therefore
a form of savings in a country other than the one emigrants are
employed in, their country of origin).
As we will see in the following sections of this chapter, as well as
in chapters six seven and eight, there are many aspects to be taken
into account when investigating the macroeconomic effects of a
particular migration. In essence, such an exhaustive investigation
should include the impact of migration on all the macroeconomic
variables of the countries involved (labour exporting and labour
importing ones), in the short-run as well as the long-run period plus
aspects such as the demographic and regional dimension of migration.
Interesting and challenging as this may seem, it is clearly beyond the
scope of a single thesis given its time and word limits. Having to
choose therefore, I decided to investigate as comprehensively and
deeply as I could one of the aspects related to the effects of
migration, namely remittances. For the sake of completeness though, and
since the analysis of the ninth chapter will require an overall
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evaluation of the effects of migration between Greece and the other
E.C. countries, I had to take into account (even briefly) the other
effects as well. I therefore, consciously decided to sacrifice depth
for breadth as far as the other (besides remittances) effects of
migration between Greece and the other E.C. countries are concerned,
leaving this task for other analysts or even myself in the future.
Civen this, the methodology to be followed in this chapter will be as
follows: First, it should be made clear that the effects of emigration
can be examined both on the micro and macroeconomic level. The
microeconomic level examines the individual decision of a person to
emigrate and the consequences of this decision for that person. The
examination of the effects of emigration for the emigration and the
immigration countries in total takes place on the macro economic level.
The latter will be the priority in the following paragraphs, although
references will be made to the former one as well. Second, in terms of
structure of the contents, the division most authors seem to agree on,
short-run and long-run economic effects, will be followed. Remittances
will be dealt with separately (although they could be included in the
short-run effects). Third, the theoretical discussion will be organised
in terms of supply-side and then demand-side factors although there is
clearly an over-lap between them.
Before further proceeding, I should make clear, at this point, the
distinction of short and long-run period which I will follow throughout
this chapter as well as chapters 6-8. For the particular case of the
postwar intra-European emigration, short-run will refer to the period
in which the whole- process acceleration of migration-deceleration of
migration-acceleration of repatriation evolved, that is a fifteen, more
or less, year period (1960-74). In other words as long (or simply
longer) run effects I will treat the implications of migration which
became obvious after the above process was completed.
B. REMITTANCES, THEIR IMPACT ON GROWTH AND
DEVELOPMENT AND THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
IMPLICATIONS OF MIGRATION.
1 General. 
Emigrants remittances represent one of the few (if not the only)
factors all authors accept as necessary to be examined, as far as the
economic effects of migration are concerned. In almost all migratory
flows in world history, immigrants have tended to remit money to their
countries of origin, especially when they were not accompanied by their
families and relatives.
To the emigration countries, remittances represent economic support
for those who receive them or savings sent or brought upon return; on
the other hand, remittances could be seen as a simple intra-family
transfer, different from the support working members of a family
provide to the non-working ones only because they are happening across
national boundaries (Glitsos, 1988, pp. 524-5).
Economic theory has, to a very large extent, viewed remittances as a
by product of migration, emphasising their impact on the balance of
payments of emigration and immigration countries and neglecting their
determinants (Straubhaar, 1986, p. 728). Empirical evidence suggests
that immigrants are usually willing to work overtime and live at a
relatively (to the indigenous population) lower standard of living
because their specific goal is to maximise their remittances in a
relatively short period of time (Kindleberger, 1965, p. 237, Castles
and Kosack, 1985, pp.. 93-8).
In the conventional balance of payments analysis, remittances are
treated as a gift or so-called unilateral transfers. This treatment
though, could be subject to some criticism, especially when the human
capital element is brought in the analysis. The families of the
emigrants are deprived of the financial support he (or she) would offer
them had he not emigrated, assuming that emigrants would have been
employed; although these people could only be considered as capital
exporters if the human capital approach is adopted, their claims for
some income are fair enough, especially since "...workers do not go
abroad in large numbers to escape from their families, but rather to be
able to provide more for them... "(Blitz, 1977, p. 499).
By using a human-capital approach, one could regard remittances as
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the return on foreign investment. The question which arises though is
who receives the return of this investment. An emigrant may remit money
home in order to (partially or even entirely) finance the consumption
of his (or her) family (Granier and Marciano, 1975, pp. 161-2). In
case their families join them abroad or when they get married abroad,
their remittances are usually considerably reduced or even stopped
(Blitz, 1977 p. 498). Evidence on intra-European migration in the early
1960s suggested that the average migrant "...remits in a pattern which
is low during the first months, as he becomes accustomed to foreign
patterns of production and consumption and picks up to remain high for
years. If the man or family returns, the remittances, of course, stop
altogether. But if he remains abroad, they slowly decline and probably
cease after half a generation or more, to revive again sporadically in
times of compassionate need at home" (ICindleberger, 1965, pp. 237-41).
Since immigrants do not spend the money they remit on consumption,
remittances are measured as a part of saving and therefore could be
examined in the context of a savings function. On the other hand
though, they may simply mean an individual's preference to spend on
consumption, save or even speculate on these amounts of money in his
country of origin rather than in the immigration country. There are two
things to be found out therefore: the factors that determine an
individual's decision to remit and, secondly, the motives and the aims
of those remitting which determine, to a great extent, the economic
impact of remittances.
A series of factors may influence the volume of emigrants'
remittances. An individual working in an immigration country has
basically three options: to accumulate savings, to purchase consumer
goods and to purchase capital goods. In macroeconomic terms, saving is
merely a precursor to the two other options. Saving represents
postponed consumption or future investment (Straubhaar, 1985, p. 88).
From a purely macroeconomic point of view, especially in the case of
temporary emigration, one could assume that decisions on remittances
are taken based on life-cycle considerations. There are two main kinds
of flows of remittances to the emigration countries: i) remittances for
the subsistence of the emigrants' families (consumption purposes) and
ii) transfers of savings for hoarding (investment purposes). This
heterogeneity of remittances as to their purpose differentiates the
factors that determine their volume and the frequency of inflow of the
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exchange. Remittances which finance consumption are determined by
factors related to the family of the emigrant such as its level of
income, the number of children, the average life standard in the
emigration country, the exchange rate and the inflation rate (Glitsos
N., 1987, p. 88). Remittances destined for savings in the emigration
country are determined by the emigrants level of savings in the
immigration country, the relative interest rates in the two countries,
the rate of return of certain investments (e.g. constructions) in the
emigration country, the exchange rate, the security of savings in the
emigration country etc. (op. cit.). Generally speaking, the aggregate
level of remittances to an emigration country is usually determined by
factors such the number of emigrants, their income in the immigration
country, their propensity to consume and to save, the situation of the
labour market in the immigration countries, the incentives provided by
the emigration ones, the exchange rates etc. Empirical tests (Duysan,
1985, Glitsos, 1987 and 1988, Straubhaar, 1986) have verified that
remittances are usually, determined by such factors but, at the same
time, are influenced by a series of non-economic ones such as their
family status.
At this point, a distinction relative to the role of remittances on
the measurement of GDP could be made: The permanent migrant contributes
nothing to the GDP of his country of origin; it is the immigration
country which benefits from his employment in terms of GDP. His
remittances are, therefore, a transfer. The temporary migrant, on the
other hand, contributes to the GNP of the emigration rather than the
immigration country; his remittances, therefore, are net earnings, (and
therefore a credit in the balance of payments as services exported)
derived from his gross earnings (his income) less his subsistence which
can be regarded as an import of food and services (Kindleberger, 1967).
2, A Theoretical Approach on 1k Effects of Remittances. 
Remittances can contribute both to foreign exchange earnings and to
capital formation. As a source of foreign exchange, they are preferable
to the exports of goods, in the sense that they imply no imports of
inputs (raw materials and equipment) as most manufacturing goods do.
Following a simple Keynesian model we could say that the
remittance-multiplier
	 is	 higher	 than	 the	 export-multiplier
(1Cindleberger, 1965 states that it is lower but this is probably a
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printing error) since there are no withdrawals included in the
denominator, if the emigrant was unemployed before leaving; besides
that, one could argue that remittances may not stimulate imports since
they will, to a certain extent, be spent for consumption by the spouses
of the emigrants which may have a limited taste for foreign articles of
consumption since they reside at home (1).
In any case, the impact of remittances depends on their size and use
and this is the main reason why many emigration countries (Turkey
probably being the best example) adopt policy measures aiming at their
maximisation as well as their more beneficial (for the national
economy) use (Paine, 1974, pp. 151-3 and Straubhaar, 1986, p. 728).
Perhaps the most obvious consequence of remittances is the one
concerning the balance of payments of both groups of countries. Apart
from that, they may influence a series of other macroeconomic
variables. If, for example, they contribute to an increase of savings
available for capital formation, they may stimulate an increase of the
productive capacity, employment and output growth (Kirwan, Holden,
1986, pp. 52-5 and Rivera-Batiz, 1986, pp. 3-19). If spent on imported
consumer goods because of domestic supply limitations, they will simply
cause an increase of level and imports (MacMillen, 1982, pp. 262-6).
The inflow of remittances could be seen as representing a net benefit
for the emigration countries, especially as far as their balance of
payments is concerned, since it represents a unilateral transfer, very
(1) A simple sample models has been constructed in order to modulate
the assumption on the relative size of the two multipliers:In an
economy with a government and a foreign sector (including autonomous
exports, imports and inflows of remittances), GDP for a certain year is
given by the following equation:
Y = C+I+ G + (X - M) + Rem	 in addition to that:
C=c+cYd, Yd= (Y-T)=(Y-tY), - I=I, - G=G, X=X, - Rem=Ref, -2M=(m
(indicating the import content of exports). The reduced form of the
model will be:
-r-r+-o + X(1-ni2) +Rem
(1 - c + ct + m 0
in such a case the remittances (b) and exports (b) multipliers will
be equal to: kt = AY I d Rem = 1 / (1 - c + ct + mi)
k2 = zl Y / il X = (1 - m2) / (1 - c + ct + nu)
since m2 is a positive number, (we have assumed that exports have a
positive import content), ki > b.
Y— 
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much alike, one could say, to the development aid rich countries
provide to the poorer ones. By taking this point and therefore treating
remittances as akin to foreign aid, one could use the "dual-gap model"
in order to investigate the impact of remittances on economic growth
and development as well as the balance of payments of the emigration
countries.
According to the "dual-gap model" (for an extensive analysis see
Thirlwall, 1989, pp. 294-316), countries, especially those in the pre
take-off stage of development (as most of the emigration countries) are
faced with two gaps; the first one is the savings-investment gap
(caused by inadequate savings for the financing of the, necessary for
economic development, investment); the second one is the foreign
exchange gap (that is an excess of imports over exports) which follows
the first one. Since growth requires investment goods which may be
produced domestically or imported, domestic provision requires savings
and foreign provision requires foreign exchange. If the investment
goods necessary for growth can only be provided from abroad, then
growth requires foreign exchange in order to be sustained. Foreign aid
(remittances) can provide this foreign exchange by relaxing the balance
of payments constraint. The crucial question to be answered though is
whether this availability of foreign exchange and therefore imported
investment goods will be able to sustain economic growth and
development. According to the pioneering studies of dual-gap analysis
by Adelman, Chenery and collaborators (1966) (who in fact studied the
application of this model in the case of Greece among other countries),
foreign aid will contribute to the economic development of the
receiving country provided that this country will manage to use this
aid in order to finance investment which will unable it to produce
exportable goods or investment goods which will substitute imports. In
other words, since the inflow of foreign exchange due to foreign aid
(or remittances) will apply for a certain period of time, the receiving
country will have to shift to the production of exportables or (and)
reduce the import content of its production which will bridge the
foreign exchange gap in the medium and long-run period, that is after
the inflow of exchange in the form of foreign aid (remittances) ends.
Otherwise this inflow of foreign exchange will bridge the two gaps only
temporarily and cause a further increase of the foreign exchange gap
since growth will be based on increasing imports.
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In a more comprehensive way of analysis foreign aid has two functions
as far as economic development is concerned: The first function of aid
(remittances) is to "facilitate economic and social transformation by
overcoming temporary shortages in specific human and material
resources, by promoting strategic activities, by inducing and
facilitating critical governmental policies, and by providing a certain
amount of working capital or margin of resources for carrying out
programs involving a shift in the structure of the economy..."
(Mikessell, 1968, pp. 258-9). The second function of aid (remittances)
is "...the employment of external capital for supplementing domestic
resources for achieving a higher level of investment and rate of growth
in output..." (op. cit).
In the context of this theoretical approach remittances are examined
as a potential supply factor for economic growth in the sense that they
may provide resources (in foreign exchange) for the financing of
investment in the emigration countries. The main problem in "borrowing"
this theory, which was constructed for foreign aid, and using it for
remittances, is the fact that foreign aid is usually administered by
the governments of the receiving countries, while remittances are
usually administered by the persons who receive them, that is the
relatives of the emigrants. It is therefore easier to channel foreign
exchange from foreign aid to the activities described above rather than
using remittances for this purpose. This reservation is related to the
fact that, if remittances are spent on consumption they can hardly
contribute to development through the process described above.
Furthermore, they could have an adverse effect on the balance of
payments if they finance the purchase of imported goods (the so called
boomerang effect, that is, the increase of imports of the emigration
country due to the increase in disposable income caused by the inflow
of remittances).
Even if remittances contribute to the financing of investment though,
it is not certain whether they will contribute to economic development
through the process described in the dual-gap model (one should keep in
mind that even in the context of the dual-gap model money can be
channeled in the "wrong" direction). The investments remittances have
to finance according to this model are specific in terms of their
contribution both to capital formation and the production of goods
which will enable the receiving country to achieve self-sustained
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growth by expanding its exports and domestically producing investment
goods which were imported previously. In this context, investment in
housing or manufacturing sectors producing goods for the internal
market may bridge both gaps temporarily but widen the foreign exchange
gap in the medium and long-run (Adelman and Chenery, 1966).
On the demand-side now, the following points could be made:
-The inflow of remittances may cause an increase in imports in the
emigration country. The size of this increase will depend on whether
the propensity to spend on imports out of remittances is higher than
the corresponding one for the indigenous income; if this is the case,
(since it may as well be lower than or, equal to the MPC for the
indigenous income) one should expect a rise of imports as a percentage
of GDP. This will also be the case if remittances finance (to a great
extent) the purchase of goods with a high (above average) import
content or if the people not receiving remittances imitate the
consumption pattern of those who do (Paine, 1974, pp. 43-44). On the
other hand exports to the immigration country may increase if migrants
persist in demanding consumer goods produced in their country of
origin. Besides that migrants may act as "ambassadors" of their home
country causing an increase of tourist receipts. Another indirect
effect of migration on the balance of payments (the balance of trade in
particular) of both groups of countries (which is not taken into
consideration very often) is that immigration countries may manage to
promote their exports, including exports to the emigration countries,
simply because the import of cheap labour from the latter presses the
labour cost down, thus, increasing the competitiveness of the
exportables the former produce (Paine, 1974, pp. 43-4).
-If the above is true, emigration may influence the future of both the
export orientated and the import substituting industries in the
emigration country. The increase in imports caused by the boomerang
effect of remittances may displace the domestically produced goods.
Assuming that the emigration country in question is, at that time,
trying to develop its manufacturing and tries to protect it until it
acquires a competitive edge (that is by taking "infant industry"
considerations into account, one could say that this displacement of
domestic goods by imported ones may prove to be a negative factor for
the industrial development of the emigration country if it is
substantial. Even if remittances contribute to the finance of
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investment in the "infant industry", in reality this may prove to be a
loss of money if there is no room for the products of this industry in
the foreign or the domestic market.
-Another consideration is that migration may also affect imports,
exports and the development of infant industries, through the exchange
rate. This factor was not taken into account in the period between the
end of World War II and the early 1970s, because nominal exchange rates
were relatively stable (although subject to adjustment) for most
immigration and emigration countries under the Bretton Woods system;
even in that period though, remittances must have had some impact on
the real exchange rates by changing the balance of payments pattern and
influencing inflation rates. In a system of "dirty" floating (like the
one which prevailed for most countries after the collapse of the
Bretton Woods system), an emigration country will have to maintain a
not substantially over valued exchange rate for its currency vis a vis
the one of the immigration country in order to attract remittances
(although one could express reservations of course on how a country can
determine its own exchange rate in such a system). Otherwise emigrants
may choose to deposit in a bank abroad (Paine, 1974, pp. 43-44). In
such a case, the policy makers in the emigration country will either
have to set an exchange rate which attracts remittances at the cost of
loss of competitiveness for the domestic goods or operate on a dual or
even multiple exchange rate system. Under a system of floating exchange
rates though, (and this applies to "dirty" floating to a great extent),
characterised by the existence of speculation, both alternatives imply
a high risk for the • national currency because not only will it be
vulnerable to a deterioration of the balance of trade but to pressures
caused by speculation as well. The final outcome of the whole mechanism
may as well be a considerable de facto loss of value for the emigration
country's currency.
-Finally, remittances can harm the exports of the emigration country by
leading to a "higher" value for the currency of this country, which
would make its exports less competitive in the international markets.
2,. Some Further Theoretical Considerations. 
The inflow of remittances is, in principle, a positive factor for the
balance of payments of emigration countries since they can finance
short-run deficits in the balance of trade; dependence on remittances
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as a major source of foreign exchange, though, may have several
additional medium and long-run implications. First, the size of
remittances (as well as the size of the other invisible receipts) may
witness very high fluctuations (in Turkey during the early 1970s in
particular, they reached a twenty four per cent drop in one year and a
seventy two percent increase in another year, (MacMillen, 1982, pp.
264-265) the worst part of the story being that emigration countries
can do very little or even nothing to reduce the size of these
fluctuations or remittances in general. These fluctuations "...increase
the difficulties of demand management in the short run and uncertainty
does not improve the basis for longer term macro economic planning"
(MacMillen, 1982, pp. 264-266). Secondly, the fact that remittances
relieve the balance of payments constraint in the short-run, could
cause a delay or even a postponement of measures and policies desirable
and necessary for economic development, although there is no necessary
link. In many cases they hide the need for policies aiming at the
restructuring of the economy in general and industry in particular,
since they (appear to) carry out one of the main tasks of industry,
namely the provision of foreign exchange, emigration taking care of the
crucial task of providing employment for the native population.
The analysis so far should in no case lead to definitely negative
conclusions as far as the potential effects of remittances for the
emigration countries are concerned. In principle emigration countries
may benefit from them, depending on whether they use them to expand the
productive capacities of their economies, provided of course that the
volume of the remittances is somehow guaranteed. The fact that there is
very little (if any) empirical evidence of such a benefit for the
emigration countries could be attributed to the inability of these
countries to influence the volume and fluctuations of remittances and
use them in an efficient way.
We should now consider remittances and the balance of payments
effects of migration for the immigration countries. Remittances clearly
represent an outflow of exchange to the emigration countries and could,
therefore, be considered as a negative factor for the balance of
payments of the immigration countries, similar to the one of capital
outflow.
As far as the impact of immigration on the trade balance is
concerned, the import side is fairly straightforward; for each of the
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major categories of expenditure, (spending on consumers' goods, on
government goods and services and on investment items) a proportion is
spent on imported goods. These imported goods may be either final
goods, bought directly by their ultimate users or, intermediate goods
used in the production of final ones.
If the import content of each category of immigrant expenditure is
the same as for the remainder of the population, then generally
speaking, the impact of immigration on imports depends on factors such
as:
-the impact of their expenditure for consumption on imports depends on
which part of their income they spent on consumption (here again their
propensity to remit is of great importance) and on their consumption
pattern (domestically produced or imported goods). Immigrants should be
expected to adopt the consumption patterns of the lower income groups
of the population, mainly because they remit a great part of their
income and have to live on a fairly low remainder.
-Very few immigrants and, especially temporary ones could be seen as
potential investors (especially in non-property assets) in the
immigration country mainly because of their ignorance of the
conditions; this expenditure category therefore, should not be
seriously taken into consideration in the case of temporary
immigration, at least not in a direct way. It could be taken into
consideration, though, as far as the stimulative effect of immigration
on investment by native residents is concerned. In other words,
immigration may stimulate high import content investment by native
investors and therefore influence imports in an indirect way.
From the analysis so far it becomes clear that "...more than any
other effect, an assessment of the immigrant impact on the balance of
payments is essentially impressionistic..." (Jones, and Smith, 1970,
pp. 156-8). One may take into account all the necessary special
considerations and, in fact, feed them into the calculation, but, in
many cases they consist of the end products of other assessments as the
inflationary and productivity impact of immigration.
As far as exports are concerned, we could say that, whether or not
the arrival of immigrants has a direct effect on the level of exports
basically depends on whether the demand for goods produced and exported
by the immigration country can be met without the additional immigrant
labour. If labour shortages have been a factor constraining the
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production of these goods, then obviously immigration will facilitate a
boost in exports. This will be particularly true, for those sectors
which in the absence of immigration would face labour shortages leading
to wage increases at the cost of falling international competitiveness
though. Although quantifying this effect is difficult, in fact possible
only in the context of a full model of the economy of an immigration
country, it should certainly be taken into account when discussing the
effects of immigration on the balance of payments.
C. OTHER SHORT-RUN ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF MIGRATION.
Although emigration may involve individual gains and losses for the
emigrants, the analysis of this section will concentrate on the
short-run costs and benefits of migration (besides remittances) for the
economies of the labour exporting and labour importing countries.
L The Effect on II& Labour Market And Wages. 
Migration of workers is, first of all, a factor directly influencing
the supply of labour both for emigration and immigration countries. For
the emigration countries in particular, net emigration, besides
directly reducing the labour supply, reduces it disproportionately
since it mainly refers to particular groups of the labour force
(Bohning, 1975, p. 261). As a result, the unemployment and the
underemployment rate in the emigration countries are reduced after
emigration, at least in the short run. This reduction, of course,
depends on the size of emigration relatively to the size of the labour
force of those countries. We can therefore examine emigration as a
mechanism blunting (in the short-run) the pressures imposed by
unemployment in the emigration countries, (Coale, 1976) or, in other
words a "safety valve" for unemployment.
On the other hand, the inflow of labour for the immigration countries .
empowers them to overcome labour shortages and to preserve relatively
(to what they would have been had emigration not occurred) low wage
levels. Furthermore if these countries can directly control the number
of immigrants (which was the case for West. Germany, but not for the
U.K. which now sets upper limits), this simply means that they may have
an additional tool for the short and medium term planning of the
economy, at least as far as labour supply is concerned. This scheme
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operates when migration takes place from relatively overpopulated
countries to relatively under populated ones (from high unemployment
and low employment opportunity countries to ones witnessing lower
unemployment rates and higher employment opportunities) and only in the
short-run.
According to ICindleberger (1967, p. 200), emigration may lower
unemployment and underemployment in the emigration countries, while the
level of production is unaffected. This could be true under several
strict assumptions (zero or even negative marginal labour productivity
in the emigration country prior to emigration and negligible
contribution of the emigrants in aggregate demand). These assumptions
are necessary in order to accept that the departure of emigrants does
not affect the level of output in the emigration country. It is quite
obvious that this analysis is mainly based on the Lewis model discussed
in chapter one; the zero marginal productivity hypothesis may seem
quite strong, especially when discussing the case of a massive
emigratory flow. A very low (close to zero but still positive) marginal
productivity assumption for the emigrants seems to be more realistic;
under this assumption one could rephrase the conclusion in the
beginning of the paragraph as follows: emigration will lower
unemployment and underemployment in the emigration country at the
possible cost of a relatively low fall in the level of production.
Assuming that migration is not accompanied by a considerable increase
of the labour supply in the emigration country and a considerable fall
of the domestic labour supply in the immigration one, one could say
that it causes a shift of the short-term aggregate supply of labour
curve to the left (labour supply measured in person-hours) for the
emigration countries, and, a shift of the short-term supply of labour
curve to the right in the immigration - ones (Kindleberger, 1967, p.
200). Under such conditions and, provided no (Keynesian) wage
rigidities exist, one could expect considerable implications (a .
downward pressure) for the real wage rate in the immigration country;
one could also expect an upward pressure on real wages in the
emigration country (op. cit.).
Following a Neoclassical way of analysis and, using a general
equilibrium model, Quibria (1989) came up with the conclusion that
under certain circumstances emigration may cause a fall instead of an
increase in real wages in the emigration countries. This approach, is
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in accordance with the conclusion that an increase in real wages should
be expected in the case of unskilled labour emigration. The emigration
of people endowed with physical or human capital though, could imply a
withdrawal of capital that exceeds in proportional terms the outflow of
labour, leading to a fall of the economy's capital-labour ratio and
thus, of real wage.
For the immigration countries now, the size of the impact of
immigration on real wages seems to depend on the length of stay of the
immigrants (temporary or permanent immigration). Clearly, a short-stay
immigration has temporary (if any) effects on the labour supply and
therefore the real wage rate, compared with long-stay or permanent
immigration. It can also depend on whether immigration is regulated or
not. The overall effect on labour supply will depend on whether
indigenous labour will respond to immigration and in what way.
Temporary immigrants could prove to be very sensitive to wage increases
(both in terms of their geographical mobility and supply of weekly
hours of work), probably more sensitive than indigenous workers and
certainly more sensitive than permanent immigrants, especially if they
aim at maximising their income (and probably remittances) before
repatriation in a limited period of time (especially if immigration is
regulated in terms of their length of stay). On the other hand though,
income maximisation may imply work as many hours as possible; if this
is the case, one may as well assume an elasticity equal to zero.
Regulating immigration can also make immigrants more mobile both
geographically and professionally; if immigrants are hired on a
relatively short-term contract basis and can only prolong their stay by
getting a job in another firm or else be expelled, (as was the case in
West Germany but not in the U.K.) they will have to be very mobile, at
least more mobile than indigenous workers especially if indigenous
workers do not respond to immigrants in a competitive way.
In many cases and as far as the impact of emigration on the labour
market is concerned the following error is made by some authors (e.g.
OECD): the emigration of a certain number of people is considered as an
equal fall in the number of unemployed and underemployed. This is an
oversimplification, the error being that it is not sure that those who
emigrate were accounted for in the labour force of their country of
origin for two reasons:
-A certain part of those who emigrate are relatives of the emigrant
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workers (family emigration); these people were not active before
emigrating, the possible exception being those involved (even on a
part-time basis) in a family type agricultural production (organised on
a non-capitalist basis) as was the case for most migrants from the
Mediterranean countries. Even in that case though, employment
statistics do not consider these people as employed. In a sense, it is
not at all certain whether these people will be economically active
after emigrating. This has very often been the case with the postwar
intra-European emigration since the late 1960s (Bohning, 1975).
b) A part of the emigrants were not active in their country of origin
but they become so in the immigration countries (e.g. women) (Paine,
1974, p. 39). The validity of this argument, of course, depends on the
definition of economically active (e.g. should one include housework in
economic activity, underemployment etc?)
It is also argued that some of the dependents of the emigrants in the
home country will cease to work (or look for work) because they receive
the remittances. (op. cit.)
The Impact on Incomeand GDP Growth
In the short-run migration can increase the per capita income in the
emigration countries and correspondingly reduce it in the immigration
ones. This conclusion which can be derived from the evolution of the
ratio total income / total population (the denominator changes in both
countries) is surprisingly extended by several economists (Mishan and
Needleman 1966, Rodriguez 1975) for the long-run period too. This kind
of analysis, though, is strictly static in nature, it is based on the
assumption of similar birth rates for the two groups of countries and
does not take into account the fact that migration will surely affect
total income and the capital formation in both countries, through the
changes in aggregate demand. Even if we accept that the emigrants'
income is close to the subsistence level before migrating, it is.
certain that their departure will affect aggregate demand, at least as
far as consumption is concerned. Furthermore their employment abroad
will supply them an income, part of which may be remitted in the
homeland (Grubel and Scott, 1966, Grubel 1981).
Migration implies a transfer of a factor of production from one
country to another. Following a supply-side approach to economic
growth, one could say that the increase of labour supply in a growing
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economy where capital formation leaves the capital-labour ratio almost
unaffected. As a result, profits remain high and growth is continued.
The defenders of this argument (Maddison (1977), ICindleberger (1967))
do not claim that abundant labour can initiate growth, but once the
dynamic process has started, whether this process will continue or will
be thrown into reverse, depends upon labour supply being available.
Kaldor in particular, assuming that a pool of labour was available,
emphasized the significance of labour absorption by manufacturing (the
powerful engine of growth), partly because of its forward and backward
linkage effects, but more important, because, in line with Verdoorn's
law, it is in this sector that economies of scale are most pronounced
and that productivity grows faster the faster the growth rate of output
(Verdoom, 1951, Boltho 1982).
The impact of emigration on the GDP of the emigration countries could
be examined in a context including both supply and demand-side
approaches to economic growth.
The side of the demand covers the fall in consumption due to the
decrease of the population caused by emigration, in contradiction to
the increase of consumption due to the inflow of remittances.
(Kindleberger, 1967, p. 241) Here the final outcome depends on the
nature of who emigrates; if the people who emigrate had a very low
income before emigrating (unemployed or underemployed), the fall in
aggregate demand after their departure will be small. (Friendlander,
1965. p. 31) On the other hand, the remittances will cause an increase
of the national disposable income (depending on their size of course);
this will probably lead, to an increase in aggregate demand, especially
if a considerable part of remittances is spent (OECD, 1979).
The supply side refers to the production foregone due to the
reduction of the labour force after emigration and the impact on
capital formation (Cindleberger, 1967, p. 243). Again the final outcome
depends on who emigrates. Emigration will cause a fall in production
only in the case when the labour reserves of the emigration country
fail to fill the gaps caused by the departure of the emigrants.
(Zolotas, 1966, p. 13)
The simultaneous analysis of the demand and supply sides brings up
another question; the inflow of remittances, especially if they are
greater than the fall in consumption caused by emigration, will
increase aggregate demand in money terms.
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The contribution of the immigrants to the economic growth of the
immigration countries consists of the coverage of labour shortages.
Generally speaking, and "...unless the economy is prone to extremely
perverse effects..." (Jones and Smith, 1970, p. 127), immigration, by
adding to the country's labour resources, will potentially increase
total output. What is less certain however, is whether or not
immigration tends to raise or lower per capita output and standards in
the immigration countries. The impact of immigration on production and
per capita income can take two forms:
-The first one is the 'direct production effect" (Macmillen, 1982, p.
246). Assuming an economy at full employment and no aggregate demand
problems in the short-run. In such an economy, the increase of the
labour force due to immigration would cause production to rise (Shlaim
and Yannopoulos , 1976, pp. 100-109). This is the direct production
effect. According to this model the direct production effect will be
the greater if total labour productivity increases either due to
induced investment or simply because immigrants are more productive
than the native labour force (Mishan and Needleman, 1968, pp. 129-30).
-The second one is the "instantaneous welfare effect" (MacMillen, op.
cit.). It has already been argued that the inflow of immigrants
suppresses wages and redistributes income in favour of capital, through
increasing profits. This, according to Shlaim and Yannopoulos (1976)
causes an increase in investment, GDP and local capitalists are the
ones to enjoy this increase . In fact, none of the increase in output
resulting from immigration accrues to the indigenous labour force. The
increase in labour supply lowers the general wage rate below what it
would have been otherwise; this fall simply means additional profits
for the capitalists in the immigration country. In other words (since
this analysis assumes that there are no multinationals and therefore
capitalists are indigenous) the income of the indigenous population
rises. This is the "instantaneous welfare effect"; it's size depends on
the capital stock owned by foreigners. The higher the proportion of
capital owned by foreigners, the smaller the size of this effect. There
is a series of reservations one could express in relation to this
analysis. First, the redistribution of income caused by the wage
suppression effect of immigration, reduces consumer demand and lowers
investment. Therefore the "instantaneous welfare effect" analysis is
somehow based on Say's law (supply creating its own demand). Second, it
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is based on the (purely Neoclassical) assumption of real wage downward
flexibility. Clearly, if these two assumptions are not valid, the whole
model collapses.
The increase in returns to capital used to generate output growth
with immigrants plus the redistribution of income from wage earners to
capitalists will be very helpful in the analysis of the long-run
implications of immigration, as well.
Both the "direct production effect" and the "instantaneous welfare"
one are purely static in nature. Static in this case is used in a
special sense to denote the absence of any economies of scale and any
(exogenously determined) time related technological change or progress
element in the production function (Jones and Smith, 1970, p. 128).
Under these assumptions, and in a theoretical framework in line with
Say's law, output will change only as a a result of changes in the
inputs of capital and labour.
In such a case, the impact of immigration on output and per capita
output could be examined in two extreme situations:
a) immigrants are employed in combination with the existing stock of
capital, implying a fall in the capital per worker;
b) there is a proportionate rise in the stock of industrial capital in
order to maintain the previous production method (or, in other words,
the level of capital per worker) (Jones and Smith, 1970, p. 129). The
impact of immigration on national productivity depends on the nature of
the consequent changes in capital per worker.
Impact on Prices and Income Distribution. 
The discussion about the relationship between migration and the path
of inflation in the emigration and immigration countries is of
particular interest and, at the same time, of particular complexity,
since it depends on the theory of inflation employed. Migration may
influence the price level and the rate of its change in more than one.
ways; in particular the impact of migration on prices may originate
from the changes it implies on the labour markets of both groups of
countries. Besides that, remittances may have an impact on prices
through the changes in demand they may imply as well as through changes
in the money supply. Finally migration may affect the price level
through the changes in total output and aggregate demand it implies.
In particular and, as far as the immigration countries are concerned,
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assuming no downward wage rigidity, the increase in the supply of
labour may cause a downward pressure on the real wage level; even when
the latter increases, however, it may fall short of the increase of
labour productivity (Kindleberger, 1967). This is usually the case in
the immigration countries especially due to the limited unionisation
and bargaining power of the immigrants. Exactly the opposite may be
true in the emigration countries, where the decrease in labour supply
may result in a wage increase if the emigrants were employed before
leaving, which would not have occurred without immigration.
The deflationary impact of immigration through the avoiding of
considerable wage increases labour shortages could have caused, needs
further consideration. First of all, it must be made clear that it is
based on a Phillips curve way of thinking; it is surely based on the
idea of a downward sloping Phillips curve or, in other words a trade
off between unemployment and wage (price) increases. In the case of an
inelastic Phillips curve, the impact of migration on price increases
could be minimal (a vertical Phillips curve) or even zero (a horizontal
Phillips curve).
Provided that the aforementioned assumptions on the increased
mobility of the immigrant labour force are valid, the impact of
immigration on inflation could be examined as follows: Immigration may
act as a substitute for interregional (internal) movements of labour;
it therefore tends to eliminate (or at least considerably reduce)
interregional differences in labour market shortages. As a result, the
national unemployment-wage relationship will tend to change, reducing
demand pressures (this of course depends on the immigrants' MPC),
although national unemployment may prove to be a poor measure of the
available pool of labour; besides that, immigrant workers are more
mobile than native workers and therefore more "helpful" in reducing
imbalances in the regional labour markets (Shlaim and Yannopoulos, p.
111). Mishan and Needleman, (1968) though, argue that immigration may
fail to remove bottlenecks from certain sectors, because a
preponderance of immigrant workers in these sectors makes them less
attractive for the native labour force, although empirical evidence
(Castles and Kosack, 1985, pp. 48-50) suggests that migration was to
the areas already considered inferior; as a result, the supply of
native labourers to these sectors may fall. Even if this is the case,
though, the overall impact should be expected to be a deflationary one:
152
by postponing the need for wage adjustments immigration tends to reduce
the risk of the inflationary effects such adjustments may generate.
As far as the possible appearance of demand pull inflation in
relation to migration is concerned, the analysis is based on the degree
of variation of total supply and total demand in the emigration and
immigration countries. It is plausible to expect a simultaneous (but
not necessarily of equal size) increase of total supply and demand in
the immigration countries; whether inflation rates increase however
depends on whether demand or supply will increase the most as a result
of migration (Bohning, 1975). Here again, immigrants' MPC may prove a
very important factor to be taken into account, although the other
components of demand should be taken into account too. .
Net immigration in an economy at (or near) full employment will
contribute to demand pull inflationary forces. Even if immigrants have
a lower propensity to consume than the native population, the
additional resources made available for new investment are by no means
sufficient to cover the immediate capital needs of the new members of
the population. Under certain circumstances the threat for a
substantial contribution of immigration to inflationary pressures can
be real. (Jones and Smith, 1970, p. 143) The counter-factual position
though, that is, what would have happened if the excess demand for
labour had not been satisfied by immigration, may lead to the
conclusion that inflation would occur one way or another.
As far as the emigration countries are concerned, we should expect a
decrease of output (except when the marginal productivity of labour in
the emigration country equals zero prior to emigration) and an increase
of demand as a result of remittances (to the extent that these
remittances finance consumption), coinciding with a decrease in demand
due to the departure of the emigrants. This increase in disposable
income (as a result of remittances) and the consequent increase in
demand (provided that the increase in demand due to the remittances
outweights its decrease due to the departure of the emigrants) may
induce an increase in the price level if it is not followed by a
simultaneous and analogous increase of aggregate supply (Coale, 1976).
Inflation may also rise in the emigration countries if the departure of
the emigrants leads to selective labour shortages and therefore wage
increases; alternatively, return workers may influence trade unions to
pursue more militant policies but this will depend on whether returnees
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will chose to unionise (Paine, 1974, P. 43).
The deflationary impact of emigration, due to the fall in demand
deserves further discussion. Kindleberger's (1965, p. 242) argument
(surprisingly unKeynesian this time) is that the foregone consumption
of the emigrants has a deflationary impact. This will be true as long
as there is some net reduction in consumption which is not accompanied
by an equal reduction in output (or potential output). This effect,
though, could be neutralised if, for example, the relatives of the
emigrants raised their consumption (financing it with remittances).
The impact of remittances on inflation for both groups of countries
could also be examined in terms of their impact on the money supply.
This could best be shown with an example: if country A (the emigration
one) and country B (the immigration one) have formed something like a
monetary union, which implies a common currency more or less, the money
supply increase in country A will equal the money supply fall in
country B; money supply changes in each country will ceteris paribus be
equal to remittances from country B to country A. The common currency
assumption is not the strict one in this example; the same conclusions
would be true by adopting an assumption on convertibility of the two
currencies at fixed exchange rates (which again is based on some sort
of monetary union). The strict assumption is the implicit one
concerning the absence of any intervention of the central banks of the
two countries which could easily neutralise (in terms of the money
supply) the impact of such a flow. In conclusion, the inflationary
impact of remittances for the emigration country through increases in
the supply of money is . not inevitable; it can only happen either by
default (the central bank authorities fail to take any action aiming at
neutralising this inflow) or, simply because the monetary authorities
wish a money supply increase anyway and chose to do it by not
neutralising the impact of remittances.
Besides the particular inflationary or deflationary impact of changes .
in wages due to migration, the evolution of the wage level in the two
groups of countries is a very important aspect in its own right. It is
true that emigration should be expected to lead to a convergence of
real wage levels between the emigration and the immigration countries
by abolishing the relative surpluses or deficits of labour; the
question though, is whether this convergence takes place and, if so, to
what extent. First of all, it should be made clear that this analysis
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assumes that the less developed (emigration) country is capable of
productivity to match the more developed (immigration) one.
Conventional analysis assumes similar technologies used in both
countries. In reality though, things may be quite different: In a
center-periphery scheme for example, the levels of technology used
could be very different. By adopting the Keynesian approach, one could
argue that even if wage differences narrow because of migration they
will never really disappear; wage rigidities may persist (chapter one)
irrespectively of the size of migration. By adopting the Marxist
theory, on the other hand, one could even doubt whether any convergence
should be expected.
Emigration lowers the capital-labour ratio in the immigration
countries since it contributes to the increase of the labour force;
besides that, immigrants are usually employed in industries with a
capital-labour ratio lower than the average (this feature mostly
applies to the postwar migrations) and, furthermore, skilled immigrants
(human capital) may lower the need for material capital per unit of
product (MacMillen, 1982). This human capital element, though, does not
really apply in the case of the postwar European immigration.
The inflow of immigrants lowers the marginal product of labour and
consequently the wage level (that is if wages are correlated with the
marginal product of labour and assuming no change in other factors;
this may also depend on the skill and effort levels). As a result, the
marginal product and the revenue of the other factors of production
(whose volume is assumed to remain constant) rises (Kindleberger,
1963). Under these conditions we can examine migration as a factor of
income redistribution in favour of capital in the immigration countries
and in favour of labour in the emigration ones.
C. THE LONG-RUN ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF MIGRATION.
1. General. 
The examination of the long-run economic effects of migration is
probably the most difficult task for an economist dealing with
international movements of labour, both as far as the theoretical
approach as well as the application to a particular migratory flow are
concerned. The lack of relevant literature is one of the main reasons
for this difficulty; in fact, out of the limited (as mentioned)
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literature on the effects of migration, very few references can be
found on the long-run ones. A second explanation could be that the
long-run implications of migration (as in most economic phenomena) is
very difficult to distinguish and, in most cases, impossible to
quantify and therefore model what would have happened otherwise.
The analysis will concentrate on the main question of what is the
role of migration in the economic development of the emigration and
immigration countries. In this context, migration should not be
examined as a factor influencing the inputs of labour and, therefore,
the growth of output (as in the case of the short-run effects); the
effects of migration in the long-run refer to its contribution to the
transformation of the economies involved to more developed ones through
the increasing importance of the more dynamic sectors and the
relatively falling importance of the traditional less dynamic ones.
Emigration changes the sectoral distribution of the labour force in
both emigration and immigration countries, especially when emigrants
are moving from the primary sector of a country to the secondary sector
of another. This has structural implications for the labour force and,
more generally, for the economies of both countries which can be seen
in the medium run (0.E.C.D., 1979). In particular, emigration may lead
to an increase of the importance of manufacturing in both countries, in
the following way: assuming that people move from the agricultural
sector of the emigration country to the manufacturing sector of the
immigration one, the share of agriculture in total employment in both
countries falls and the share of manufacturing rises. This, of course,
does not necessarily imply a structural change in terms of the
composition of output. Such changes in the structure of employment not
accompanied by changes in the composition of output could be described
as "negative industrialisation", that is a decline in agriculture
without an expansion of manufacturing.
This is an oversimplified approach; by reducing the number and?
therefore, the share of farmers in total employment in the emigration
countries, the share of the other sectors increases, but this is in no
case an indication of economic development. The long-run effects of
migration will be analysed for the emigration and immigration countries
separately. First, we should examine the long-run implications for the
emigration countries.
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2 The Human Capital Element
Emigration is regarded as a loss of human capital for the labour
exporting countries in the sense that they bear the cost of "producing"
the labour force that emigrates; this cost refers to the amount that
has been invested in the upbringing of the persons who migrate. This
view though, raises a series of analytical problems. The main question
is whether the labour exported is productive for the emigration
country; a second one has to do with whether the productivity accrues
to the individual or somehow to the country at large; besides this, one
should examine whether there are "externalities" from the employment of
these people. Thirdly, one could argue on whether capital theory could
(or should) be applied to human beings in developing countries
(Kindleberger, 1965, p. 245).
Generally speaking there are two opposite views on this issue:
according to the first one, since the persons are there anyway,
previous costs incurred in their upbringing should not be taken into
account when examining whether they should be "exported" or not. In the
words of Kindleberger (1965, p. 246) who is probably not taking all the
possible options into account "...the young people exist, and we need
to apply to them not the real cost but opportunity cost analysis (which
is equivalent to saying never charge for use of capital equipment once
it has been built). What is the most effective use to make of existing
labour, to employ it abroad, or leave it unemployed at home; or if
there are job opportunities at home, to employ it at home with a small
amount of capital. or abroad with more..."
Castles and Kosack (1973, pp. 409-10) take the opposite view arguing
that the total cost of raising a child until working age should be
taken into consideration as it is a charge on the country's national
income and they proceed to estimate these costs.
One strong argument for this real cost approach is that it recognises
that surplus labour does not exist like a pool, but rather as a result .
of the policies an economy pursues. If however these policies fail to
provide productive employment to these people then the question of the
most effective use of the surplus labour can legitimately be asked
(Paine, 1974, pp. 46-47). If the real cost approach is adopted, one is
essentially assuming that governments in the emigration countries can
take decisions on whether to bear the cost of upbringing children for
the purpose of exportation and avoid the unnecessary costs from the
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surplus population by reducing the birth rate. It is impossible to plan
with accuracy on such issues though, and the whole discussion seems to
be academic. What costs are appropriate seems to depend on the pattern
of emigration. If emigration is a "one off", then costs of having
raised children could be ignored; but if migration is a continuous
process, then full cost appears more appropriate. Besides that, these
costs cannot be taken into account when negotiating the "terms of the
export" since no direct payment is made in this trade. Finally it
should be noted that the whole argument about the transfer of social
capital is usually framed in terms of costs and benefits to the
emigration country's economy in the abstract, and takes no account
whatsoever of the welfare of the individuals concerned, nor of the
distribution of costs and benefits within the economy (Paine, 1974, pp.
46-7).
The Acquisition of Skills Argument. 
Kindleberger, (1965, p. 248) mentions another possible dynamic gain
for the emigration countries, namely the training of industrial
workers. According to that, it is possible that most emigrants will
return and that they will bring back with them skills required for
economic development and also adjustment to industrial life. The
process of conditioning people for factory work has been analysed in
terms of stages of recruitment, commitment, advancement and
maintenance, which means all the steps which go to make a rural hand
into a factory worker.
The aforementioned dynamic gain is possible, but under three
assumptions:
a) First of all, immigrants have to return and, furthermore, while they
still are in the working age brackets.
b) Those who return have to accept and obtain a job similar to the one
they had abroad.
c) There must be similar in nature industrial units in both countries
(Nikolinakos, 1974). Furthermore, repatriation can have additional
economic as well as non-economic implications (Korner, 1984).
The return of migrants more skilled than on their departure has
traditionally been regarded as one of the main economic advantages of
temporary migration for the emigration countries, although one could
ask why would foreign firms provide the training when they appear not
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to benefit from it. However, OECD and ILO reports on this issue
indicate that repatriation has had little positive effect on the
economies and societies of origin. Discussion has centred on the skill
endowment of returnees but statistics in this area can be very
misleading because of different definitions between countries. As far
as the intra-European migratory flows are concerned, it appears that
emigration does not seriously improve the quality of labour in the
sending country mainly because the number of skilled jobs taken by
foreigners in the immigration countries is relatively small (MacMillen,
1982, pp. 259-60).
il The Balanced Growth Argument. 
Migration may, to a great extent, affect the economic structure of a
country, in the long run, and to a certain extent, its position in the
international division of labour. The outflow of labour force, as far
as the emigration countries are concerned, may initiate the
technological modernisation of the economy, through "an increase of the
marginal product of labour and the transition from a system of
disequilibrium where labour is paid according to its average product,
to another where it is paid according to its marginal one"
(Kindleberger, 1965, p. 250). This stimulus for investment and
technological change from raising the marginal product of labour due to
migration, is very ambiguous. The above analysis is static in nature;
it focuses on industry and therefore neglects the dynamic impetus of
rising wages on investment and technological change in agriculture,
which in the case of emigration from a country rather than a sector,
may apply throughout the economy.
Although debatable, the aforementioned argument deserves further
investigation. The essence of the argument which was titled the
"balanced growth" one and has very strong Neoclassical affiliates was
first presented by Vera Lutz (1963). According to this argument and
under the Neoclassical assumptions of full employment, no surplus
labour, perfect competition and optimum resource allocation, emigration
will raise income in the agricultural sector to a per capita level
where income recipients devote substantial income for the purchase of
industrial goods; this will create a market for industry and will allow
it to develop effectively. In buying industrial goods the agricultural
sector will have to furnish food, thus closing a "food gap" which would
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appear if surplus labour were taken off the farm and set to work
locally in industry, rather than at a distance. It is not completely
clear whether agricultural income per head is merely raised by the
reduction in agricultural labour (a change in the land 1 labour ratio),
or additionally by investment, but it seems to be both.
Generally speaking, this is an interesting idea, but like so much of
the balanced growth discussion, it ignores foreign trade. Industrial
workers (in Southern of Italy which was used as a reference point in
the analysis of Lutz) could export their output (to Northern Italy) if
not to foreign countries, and buy food abroad. Or, after emigration,
Southern agriculture could sell its products abroad, and buy industrial
goods outside the region without necessarily creating a market for
indigenous manufacturers. Southern Italy is not so isolated that
transport costs give it great protection. Furthermore, there may be
some conflict in agriculture between using the increased income per
capita for investment in agriculture, or for consumption, and if the
latter, whether of food or of industrial goods. (Kindleberger, 1965)
The extra income, it is clear, can only be used once, and for poor
countries, as emphasised, it is likely to be eaten in great part rather
than invested or spent on industrial products. Generally speaking,
ICindleberger (1965) seems to be right when he claims that "...Mrs
Lutz's idea is interesting but not convincing...") mainly because the
Neoclassical approach in general is not very helpful for analysing
industrial development.
The analysis so far has revealed that one cannot really come up with
a generally applicable conclusion as to the role of emigration in the
economic development of the labour exporting countries. What is almost
certain though, is the stimulus to higher real wages emigration will
cause provided that there will be no labour surplus after emigration.
This stimulus is not necessarily positively related to development (in
fact the opposite seems to be more likely); it certainly causes an .
increase in the labour cost though, and consequently costs and prices
increase as far as the labour intensive goods this country is producing
are concerned. For a developing country, mainly producing labour
intensive goods means a loss in competitiveness and probably the search
for a new position in the international division of labour. This new
position though, will only be attainable provided that the emigration
country in question has meanwhile successfully shifted to the
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production of more capital intensive goods, either exportables or
import substituting ones (in line with the dual-gap model, as mentioned
earlier in this chapter). If this is not the case, this country will
end up in a very unpleasant situation not being able to successfully
compete either with the less developed countries or with the more
developed ones.
5, Some Additional Long-Run Effects. 
Since neither emigration and repatriation nor remittances are
"evenly" distributed among the different regions of an emigration
country, the whole process will certainly have a regional dimension
which will have to be taken into account.
Besides the purely economic effects of migration, the demographic
ones have to be taken seriously into consideration in order to have a
complete evaluation of a particular migratory flow. Since emigration is
a selective process (in the sense that immigration countries may select
the people they are going to import), mainly referring to people in the
"productive" age brackets (15-55 years old), it statically influences
the age pyramid as well as the size of the population both in
emigration and immigration countries; (Zolotas, 1966, pp. 21-22) it
also influences fertility rates in both groups of countries (it is the
young who usually emigrate) affecting, therefore, the rate of the
natural increase of the population (Blitz, 1977, p. 487).
Things are clearer as far as the long-run effects for the immigration
countries are concerned. These countries greatly benefit from the fact
that the expenses of child rearing and education embodied in the
immigrants have been borne in the country of origin. "...in a nutshell
it is cheaper to import workers than to grow them..." Reder, 1963, p.
224) Furthermore, the typical age and sex composition of immigrants is
such that they will seek employment to a greater extent than the native
population (Blitz, 1977, p. 479).	
.
The money immigration countries "save" by "importing" human capital
free, can be spent on investment in industry or infrastructure. This
brings us to the idea of a virtuous circle investment -> free import of
human capital -> development -> further investment which is exactly
ICindleberger's (1967) explanation to the paradox why the Lewis model
has worked better in Europe than in the less developed countries for
which it was conceived. The former possessed superior infrastructure
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(among other things) as compared with the latter.
Another characteristic of the "freely imported human capital is it's
young age; in the case of temporary migration (as was the postwar
intra-European one) this capital will appreciate rather than
depreciate, not just through formal education, but by subsequent
interlaced practical learning experience (Blitz, 1977, P. 489).
Alike the short-run direct production effect which has been already
discussed, there is a long-run impact on the welfare of the indigenous
population; this could be explored by the means of the standard
Neoclassical growth model. This model predicts that in the absence of
changes in either the growth rate of the indigenous labour force or the
rate of capital accumulation, or the level of technology, the steady
state long-run growth rate of domestic output will be determined by the
growth rate of the immigrant labour force. Thus the pre-existing
long-run steady state growth rate of output will be retained some time
after an increase in the total labour force due to a once-and for all
inflow of foreign workers. A continuous immigration of labour at a
constant rate will result in a permanently higher long-run growth rate
of output and labour immigration at an increasing rate will raise the
growth rate continuously (MacMillen, 1982, pp. 248-9).
One should keep in mind that the operation of such a mechanism
depends upon certain ceteris paribus assumptions about the level of
technology and the rates of growth of the capital accumulation and the
native labour force. Immigration may influence these variables in
either direction; first of all it would appear that no definite
conclusions could be reached on the causal relationship between
immigration and the growth rate of the native labour force. The
Neoclassical analysis mainly focuses on the causal relationships
between immigration on the one hand and capital accumulation on the
other, since technological change is assumed constant and exogenous.
Labour productivity though, is determined by such a complexity of
factors that quantifying this long-run impact of immigration on output.
is practically impossible. A Keynesian (Kaldorian) analysis on the
other hand, as we saw when discussing the static impact of migration on
GDP growth, would stress the endogeneity of employment and productivity
growth which depend on output growth through the Verdoorn's law.
One of the main long-run benefits from employing foreign labour for
the immigration countries stems from their relatively high occupational
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and regional mobility. This provides the policy makers, in the
immigration countries, with an additional means of economic policy.
Given that immigration countries can usually determine (to a certain
extent) the numbers of foreign workers, one can easily understand why
immigration is considered as an efficient means for the medium-term
planning of the economy.
Finally, as in the case of the emigration countries, immigration has
a clear regional dimension; besides that it is related to possible
demographic effects.
CHAPTER SIX
" THE EVOLUTION AND THE IMPACT OF EMIGRANTS
REMITTANCES FOR THE GREEK ECONOMY"
A. THE POSTWAR EVOLUTION AND THE DETERMINING
FACTORS OF EMIGRANTS REMITTANCES IN GREECE.
1. General. 
Remittances represent one of the main economic effects of migration,
since the inflow of foreign currency remittances can be of great
importance for the developing-emigration countries which are usually
faced with shortages of foreign exchange.
There is a problem in defining remittances; if one accepts that any
inflow of foreign exchange caused by the employment of emigrants abroad
should be included in the definition of remittances, one will soon find
out that they are not homogeneous as far as their origin is concerned.
This happens because remittances under this definition include the
money remitted by those employed abroad, the pensions of those who were
employed abroad in the past and the money returning emigrants bring.
This "non homogeneity" could imply that different types of remittances
are put to different uses, but these differences only matter when the
different types of remittances are put to different uses (King, 1986,
p. 22). In terms of their impact on the balance of payments, on the
other hand, the type of remittances may not matter at all.
As we have seen in the previous chapter, emigrants and especially
those who are not accompanied by their families, usually have a
particularly high propensity to save and, a high propensity to remit
money to their country of origin (Granier, and Marciano, 1975, pp.
161-2). Especially as far as Greek immigrants in West Germany are
concerned, it was estimated that their remittances represented 25% of
their disposable income for those accompanied by their families and 45%
for those not accompanied by their families (Blitz, 1977, pp. 498-499).
Emigrants usually adopt a different saving attitude in comparison to
their compatriots who do not emigrate. This could be explained by
taking into account that acquiring a relatively well paid employment
and maximising remittances are the main motives for emigration to
occur. As a result, the determining factors of remittances are usually
very different from those determining the savings of the non-emigrants
(Glitsos, 1987, pp. 75-77).
Generally speaking, the size of the remittances is influenced by two
sets of factors: a) Factors that have to do with the status of
immigration (number of immigrants, their income etc.) b) Measures taken
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by the emigration countries in order to absorb the savings of the
emigrants (Poulopoulou-Emke, 1986, pp. 302-3).
2. The Evolution of Emigrants Remittances. (1)
Greece, a country with a long tradition in emigration had a
corresponding experience in the inflow of remittances. In fact, in the
period 1914-1928 emigrants and sailors remittances covered more than
50% of the Greek trade deficit. In that period, remittances were equal
to three-fifths of the country's exports (Poulopoulou-Emke, 1986, P.
298). In the first half of the 20th century, Greece had the highest per
emigrant remittances: $ 50 U.S.
	
(in current prices) while the
corresponding figures were $ 28.1 for the Irish and the English and $
4.05 for the German emigrants (op. cit). The postwar increase of
emigration, especially after 1960 caused an increase of remittances;
the expansion of emigration to West Germany in particular, soon made
this country the main source of remittances for Greece.
In table II-1 we can see the contribution of emigrants' remittances
from West Germany to the build up of total remittances and the rates of
increase of remittances in total and from West Germany in particular,
in the period 1960-1984. From this table we can derive that, especially
in the 1960s and the 1970s, West Germany had been the main country of
origin for remittances. Since 1978, remittances from West Germany are
continuously falling, causing a consequent fall in the share of this
country in total remittances (Poulopoulou-Emke, 1986, p. 302).
One should take into account though, that some Greek economists
(Zolotas, 1966, Glitsos, 1988) believe that the inflow of foreign
exchange from the emigrants, and those in West Germany, in particular,
must have been greater than the figures of the official statistical
data.
(1) In most cases estimates of the volume of remittances are
complicated by the necessity to reconcile balance of payments and
national income accounts; national statistics tend to underestimate the
size of remittances since they only take into account the exchange from
remittances legally (through the central bank) converted to national
currency at the official exchange rate. In any other case such as black
market for currencies or a parallel currency (foreign currencies
financing transactions) which are fairly possible for countries
possessing a weak currency as most emigration countries do, this simply
means a divergence between reality and national accounts.
-
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The size and importance of emigrants remittances in the case of the
Greek economy can be best analysed if examined in conjunction with
other items of the balance of payments and particularly the invisibles
in total and the trade balance as in table 11-2 and figure II-1.
Table II-1: The evolution of emigrants remittances to Greece from FRG
and total (1960-84).
Rem. in
Year mil.	 $
( 1 )
Rem. from	 Annual %	 Annual %	 Remittances from
FRGin mil.$ change of 	 change	 of	 FRG as a %
(2)	 Rem.	 Rem. from FRG of total	 (2/1)
1960	 90.5 0.4 - 0.44
1961	 107.4 2.5 18.67 525.00 2.32
1962	 139.1 4.0 29.51 18.54 60.00 178.31 2.87
1963	 168.1 7.4 20.84 85.00 4.40
1964	 176.8 10.6 5.17 43.24 5.99
1965	 206.9 13.7 17.02 29.24 6.62
1966	 234.9 20.3 13.53 48.17 8.64
1967	 232.0 21.0 -1.23 9.73 3.44 40.07 9.05
1968	 234.3 22.9 0.99 9.04 9.77
1969	 277.3 48.2 18.35 110.48 17.38
1970	 344.5 132.9 24.35 172.72 38.57
1971	 496.6 186.0 36.31 39.35 39.60
1972	 575.2 222.7 22.48 19.72 19.73 48.00 38.71
1973	 735.3 269.0 27.83 20.79 36.58
1974	 645.2 225.5 -12.55 -16.17 34.95
1975	 733.5 262.0 13.99 16.18 35.62
1976	 803.1 303.2 9.48 15.75 37.75
1977	 924.8 331.2 15.17 12.08 9.23 8.23 35.81
1978	 984.4 313.9 6.44 -5.22 31.88
1979	 1135.6 331.7 15.35 5.67 29.14
1980	 1064.6 313.8 -6.25 -5.39 29.47
1981	 1063.6 283.3 -0.09 2.02 -9.71 -9.74 26.63
1982	 1019.0 276.8 -4.19 -2.29 27.16
1983	 1228.7 232.2 20.57 -16.11 18.89
1984	 1230.6 196.9 0.10 -15.20 16.00
Tot. 14825.0 4032.1
	 27.00
Sources: a) Bank of Greece.
b) Own calculations.
From table 11-2 and figure II-1 one can derive that all through the
postwar period Greece witnessed a constantly expanding deficit in its
trade balance which could be outweighted by a surplus in the other
balances. In fact, the balance of invisibles proved to be very
successful in doing so. The continuous increase of the invisible
payments since the late 1970s limited the ability of the balance of
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invisibles to cover the balance of trade deficits (Negreponti-Delivani,
1981, pp. 401-11).
Table 11-2: The contribution of invisibles and remittances in the
narrowing of the balance of payments deficit in Greece (1950-1984).
Trade balance
Year in mil $ (1)
Invisibles	 Remittances
	 (2/1)
in mil $ (2)	 in mil $ (3)
(3/1)
1950	 -312.6 51.5 14.3 16.47 4.57
1951
	 -329.7 62.9 17.0 19.07 5.15
1952	 -160.4 75.1 18.0 46.82 11.22	 18.15
1953	 -109.2 107.8 45.6 98.71 41.75
1954	 -167.4 124.2 47.0 74.19 28.07
1955
	 -157.7 153.8 50.6 97.52 32.08
1956	 -235.1 182.6 60.9 71.57 23.87
1957	 -285.5 235.7 75.0 82.55 26.26 29.84
1958	 -265.5 217.6 76.7 81.95 28.88
1959	 -232.2 237.2 88.6 102.15 38.15
1960	 -295.2 273.2 90.5 92.54 30.65
1961
	 -330.4 319.6 107.4 96.73 32.50
1962
	 -394.5 379.6 139.1 96.22 35.25 33.83
1963
	 -433.5 454.3 168.1 104.31 38.77
1964	
-552.4 479.5 176.8 86.80 32.00
1965
	 -684.3 549.4 206.9 80.28 30.23
1966
	 -743.0 635.9 243.9 85.58 31.61
1967
	 -693.7 659.0 232.0 94.99 33.44 31:43
1968
	
-767.8 719.0 234.3 93.64 30.51
1969
	 -883.7 788.3 277.3 89.20 31.37
1970
	 -1084.2 949.2 344.5 87.54 31.77
1971
	 -1302.3 1292.3 469.6 99.23 36.05
1972
	 -1571.6 1605.9 575.2 102.18 36.59 30.59
1973	 -2800.3 2195.4 735.3 78.39 26.25
1974	 -2888.1 2495.6 645.2 86.40 22.33
1975
	 -3035.7 2836.6 733.5 93.44 24.16
1976
	 -3328.6 3178.6 803.1 95.49 24.12
1977	 -3887.4 3699.4 924.8 95.16 23.78 22.62
1978	 -4339.2 4421.6 984.4 101.89 22.68
1979	 -6177.8 5662.3 1135.6 91.65 18.38
1980
	 -6809.5 6158.6 1064.6 90.44 15.63
1981	 -6696.6 6495.1 1063.6 96.99 15.88
1982	 -5926.9 6097.6 1019.0 102.88 17.19	 18.90
1983	 -5385.9 5529.2 1228.7 102.66 22.81
1984	 -5350.8 5288.7 1230.6 98.83 22.99
Total-68638.7 64072.3 15318.7 93.33 22.31	 .
Sources: a) Bank of Greece.
b) Maroulis D., 1986.
c) Own calculations.
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Figure 11-1: Remittances and trade deficit in Greece (1960-82).
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Especially in the period 1955-1975 (when the exchange rate of the
drachma vis-a-vis the US $ and the other main currencies was fixed),
emigrants remittances represented a basic factor for covering the
deficits in the balance of trade corresponding to a 30% of this
deficit. By combining the data of tables 11-2 and 11-3 one may conclude
that in the 1960s and the early 1970s remittances from West Germany
were covering 3-12% of the balance of trade deficits.
Table 11-3: Remittances in Greece as a percentage of GDP (1970-1980).
Year Remittances in mil. U.S. $ Remittances as a % of GDP
1970 342.8 3.9
1971 457.9 4.6
1972 559.6 4.9
1973 714.6 4.7
1974 624.4 3.5
1975 753.3 3.9
1976 772.2 3.7
1977 899.1 3.7
1978 951.4 3.3
1979 1,136.9 3.2
1980 1,059.4 2.8
Source: Emke-Poulopoulou, 1987, p. 304.
Finally, the fall in the number of emigrants after 1975 was
reflected in a continuously decreasing coverage of the balance of trade
deficits by the remittances.
The decreasing importance of remittances can also be indicated by
the fact that, as one could derive from table 11-3, remittances have
been falling as a percentage of GDP all through the 1970s.
Since 1981, remittances have been falling in absolute terms as well
as in terms of importance; in fact, one could expect a continuously
falling trend for remittances in the future. Only in case of a
repetition of massive emigration from Greece in the future, should a
recovery of remittances be expected.
B. AN ECONOMETRIC INVESTIGATION OF THE FACTORS
DETERMINING THE EVOLUTION OF REMITTANCES.
There are several aspects to be taken into account before trying to
formulate a model for the determining factors of emigrants remittances.
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The decision of an emigrant to remit money to his country of origin,
first of all means that he decides not to spend this money on
consumption or save it in the immigration country. In a sense
therefore, remittances represent a part of his propensity to save; one
could argue though that remittances simply represent an intra-household
transfer. The particularities of remittances though, are that emigrants
decide to save that money in their country of origin instead of saving
it in the country where they live and work and that remittances could
be in effect a transfer of finance within his household, if an emigrant
is separated from his family and sends money which his spouse spends on
consumption or saves in the emigration country.
Remitting money, therefore, implies two sets of choices for the
emigrants: the first one has to do with which part of their income they
will spend on own consumption (which consequently determines their
level of savings), and the second one has to do with where they will
decide to save their money.
As already mentioned, two sets of factors may influence the size of
remittances, the first one operating in the immigration country and the
second one in the emigration one. In particular, the number of
immigrants, their wages (and therefore income) and employment status
could be included in this category. In fact, the economic environment
in the immigration country, the family status (single or married,
escorted by their families or not), the exchange rate, expectations and
the interest rates in the immigration country may as well influence the
size of remittances.
The second set of factors includes all the "pull" forces exercised
by the emigration country in order to maximise the inflows of
remittances. Short and long-term interest rates, special exchange rates
and any other direct and indirect incentive could be included in this
category.
Following these theoretical considerations and, taking into account
other models on remittances to Greece (Duysan, 1985, Glitsos, 1988),
one could end up with the following function:
Rt	 =	 f(Rt-I,	 Yt,	 Yt-i,	 Wt,	 Wt-i,	 Et,	 Et-i,	 Ut,	 Ut-iIlt,	 lit-i,
I2t, I2t-i„ Dt, Dc-i, ERt, ERt-1,...) 	 Where:
Rt and Rt-i	 : Remittances to Greece in periods t and t-1 respectively,
Yt and Yt-i	 : Greek emigrants' income	 ,,	 N N if	 rf	
1
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Wt and Wt-i :	 ff	 II	 wage level II	 II	 ff	 N ff
E and Et-i : Employment of emigrants II	 II	 ff	 ff II
Ut and Ut-i : Unemployment"	 II II	 ff	 N	 II II
lit and lit-i: Interest rates in Greec II	 II	 ff	 II II t
I2t and 12t-i:
t-1,
ff	 II	
" immigration	 countries	 in	 periods	 t	 and
Dt and Dt-i : Dummies	 representing	 the	 economic	 performance	 of	 the
immigration countries in periods t and t-1 respectively,
ERt and ERt-i: The exchange rate between Greece and the immigration
countries in periods t and t-1 respectively.
This function includes variables which influence the prosperity of
the immigrants (directly or indirectly) and, therefore, their ability
to remit either in a positive way (Yt, Yt-i, Mt, Mt-i, Et, Et-i, Dt,
Dt-i) or in a negative one. Besides that, it includes variables
representing emigrants potential benefits from remitting rather than
saving in the immigration country such as lit, lit-i, ERt, Ert-i
(expected to be positively influencing the size of remittances) and I2t
and I2t-i (expected to negatively influence the size of remittances).
As in chapter four, I started with a model including all the above
variables and then, by dropping the non-significant ones, I ended up
with the following estimated model on remittances from West Germany to
Greece for the 1960-1984 period:
logRt=-1.48 + 0.633 logRt-i + 0.45 logEmplt + 1.299 logIt + 0.305 Dt
(-0.682) (5.118)
	
(1.764)	 (2.053)	 (2.133)
R2 = 0.983, F(4, 20) = 295.94, D.W.= 1.6, Durbin's H test = 1.106
where:
Rt	 : Emigrants remittances from West Germany in period t in
millions of DM (current prices).
Rt-1	 : Emigrants remittances from West Germany in period t
in millions of DM (current prices).
emplt
	 : Number of Greeks employed in West Germany in period t. .
Iltt	 : Long-term interest rates (for more than 24 months)
for emigrants' deposits in Greece in period t.
Dt	 : Dummy variable taking the value of 1 when the economic
conjuncture is favorable in FRG and 0 in periods of
economic recession.
The expression of the variables in logarithms was justified by an
_
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isvariables
F-test (where the superiority of the model including the variables
expressed in logarithms relatively to the one where variables were
expressed in levels was established). As far as the economic
justification of including each one of these independent
concerned we could say that
-The remittances of the previous year influence
year since they are a point of reference for
the size of the present
the emigrants. It would
probably make sense to assume that, even in periods of economic
recession, emigrants try to remit at least the same amount of money as
in the previous year or at least, not a significantly lesser one; in
case of a favourable economic conjuncture they try to remit more money
but always relatively to the previous year.
-The number of Greeks employed in West Germany clearly influences the
size of the remittances since they are the ones to earn an income and
to be able to remit a part of this income. This variable was preferred
to the total number of Greeks established in West Germany, because the
latter includes the unemployed and the non-working dependents of the
emigrants who do not have an income which would allow them to save and
therefore to remit any money.
-Long-term interest rates for the deposits of the emigrants determined
by the Bank of Greece (and there are special arrangements for emigrants
after 1967) are of great importance as far as the size of the
remittances is concerned; an increase of these rates would have a
negative effect on the propensity to consume of the emigrants as well
as their alternative to deposit their money to German banks.
-Finally the dummy variable representing the economic conjuncture in
West Germany determines both economic factors (income and unemployment
of the emigrants) as well as purely psychological ones (the
uncertainty of the migrants) which determine the decision of the
emigrants on the amount they are going to remit. The dummy variable
takes the price of 1 for the years 1960-1965 and 1969-1973 (favorable
economic conjuncture) and 0 for the rest (1966-68 because of the short
period of recession for the German economy-see chapter 2).
Besides these independent variables, a series of others was tested
but they proved to be non-significant; we could just mention themi the
total number of the Greeks established in West Germany, the German
interest rates, the exchange rate between the mark and the drachma
-
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(both nominal and real) and the economic conjuncture in Greece. In
particular, the inclusion of these variables in the model was tested
and rejected by an F-test.
The data used was derived from the following sources:
-Remittances are given in US $ (current prices) according to the data
of the Bank of Greece.
-The number of the employed Greek immigrants by year is given by the
Federal Employment Foundation (Hatzipanayotou, 1977)
-Long-term interest rates for the emigrants are the average annual
ones. (Bank of Greece, 1982) •
-The dummy variable is given the value of zero when the GDP growth rate
is smaller than the one for the previous year by at least 2.5
percentage points or (and) the unemployment rate is at least 1.5
percentage points higher than the one of the previous year.
From the estimated model the following conclusions can be derived'
-The general fit of the model is very satisfactory.(high R 2 and F (4,
20) = 295.949 (critical value = 2.87 at a 95% confidence level).
-There is no autocorrelation problem since the h test (used when the
lagged dependent variable is used as an independent one) gives a value
1.10643 which is included in the accepted critical margin [-1.96,
1.96].
-The signs of the coefficients seem to be consistent with economic
theory; a positive relation between the remittances and each one of the
dependent variables of the model was expected.
-All the dependent variables are significant since for a 95% level of
significance and for 19 degrees of freedom the critical value is
+1.729, and all the estimated values are higher than that.
The fact that only one (logIltt) out of the four independent
variables of the model has to do with the evolutions in Greece and, in
addition is the third in terms of significance, suggests the decisive
role of the economic condition in the country of origin on the size of
remittances.
The test for normality of the residuals gave a value of 3.168 for
the X 2 distribution ( for two degrees of freedom and a 95% confidence
level, the critical value being 5.991. Therefore there is no efficiency
problem for the least square estimators.
The test for Heteroskedasticity using the White test gives a 2.7669
-
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value for the F distribution (95% confidence level, against a critical
value of 2.91. More important is that the distribution of X 2 given by
this test is 15.4361 against a critical value of 15.507. The zero
hypothesis for heteroskedasticity is therefore rejected.
Finally the test for omitted variables, using the Reset method gives
negative results (F(3.18, 0.05) = 3.16 which is greater than the
critical value 2.523). We cannot reject, therefore,the zero hypothesis
for the non-existence of basic explanatory variables in the model
correlated to its existing variables.
The fact that the basic assumptions are valid justifies the use of
the O.L.S. method for the estimation of the model as well . as the
efficiency of the estimators. Besides that, the test for omitted
variables has shown that there are no basic explanatory variables
omitted from the model.
C. AN ECONOMETRIC INVESTIGATION OF THE EFFECTS OF
REMITTANCES FOR THE GREEK ECONOMY.
1. General. 
The main aim of this investigation is to examine the impact of
remittances on several macroeconomic variables which, according to the
theory may be influenced by them. Expenditure on consumption of
domestic and imported goods on the one hand and, investment on the
other, were the main ones. In particular, the impact of remittances on
the different components of consumption and imports (consumer and
capital goods) and investment (investment in manufacturing, dwellings
etc.) will be examined as well. Furthermore, this investigation will
enable a test of the applicability of the dual-gap model (see chapter
five) in the case of Greece.
Besides the usual problems all quantitative investigations on the
Greek economy are faced with (lack of reliable data etc), this
particular one had to cope with the task of including remittances (or
at least trying to) in the framework of a general macro economic model
for the Greek economy. The construction of such a model, though, was
limited by the fact that the literature on macro-economic models of the
Greek economy is relatively poor. In fact, only two books (Tsioris,
(1976) and Vernardakis, (1978)) proved to be of some help as starting
points.
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Because of their size and importance as a source of foreign
exchange, remittances were taken into consideration by most analysts of
the postwar performance of the Greek economy. They all made clear that
the impact of remittances on the Greek economy and several
macro-economic variables in particular was very significant, but they
did	 not	 support	 their	 statements	 with	 findings	 of quantitative
investigations. As a result, some authors stated the role of
remittances on imports and consumption, some on investment and some on
all macro-economic variables, the main problem being that these
analyses ended up with conclusions (or even suggested policy measures)
which were based on instinct rather than quantitative justification.
Remittances are the financial or pecuniary side of migration;
theoretically they may influence most (if not all) macro-economic
variables of an emigration country. Factors such as GDP growth,
inflation and the balance of payments may be directly or indirectly
affected by them; it is therefore essential to examine their direct
impact on variables such as consumption, imports and investment.
Before proceeding with the econometric investigation, a list of all
the variables which will be used will be provided.
List  of variables  used.
I. Rem : Remittances to Greece
2. I'd : Disposable income in Greece
3. C :
	 Private consumption expenditure in Greece
4. I :	 Total investment in Greece
5. M : Imports in Greece
6. Iman: Investment in manufacturing in Greece
7. Jew : Investment in dwellings in Greece
8. hest: Investment in the other sectors in Greece
9, W : Income from wages in Greece
10.Pr : Income from profits etc. in Greece
1 1.Yagr: Income from farming etc. in Greece
12.TrG : Transfers from the government in Greece
13.Tchr: Direct taxes in Greece
14.CrDw: Credit to dwellings in Greece
15.Navy: Earnings from navigation in Greece
16.Tourism: Earnings from tourism in Greece
17.Plc: Price index of building materials and construction costs.
18.PI: General price index.
19.Dummy: Dummy variable taking the price of 1 in the 1960-1973 period
and 0 in the 1974-1986 one. (All monetary variables in constant drachmas).
-
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Consumption. 
I will try to estimate the consumption functions using the O.L.S.
method. There are many reservations on whether this method is
appropriate in this case due to the obvious simultaneity problem. The
Instrumental Variables method is thetrefore considered to be
preferable. In various occasions though (see for example Patterson,
1991) both methods produced similar results.
Following a simple Keynesian way of thinking one could come up with
a consumption function such as:
C = a l + b l Yd + b2i where:
C : domestic private expenditure on consumption
Yd  disposable income
i	 : interest rates.
(the monetary variables are in constant prices.)
There seems to be a disagreement on whether nominal or real on the
one hand, and long-term or short-term interest rates should be used in
such equations. For the particular case of the Greek economy in the
1960-1986 period the best fit was obtained by the use of real long-term
(for time deposits - more than six months) interest rates in the
following estimated equation:
(1) C = 14.754 + 0.806 Yd + 0.017 RealLti
(2.235)	 (34.08)
	 (0.270)
( t-ratios in brackets)
R2
 = 0.983,	 F(2, 20) = 589.17	 D.W. = 0.55
Besides the problem of autocorrelation this model presented, it
included a statistically non-significant variable (Real Lti); an F-test
revealed that this variable could be eliminated from the model.
Therefore consumption as a function of disposable income only was
tested:
(2) C = 9.754 + 0.835 Yd(1.379) (34.129)
R2
 = 0.978,	 F(1, 25) = 1164.81
	 D.W. = 0.46
The problem of autocorrelation proved to be relatively easy to deal
with after the inclusion of C-1 (consumption in the previous year) as
an independent variable:
(3)	 C = 9.781 + 0.75 C-1 + 0.207 Yd
(7.15) (21.81)	 (18.56)
R2 = 0.998,	 F(2, 23) = 7162.64	 D.W. = 1.46
X2(1)=1.69, X2(2)=2.07, Fi(4, 18)=1.40, X2(3)=1.12, F2(1, 22)=0.01
where:
X2(1): the X 2
 value of the test for first order autocorrelation
X2(2): " "	 if
	
II	 II	 If	
" second
Fi	 : the F test value of the test for beteroscedasticity
X2(3): the X2
 value of the test for normality
F2	 : the F test value of the test for omitted variables
Model
	 (3)	 was	 tested	 for	 autocorrelation,	 normality,	 heterosce-
dasticity, omitted variables, A.R.C.H. (Autoregressive Conditional
Heteroscedasticity)and functional form mis-specification errors and was
found to be free of problems.
In order to include remittances Yd was then disaggregated in two
ways: first according to the identity:
Yd
 = W + Pr + Y
agr + Rem - Tdir + TrG
and then as	 Yd
 = Rem + (Yd-Rem). The first method of disaggregation
produced the following estimated model:
(4) C = 14.528 + 0.503 C-1 - 0.756 Rem + 0.202 W + 0.577 Profits
(2.170) (5.128)
	 (-1.022)	 (1.931)	 (3.233)
+ 0.324 Yagr ± 0.822 TrG - 0.384 Tdir
	
(1.721)	 (4.255)	 (-0.707)
	
R2 = 0.999
	 F(7, 18) = 3251.70
	 D.W. = 1.46
X2(1)=2.43, X2(2)=2.46, X2(3)=0.71
which was found to be free of statistical problems (only tests for
autocorrelation and normality could be carried out due to the
insufficient degrees of freedom).
The "problem" of remittances being non-significant and negatively
signed persisted even after eliminating other insignificant variables
such as Tdir.
The second method of disaggregation produced the following estimated
model:
(5) C = 14.837 + 0.551 C-1 - 0.547 Rem + 0.362 (Yd-Rem)
(6.504) (6.924)
	 (-1.359)	 (5.032)
R2
 = 0.9988,
	 F(3, 22) = 6512.81,	 D.W. = 1.11
X2(1)=4.82, X2(2)=5.35, F1(6, 15)=0.73, X2(3)=1.07, F2(1 ,21)=4.49
_
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which again presented no statistical problems (here, more tests were
possible because of the, relatively to model (4), more degiees of
freedom), but remittances were still insignificant and negatively
signed.
In an attempt to investigate, to a certain extent, all possibilities
of remittances being a significant determining factor of consumption,
various models were tested (logarithms, lags etc.) besides splitting
the period, which was rejected by the F-test; all of them indicated
that models (4) and (5) presented the best possible performance of
remittances as an explanatory variable.
3. Imports. 
Exactly the same methodology as in the case of consumption was
followed for imports in general and imports of consumer and capital
goods in particular. In the case of imports the investigation started
with an import function such as:
M = a + biYa + b2PIm/PI + b3Tariff
(tariff t is derived from the formula: Pd = (1+0 Pf where: Pd and Pf
domestic and foreign prices respectively), in the sense that besides
disposable income the tariff protection of the Greek economy and the
relative price index may influence the expenditure on imported goods.
Plm/PI and tariffs proved to be insignificant and the import equations
this analysis ended up with were:
(6) M = -23.71 + 0.375 M-1 + 0.268 Yd
(-3.290) (3.134)	 (4.974)
R2 = 0.965,	 .F(2, 23) = 318.96, 	 D.W. = 1.87
X2 (1)=0.04, X2 (2)=2.70, F1(4, 18)=3.83, X2 (3)=0.71, F2(1, 22)=2.05
(7) Mcons = -7.975 + 0.28 m	 + 0.108 Yd
(-2.797) (1.868)	 (4.769)
R2 = 0.938,	 F(2, 23) = 176.38	 D.W.	 1.82
X2(1)=0.06, X2(2)=0.16, Fi(4, 18)=1.65, X2(3)=0.10, F2(1, 22)=1.18
(8) Mcap = -19.82 - 1.896Rem + 0.3069Mcap-i + 0.278Yd - 0.001PIm/PI
(-3.019) (-1.927)	 (1.501)	 (3.34)	 (-2.332)
R2
 = 0.954,	 F(4, 21) = 109.3	 D.W. = 1.72
X2(1) = 0.72, X2(2)=6.32, Fi(8, 12)=2.25, X 2 (3)=0.14, F2(1, 20)=1.61
- 0.001 PIm/PI
(-2.53)
R2 = 0.951 F(4, 21) = 102.42
	 D.W. = 1.77
which were found to be free of statistical problems.
Following the same procedure as in the case of consumption, the
investigation produced the following models:
(9) M = -60.868 + 0.044 M-1 - 2.707 Rem + 0.702 W + 0.119 Profits
(-3.283) (0.197)
	
(-1.291)	 (2.469)	 (0.302)
+ 1.845 Yagr - 0.268 TrG - 1.435 Tdir
(3.157)	 (0.613)	 (-1.010)
R2 = 0.947,	 F(7, 18) = 112.06,	 D.W.= 2.57
X2(1)=4.21, X2(2)=5.44
(10) Mcons = -17.31 -0.137
	
ns-1m	 - 0.567 Rem + 0.388 W
(2.422) (-0.637-) 
co (-0.669)	 (0.307)
+ 0.173 Profits + 0.489 Yagr ± 0.444 TrG - 0.29 Tdir
(1.028)	 (2.162)	 (2.332)	 (0.307)
R2 = 0.9662,	 F(7, 18) = 73.56,	 D.W.= 2.05
X2(1) = 1.45, X2(2)=2.20, F2(1, 17)= 1.76
(11) Mcap = -39.046 + 0.174 M-cap-1 -1.986 Rem + 0.519 W
(-2.374)	 (0.682)	 (-1.108)	 (1.491)
+ 0.0105 Profits + 1.184 Yagr -0.344 TrG - 0.88 Tair - 0.00047 PIm/PI
(0.029)	 (0.289)	 (-0.528)	 (-0.695)	 (-0.6045)
R2 = 0.960,	 F(8, 17) = 52.32	 D.W. = 2.24
X2 (1) = 1.63, X2(2)=6.59, F2(1,16)=0.47
(12) M = -50.152 -1.017 Rem + 0.447 M-1 + 1.591 (Yd-Rem)
R2 - 0.973	 F(3, 22) --= 273.91	 D.W. = 2.45
X2 (1) = 0.05, X2(2)=2.26, F1(6, 15) = 1.52, X2(3) = 0.37, F2(1, 21)=1.94
(13) Mcons = -8.164 - 0.594 Rem + 0.058 Mcons-1 + 0.162 (Yd-Rem)
(-3.453) (-1.62)	 (-0.305)
	
(4.88)
R2 = 0.953	 F(3, 23) = 150
	
D.W. = 1.83
X2(1) = 0.005, X2(2)=1.08, F1(6, 15)=2.05, X 2(3) =2.13, F2(1, 21)=1.75
(14) Mcap = -17.027 -1.202 Rem + 0.222 (Yd-Rem) + 0.372 m--cap-1
(-2.687)(-1.375)(3.044)
	 (3.044)
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X2(1)=0.34, X2(2)=7.96, F1(8, 12) =3.12, F2(1, 20)=0.73
4. Investment. 
Including remittances as an explanatory variable in investment
functions has a quite different meaning relatively to the consumption
and import ones. In the consumption and import functions remittances
represent one of the components of disposable income which according to
the elementary theory can be either spent on consumption or saved. In
an investment function, on the other hand, remittances represent a
potential source of finance.
In a Keynesian way of thinking, the demand for investment will
certainly be satisfied by transferring funds from various sources, one
of which could be remittances. In fact, such an analysis seems to be
fairly applicable to the case of Greece. In a rapidly growing economy,
as the Greek one was in the 1960s and early 1970s, the reverse of Say's
law (the demand for investment creating it's own supply) seems to be a
quite logical assumption. In fact all macro-economic models on the
Greek economy seem to be based on this way of thinking.
Given the above, the construction of an investment function
including remittances is a fairly easy task. In fact, one may come up
with a model including investment in the previous year, interest rates,
remittances, relative prices and GDP or GDP growth (following the
Keynesian accelerator process) as the basic explanatory variables, as
follows:
I = a + bi I-i + b2 Rem + b3 Lti + 134 PI + bs GDP (or GDP growth)
As a matter of fact, besides the estimation of an aggregate investment
function it would be very useful to come up with a particular model on
investment in manufacturing, dwellings and the other (besides
manufacturing and dwellings) sectors.
The econometric investigation produced the following estimated
models:
(15) I = -4.495 + 0.618 I-1 +3.0 Rem + 97.52 GDP growth - 0.136 Lti
	
(-0.74)	 (3.963)	 (3.01)	 (1.69)	 (-0.39)
R2 = 0.948	 F(4, 23) = 91.18	 D.W. . 1.88
X2(1)=0.12, X2(2)=0.39, F1(8, 12)=1.32, F2(1, 20)=0. 17	or:
(16) I = -4.172 + 0.591 I-1 + 3.12 Rem + 88.599 GDPgrowth
(-0.706) (4.297)
	
(3.34)	 (1.708)
R2 --= 0.948	 F(3, 22) = 134.64	 D.W. = 1.85
X2(1) = 0.17, X2(2)=0.47, Fi(6, 15)=2.15, X2(3)=1.1, F2(1, 21)=0.34
(17) Iman = 0.393 + 0.613 Iman-1 + 0.342 Rem + 0.029 Lti
(0.534) (4.232)	 (2.432)	 (0.691)
+ 2.911 GDPgrowth
(-0.384)
R2 = 0.546, F(4, 21) = 110.42 D.W. = 1.76
X2(1)=006, X2(2)=0.77, Fi(8, 12)=0.31, X2(3)=1.21, F2(1, 20)=1.47 or:
(18) Iman = 0.226 + 0.655 Iman-I + 0.309 Rem + 0.02 Lti
(0.388)	 (6.94)	 (2.866)	 (0.661)
R2 = 0.954	 F(3, 22) = 86.05	 D.W. = 1.81
X2(1)=0.001, X2 (2)=0.43, Fi(6, 15)=0.46, F2(1, 21)=1.46
(19) Irest = -2.20 + 0.54 Irest-1 ± 2.221 Rem + 34.05 GDPgrowth
(-0.45) (3.329)	 (3.108)
	 (0.71)
R2 = 0.921
	
F(3, 22) = 86.05
	
D.W. = 2.06
X2(1)=0.06, X2(2)=2.32, F1(6, 15)=3.36, X2 (3)=0.66, F2(1, 21)=1.30
(20) Idw = -1.668 + 0.409 Idv/-1 + 0.915 Rem + 54.583 GDP growth
(-0.545)
	 (2.55)
+ 0.004 PIc/PI
(0.58)
R2 = 0.797
	
F(4, 21)
X2(1)=1.07, X2(2)=1.13, Fi(8,
(3.077)
= 20.67
12)=0.74,
(2.334)
D.W. = 1.73
X2 (3)=0.52, F2(1, 20)=0.95 or:
(21) Idw = -0.645 + 0.389 Id w-1 -1- 0.977 Rem + 45.642 GDPgrowth
(-0.262) (2.522)	 (3.578)
	
(2.635)
R2
 = 0.794	 F(3, 22) = 28.30
	
D.W. .----- 1.64
X2(1)=1.76, X2(2)=1.86, F16, 15)=1.60, X2(3)=0.38, F2(1, 21)=0.26
Models 15-21 were found to be free of statistical problems.
5. An Interpretation of the Results of the Econometric Investig_ation. 
Although a full analysis of the effects of remittances for the Greek
economy will take place in one of the following sections of this
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chapter, at this point the main conclusions to be reached from the
econometric investigation could be summarised as follows:
1. Remittances seem to have had very little (if any) impact on private
expenditure on consumption and imports. In fact, the other sources of
income seem to have been significant determining factors of C and M.
The low t-ratios and the negative signs imply a loose relationship
between remittances and the other two macroeconomic variables (C and M)
rather than a clearly negative one. The same conclusions apply to m—cons
and Mcap as well. Generally speaking, the derivation of final
conclusions is quite hazardous; the positive effect of remittances on C
and the "boomerang" one on M however, is not at all clear despite (the
more or less) common belief.
2. Equations 15-21 indicate that remittances have had a fairly
important impact on investment in Greece. This should come as no
surprise as far as investment in dwellings or even aggregate investment
(where Idw constitute a major contributor) are concerned. It simply
justifies those who thought that remittances financed investment in
dwellings to a very large extent.
3. What was fairly unexpected is the emerging role of remittances as an
important source of finance for investment in manufacturing and
investment in the other sectors of the economy. In fact, neither the
mainstream theory, nor the literature on emigration from Greece
provides for such an outcome. One could explain these findings in a
number of ways:
-the fact that remittances directly financed investment in dwellings
caused a relative oyerexpansion of the related industrial branches
(building materials etc.) rather than the manufacturing sector (and its
export and import substituting branches in particular) in total. The
demand for building materials in Greece was mainly satisfied by
domestic supply and to a lesser extent by imports. The apparent
relationship between Rem and Iman therefore could simply be a
relationship between remittances and investment in the aforementioned
industrial branches.
-One could look (or at least start looking) for an explanation of the
apparent relationship between remittances (Rem) and investment in the
other sectors (Irest) be examining which are the main "other" sectors.
In fact, agriculture and services are by definition these "other"
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sectors. Given this, the relationship seems to make sense; since most
of the emigrants came from the agricultural sector, it is quite logical
to assume that (at least) some of them chose to invest in agriculture
upon return. Besides that, the strong propensity of returnees to
undertake independent employment in small (and self-financed from
remittances mainly) business in the tertiary sector, could serve as an
additional means of explaining that.
D. AN EVALUATION OF THE REMITTANCES FOR THE GREEK
ECONOMY.
We could distinguish two kinds of effects of remittances on the
economy of the emigration country, Greece in this particular case: The
direct effects on the balance of payments and the external finance and
the indirect ones from the use of remittances for investment or
consumption.
From the analysis in the first section of this chapter, a series of
conclusions could be derived; since 1960, the starting year of the
massive emigration to Western Europe and until 1972, the last year of
the rapid growth of the Greek economy with low unemployment and
relative price stability, remittances had been continuously covering an
almost constant part of the structural and constantly growing trade
deficit of Greece (30-36%). Seen in a slightly different way,
remittances had been covering an almost constant share of the
expenditure on imports (20-23%). Since 1954, remittances had been equal
to 70-90% (for some years 100%) of the expenditure for imports of
capital goods as we can see in table 11-4 and figure 11-2 (Glitsos,
1987, p. 98)..
These, almost parallel, developments of remittances and the Greek
balance of payments (the trade deficit and imports) change after the
appearance of the recession in 1973; since then the ratio remittances /
trade deficit (or imports) has been constantly falling. ' This
deterioration could have been even more impressive had imports
(especially of capital goods) not been diminishing in the 1980s due to
the recession in investment. As a result, by 1982 remittances were only
covering 17.6% of the trade deficit or 9% of the expenditure for
imports (48% of the expenditure for the imports of capital goods)
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(Glitsos, 1987, P. 98).
From the analysis so far, the undeniable contribution of the
remittances in the Greek balance of payments has been shown.
Remittances, as a major source of foreign exchange, functioned as a
life boat for the Greek balance of payments, relaxed the balance of
payments constraint and prevented for many years the over 'expansion of
the deficit and the external debt of the country (Zolotas, 1966, pp.
42-43). On the other hand though, this short-term solution to the
problem of the trade deficit caused by a poor export performance and a
high propensity to import, concealed the real dimensions of the problem
and functioned as a delaying factor of underestimation of its size.
Remittances and invisibles in general, by relaxing the balance of
payments constraint, allowed for a level of consumption and imports
that would not be possible otherwise. Besides that, it appears that
Greek policy makers took invisible earnings and remittances in
particular, for granted, in the sense that the "antidote" for the
structural trade deficit of the country had been found.
Table 11-4: Remittances as a percentage of the trade deficit,
imports (M) and capital goods (Mcap). (1960-81)
Year Rem/Trade def. Rem/M Rem/Mcap
1960 31.3 18.4 106.5
1961 32.5 19.0 92.2
1962 35.0 21.7 78.0
1963 38.7 23.0 102.2
1964 31.6 20.4 80.8
1965 29.9 20.2 78.7
1966 31.6 20.5 83.4
1967 33.0 20.1 74.9
1968 30.7 19.2 71.7
1969 30.8 19.4 69.1
1970 31.5 20.2 66.6
1971 35.5 24.1 78.5
1972 35.8 23.5 70.2
1973 26.1 18.2 62.3
1974 22.4 13.8 50.3
1975 25.7 15.4 50.6
1976 24.1 14.4 51.9
1977 23.7 14.4 51.9
1978 22.7 13.4 48.8
1979 18.9 11.5 47.3
1980 15.9 9.9 44.3
1981 16.1 9.4 48.2
Source: Glitsos, 1987, p. 99.
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Trying to solve a structural problem (the trade deficit) by a
conjuctural and external solution as remittances, proved to be a
mistake (Negreponti-Delivani, 1981). The levels of exports and imports
are determined by factors completely different from those that
determine the size of invisible receipts. They may, therefore, move in
the same direction as they did in the 1960s and early 1970s (as a
matter of coincidence as it appears to have been) as well as in
opposite directions as they did after 1973 especially if we take into
account the loose relationship between remittances and imports revealed
in the previous section of this chapter.
Having analysed the impact of remittances on the Greek balance of
payments, the next thing to do was to examine their impact on several
particular macroeconomic variables of the Greek economy, namely
consumption, savings and investment. The ultimate task of this
examination is, after all, to investigate the impact of remittances on
the Greek economy; existing studies on this subject and the econometric
investigation of the previous section of this chapter are the main
sources to be used here.
As far as the impact of remittances on domestic expenditure for
consumption is concerned the following points could be made:
a) It is true that in the period of massive emigration (1960-1973)
emigrants were remitting money to their families in Greece; since low
income people were receiving that money, it may be assumed that there
was a high propensity to spend on consumption up to a certain point.
After the satisfaction of some basic consumption needs though the
marginal propensity to spend the income from remittances on consumption
is expected to fall; this could be explained in terms of the basié
motives of emigrants: people do not usually emigrate simply because
they want to provide an income their spouses may spend on consumption,
mainly in the case of temporary emigration. Even when this is the case
though, it does not last for long; after having acquired an acceptable
level of consumption for their families, emigrants will tend to
accumulate money they can use upon return, either for the construction
(or simply the improvement or the purchase) of a house. Alternatively
they could use this money for financing a small business. Several
studies (Emke-Poulopoulou, 1986) indicate that this was exactly the
case in Greece.
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b) A careful look at the data suggests that private domestic
expenditure on consumption and remittances were moving in parallel, in
the period 1960-1973; this doesn't necessarily imply a close positive
relationship between these two variables all through the period though,
for two main reasons: the first one can be found in point a); the
second one has to do with the fact that in a rapidly growing economy as
the Greek one was until the appearance of the economic recession two
variables may present parallel trends without being correlated to a
great extent. The econometric investigation in the previous section
indicates that this was exactly the case between consumption and
remittances.
c) In a particular study by Glitsos (1987, p. 150) the following point
is made: "...what matters is the contribution of remittances in the
growth of expenditure on consumption and not the absolute figure or, in
other words, what would the change in consumption (increase or fall) be
equal to zero..." By following this way of
es up with the conclusion that, especially in the
recession, (1974, 1981) the contribution of
changes of expenditure on consumption was
without the remittances, consumption and the
welfare level of the Greek population would have fallen much more after
1981. Besides the fact that these points are not supported (in fact
they are rejected) by the econometric investigation, they could be
tackled in the sense that since 1981 remittances have been falling both
in absolute terms and as a part of disposable income, at such a rate
that even if the marginal propensity to spend income from remittances
on consumption had increased substantially, the overall impact on
consumption would be minimal.
d) From the analysis so far it appears to be, that the impact of
remittances on consumption has been exaggerated by many other authors;
this should come as no surprise. In fact a close relationship between
consumption and remittances for a period as long as 27 . years
(1960-1986) implies the following scenario: emigrants leave Greece
where their income and therefore their level of consumption expenditure
is very low and seek employment in Western Europe (mainly West
Germany); in the immigration country they work very hard and try to
spend on consumption as little as possible. By doing this they are able
had remittances been
thinking, Glitsos COM
years of economic
remittances to the
stabilising and that,
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to remit relatively large sums of money to their spouses who spend it
on consumption; alternatively they save it (especially when they are
accompanied by their families) and spend it on consumption upon return
to Greece. Given the fact that the per emigrant remittances have been
increasing (in constant drachmas as well as in U.S $) this scenario
would imply either a very strong imitation effect (difficult to accept
for the Greek periphery where the per capita consumption is relatively
low) or a constant marginal propensity to spend the income from
remittances on consumption. In a once and for all emigratory flow (all
emigrants leaving within say one year) one could expect the MPC on
income from remittances to vary considerably over time according to the
analysis so far in this paragraph. In the particular case of
remittances to Greece in the postwar period though, one should take
into account that the temporary nature of emigration led to a
continuous flow of emigrants and returnees. Surprising as it may seem
at first sight, this fact could have led to a relative stability of the
MPC (compared to the case of an once and for all emigration); the bulk
of the people receiving remittances consisted of different groups of
people in terms of length of period they have been receiving
remittances, each group presenting a different MPC. Assuming that the
proportionate size of each group did not change considerably over time,
one could accept the fairly constant overall MPC hypothesis.
The impact of remittances on imports is the next issue to be
examined; the relationship between remittances and imports deserves
further examination since one of the main reservations on the positive
effects of remittances - provided by the economic theory is the so called
"boomerang effect".
According to several studies of the Greek Centre of Planning and
Economic Research (KEPE) the marginal propensity to import of
remittances is relatively higher than the one of the domestic sources
of income. In 1974, 7% of the remittances were spent on imports; for
1964 the corresponding percentage was a little lower and for 1981 a
little higher than 7%. (Glitsos, 1987, p. 151)
In table 11-5 we can see the expenditure of remittances on imports
for 1964, 1974 and 1981 by group of imported goods. These estimations
indicate that the people who were receiving remittances increased their
imports (both directly and indirectly) by 60% in 1964 and by 40% in
1974 and 1981 due to their increase in disposable income caused by the
remittances. For the economy as a whole though, the contribution of
remittances in the financing of imports never really exceeded 1%
(Glitsos, 1987, pp. 152-153).
Table 11-5: Spending of remittances on imports by group of goods and
services.
% of imports in
Group of goods total expenditure
and services
	 (1970)
Spending of Rem, on imports
(mil drs)
1964	 1974	 1981
Food 8.8 193.5 580.8 2305.9
Beverages & Tobacco 2.5 4.5 25.1 65.4
Clothing & footwear 3.0 24.8 90.2 221.4
Housing 1.8 8.6 42.5 118.5
Durable domestic
goods 15.9 74.1 272.4 583.7
Health 12.6 39.1 121.1 482.2
Education, amusement 8.9 23.1 148.7 260.6
Transportation 6.0 20.2 92.7 248.3
Miscellaneous 1.6 4.1 10.0 43.1
Total 7.1 392.0 1385.5 4329.1
Source: Glitsos, 1987, p. 152.
This last point, which is in accordance with the findings of the
econometric investigation of the previous section is of great
importance; it indicates that the "boomerang effect" of remittances on
imports has in fact been exaggerated by the previous studies
(Nikolinakos, 1973, 1974 and 1977, Zolotas, 1966) carried out in the
late 1960s and early 1970s.
The fact that remittances do not appear to have financed private
domestic consumption expenditure and imports to a great extent,
especially as far as durable goods are concerned could be attributed to
the fact that emigrants were (and still are in fact) allowed to bring
in their household equipment plus other durable consumer goods tax
free. Emigrants and their spouses therefore, need not spend their
income from remittances for the purchase of such goods (domestically
produced or imported) in Greece since they could be purchased from
abroad.
As shown in chapter 2, Greece in the postwar period, witnessed
surprisingly low (for a developing country) levels of investment. In
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this context of a general relative recession of investment in Greece
the expectations one could have in terms of remittances stimulating a
high level of investment should not be very high.
Following the definition of investment as creation of new capital,
changes in stocks of semi-finished goods and the construction of new
buildings, facilitates the analysis. With the exception of returnees
becoming entrepreneurs themselves (which was not often the case in
Greece) (Secretariat General of Greek Emigrants, 1990, pp. 214-216)
remittances can influence the construction of buildings directly and
the other two items of investment indirectly, through increases in the
aggregate demand. The findings of previous studies and the econometric
investigation in the previous section of this chapter lead to the
conclusion that this was the case in Greece.
A great part of remittances finances the construction of houses and
buildings for two sets of reasons: the first one has to do with the
emigrants' strong propensity to invest in the building sector; the
second one has to do with the absence of any policy measures aiming at
channeling remittances to other kinds of investment.
The strong propensity to invest in buildings could be explained in
terms of the emigrants' desire to buy a new flat in a city or to build
a new house in their home town of origin in which they planned to live
after their repatriation; alternatively, many of them thought that the
building sector had the highest rate of return or security and
therefore preferred to use remittances in order to purchase houses and
rent them. Given the underdevelopment of the Greek stock market and the
fact that the per emigrant remittances were not high enough to finance
the establishment of .a manufacturing unit, it seems quite natural that
remittances mainly financed either the purchase of houses or small
business mainly in the tertiary sector (Poulopoulou-Emke, 1987). It is
indicative that 40% of the construction of houses in Thessaloniki in
1965 was financed by remittances from West Germany; the corresponding
figure for the middle-sized cities of Northern Greece was 80% •OECD,
1967, p. 47).
Unlike other emigration countries like Turkey (see Paine, 1974), no
policy measures aiming at transferring remittances to industrial
investment were ever applied in Greece. The only policy measure adopted
was the special interest rates for the deposits of emigrants (mentioned
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at a previous section of this chapter) which, in fact, was aiming at
maximising the volume of remittances rather than maximising the
benefits from their use. This point is of great importance; already by
1965 OECD was warning Greek policy makers of the high propensity of
remittances to finance the purchase of houses and the relative
implications and of the fact that the only alternative use of
remittances was the finance of small inefficient units (small stores,
taxis etc.) with extremely low productivity which were intensifying
parasitism (here defined as any kind of non-productive economic
activity and self-employment (see OECD, 1965 and 1967). Surprisingly,
no measures were adopted until the early 1980s when it was very late,
since remittances were constantly falling since the early 1970s.
Generally speaking, it appears that the Greek policy makers were only
interested in remittances as a source of exchange for the covering of
the trade deficit.
This direct relationship between remittances and investment in
dwellings was indicated in all the studies on the impact of emigration
on the Greek economy (see Kayser, 1977 and Glitsos, 1987). What was not
identified though was the relationship between remittances and
investment in general or, in other words investment in the other
sectors of the economy besides dwellings. This was probably due to the
fact that in very few of these studies were quantitative methods used
and, as a result, the conventional analytical tools only allowed for
the identification of the direct impact of remittances on investment in
dwellings.
The growth of remittances coincided with the acceleration of
investment and their deceleration coincided with the recession in
investment. Although one could hardly say that remittances directly
financed investment in manufacturing, it can be assumed that the
expansion of the construction sector (attributable to a great extent to
remittances) was accompanied by an expansion of the industrial branches
related to constructions. In fact from the analysis in chapter 2, it
became obvious that these industrial branches have been the most
dynamic ones in the period of economic prosperity.
The main question to be answered at this point, under the apparent
relationship between remittances, investment in dwellings and expansion
of the industrial sectors related to constructions is whether this
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relationship had positive implications for the development of the Greek
economy or not. In a positive way of thinking, it seems that
remittances and the aforementioned mechanism, in general, have been a
positive factor for economic development in Greece. Both the previous
studies and the findings of the econometric investigation support this
conclusion. In a normative way of thinking though one could end up with
exactly the opposite conclusion.
Given their size and their relative importance as a source of
foreign exchange, remittances could have been one of the main driving
forces for the development of the Greek economy. Under the conditions
of the dual-gap model, remittances clearly covered the investment-
savings gap; they could also have covered the import-export one
leading the country to self-sustained growth through financing
investment in export or import substituting branches. The econometric
investigation revealed that this did not happen. Remittances financed
investment in either dwellings or branches with a limited export or
import substituting potential. The dual-gap conditions have to do with
the allocation of remittances as a source of finance in the different
sectors of the Greek economy and their operation in an integrated plan
for the economic development of the country. Under the circumstances
emigration and remittances evolved in the case of Greece in the postwar
period and given the level of economic development of the country, it
seems that a certain amount of planning was needed or, in other words
that the "laissez faire" principle could hardly guarantee any success.
In any case, the absence of government policy and any other mechanism
transferring remittances to the most dynamic and vital for economic
development sectors of the economy deprived the country of the
opportunity to make the best out of remittances.
There are some more aspects related to the effects of remittances on
the Greek economy such as their impact on inflation and regional
development, but these will be dealt with in the following chapters of
this part of the thesis.
CHAPTER SEVEN
" OTHER SHORT-RUN ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF
EMIGRATION FROM GREECE TO THE E.C.
COUNTRIES"
Although quite significant in terms of their economic impact (as the
analysis of the previous chapter indicated), remittances represent only
one of the short-run effects of migration. There are several others
that could be taken into consideration in order to complete the
analysis of the short-run effects of emigration from Greece to the E.C.
countries. In particular, economic theory (see chapter five), suggests
that the decision to emigrate implies individual effects for the
emigrants; furthermore, emigration has an impact on the labour markets,
wages, the price levels and income distribution in the emigration as
well as the immigration countries. Finally migration may influence the
trade, and therefore the balance of trade of both groups of countries.
In the following sections of this chapter an attempt will be made to
analyse whether the aforementioned effects have been applicable to the
case of emigration from Greece to the E.C. countries.
A. THE EFFECTS OF EMIGRATION FOR THE EMIGRANTS.
Besides the effects of emigration for the emigration and the
immigration countries, the decision to emigrate affects the emigrants
individually. Normally the presence of emigration indicates that the
benefits from emigration are more than the consequent costs, since
otherwise, emigration would not have occurred, or even if it had
started it would soon have ceased that is, if emigrants had found out
that emigration proved to be a mistake (Sjaastad., 1962, p. 80).
The decision to emigrate is assumed to be taken according to the
expected rather than the current effects it will produce. The fact that
during the 1960s one third of the immigrants in Western Europe "broke"
their contracts (the function of contracts was analysed in chapter
three) and returned to their home countries before the end of their
contracts, simply indicates the divergence between the expected and the
actual effects of migration as well as the existence of a very high
cost of migration (Kindleberger, 1967, p. 197).
In the case of Greece, the evolution of emigration and repatriation,
shows that even in the periods when emigration was accelerating, a
considerable number of people preferred to return to Greece, (Korner,
1984, p. 235). This fact suggests that besides those who returned after
having achieved what they were aiming at by emigrating (building up
savings), many Greeks returned simply because their hopes were not
fulfilled. It is true that the Greek governments adopted policies of
full information of the potential emigrants on the environment they
would face in the immigration countries (Kindleberger, 1967, p. 199).
The existence of such policies though, cannot guarantee that the
citizens of a country will realise and evaluate the possible effects of
emigration precisely.
We could briefly analyse the effects of emigration for the Greek
emigrants as follows:
L The Positive Effects for the Greek Emigrants. 
Given that the postwar migratory flow from Greece to the E.C.
absorbed mainly the unemployed of the cities and the underemployed of
agriculture (chapter three), we could say that emigration solved the
employment problem for a considerable part of the Greek population.
Especially for those who emigrated under the bilateral agreements,
employment was guaranteed before leaving Greece, (Mantzouranis, 1974).
Until the appearance of the economic recession, the unemployment of
Greek emigrants in West Germany was negligible (table 1-35) and the
unemployment rate of the immigrants was much lower than the
corresponding one for the native labour force. Things changed
dramatically after 1974 though; unemployment hit Greek immigrants in
the E.C. countries and many of them had to return to Greece after
looking for employment in vain for a period of time.
The main "monetary" benefit for the immigrants from working abroad is
the attainment of a higher income due to the differences in real wages
between the two groups of countries. One could add the possible
differences in social security, education etc. to these benefits. The
relation of incomes in Greece and the E.C. countries could have been
indicated by the relation between wages in similar sectors (heavy
industry for example), but such an attempt would not be indicative of
the monetary benefits of emigration. The finding of a job for the Greek
emigrant in the E.C. countries simply meant a movement from an income
level close (or even below) to the subsistence level (for the employed
and the underemployed) (Connel et al, 1976, pp. 17-18), to an income
level corresponding to the wage level of an industrial worker in the
E.C. countries; this wage rate was 2.5-3 times higher in nominal terms
than the one they would get by finding a job (which was very difficult
as mentioned) in the Greek industry. The Greek immigrants seem to have
had a very low propensity to consume and were able to remit
considerable sums of money to their families. One could, therefore,
conclude that, especially before the recession emigration produced a
positive net monetary effect for the emigrants.
2. The Negative Effects for the Greek Emigrants. 
The negative effects of emigration for the emigrants, the so called,
"cost of migration", can be divided to the monetary and the
non-monetary ones (Sjaastad, 1962).
The monetary cost of migration consists of all the transportation and
establishment expenses borne by the emigrant plus any wages foregone
for the period he stops working in his country of origin until the day
he starts working in the immigration country. As far as the wages
foregone are concerned we could say that, even though there is no
statistical evidence, this cost item was not very high in the case of
the Greek emigrants for two main reasons:
a) A large part of the emigrants were unemployed or underemployed
before emigrating (chapter three), and
b) Since they were moving according to the bilateral agreements they
undertook employment just after arriving in the immigration country.
As far as transportation and the establishment costs are concerned,
one could conclude that this cost was considerably high (compared with
the per capita income in Greece in that period) and, in many cases
emigrants had to spent their savings or even borrow in order to finance
their movement (Mantzouranis, 1977).
The various consisting parts of the "non-monetary" or "psychic" cost
of emigration (Sjaastad, 1962) provides a fairly comprehensive list of
these parts), may prove to be quite significant. Aspects such , as the
homesickness and the uncertainty of the immigrants could be included in
this category. One should keep in mind though, that in the case of the
Greek immigrants in the E.C. countries special arrangements were in
operation and they could leave their job and visit Greece without any
repercussion for a period of two months per year (Kindleberger, 1967,
p. 198).
Besides their nostalgia, Greek immigrants in the E.C. countries were
faced with a series of problems which could be listed as follows:
a) Low standards of living due to a very low level of expenditure
(relatively to the ones they could have, given their income) due to
their desire to maximise remittances (Mantzouranis, 1977).
b) Bad housing conditions relatively to the native workers due to a)
and the shortage of houses (Castles and Kosack, 1985, pp. 241-270).
c) Rough working conditions and high accident ratios
(Hatzipanayotou,1977) mainly because of their anxiety to increase their
productivity and therefore their income (Mantzouranis, 1977).
d) Prejudice and hostility from their native colleagues for many
reasons and particularly because of the increase of the production norm
and the lowering of real wages because of the increased labour supply,
due to the immigrants (Castles and Kosack, 1985 pp. 241-70).
B. THE IMPACT OF MIGRATION ON THE LABOUR MARKETS
OF GREECE AND THE E.C. COUNTRIES.
1. The Effects of Emigration and Repatriation on the Greek
Labour Market. 
As analysed in chapter five, emigration may lower unemployment and
underemployment in the emigration countries, while the level of
production is unaffected. This could be true under several strict
assumptions (e.g. zero or even negative marginal productivity of labour
in the emigration country prior to emigration). These assumptions are
necessary in order tO accept the unaffected production hypothesis of
the above argument.
Emigration causes a shift of the short-term aggregate supply of
labour curve to the left for the emigration countries and to the right
in the immigration ones.
In many cases and as far as the impact of emigration on the labour
market is concerned the following error can be made: the emigration of
a certain number of people is considered as an equal fall in the number
of unemployed and underemployed. This is an oversimplification the
error being that it is not sure that those who emigrate were accounted
in the labour force of their country of origin for two reasons:
a) A certain part of those who emigrate are relatives of the emigrant
workers (family emigration); these people were not active before
emigrating and they are very unlikely to become so after emigrating.
This has been the case with the postwar intra-European emigration since
the late 1960s (Bohning, 1975).
b) A part of the emigrants were not active in their country of origin
but they become so in the immigration countries (e.g. women) (Paine,
1974, p. 39). The validity of this argument, of course, depends on the
definition of economically active (e.g. should one include housework in
economic activity?)
It is also possible that some of the dependents of the emigrants in
the home country will cease to work (or look for work) because they
receive the remittances (Paine, 1974 p. 39).
In the case of the postwar emigration from Greece the above
reservations do not seem to apply, at least not in the 1960s, mainly
because emigration was not of a family type in the beginning and the
participation rate of women was extremely low as we have seen in
chapter three; we cannot therefore accept that a considerable number of
emigrants' wives ceased to work because of remittances.
The impact of emigration on the labour force of Greece was really
impressive. Between 1961 and 1971 the labour force of Greece fell by
404,000 people (15 % of the labour force in 1971) or 1.2% annually
(KEPE, 1976, p. 51). As a result the female participation rate (defined
by KEPE as: women labour force\total labour force - the usual
definition being: women labour force\women population) fell from 43.4%
in 1961 to 36.9% in 1971 and 36.4% in 1975 (KEPE, op. cit.).
As already mentioned in the first part of the thesis, the Greek
economy in the postwar period was faced with a severe problem of
absorbing the unemployed of the cities and the underemployed of
agriculture in spite of the considerable increase of GDP. It was also
mentioned that the pattern of development in the postwar period did not
allow any optimism as far as full employment was concerned. Given these
conditions, the emigration of a considerable part of the labour force
functioned as a "safety valve" (Poulopoulou-Emke, 1986, p. 256) for
unemployment. This function of emigration prevented a further increase
of unemployment and underemployment with several economic, social and
political implications.
The reduction of unemployment in Greece due to emigration, especially
for the period of massive emigration (1960-1974), can be estimated by a
simple method used by the OECD (1985, pp. 56-7); according to this
method (which is very simplistic, not to say naive) the number of
emigrants is added to the number of the unemployed and the sum is
divided by total labour force; the rate found is the unemployment rate
had emigration not occurred. The logic of this method is based on the
implicit assumption that emigration has no impact on demand or capital
formation. Besides that, there are two problems with this method: the
first one has to do with the reservations expressed in the beginning of
this paragraph on whether emigrants were active in their country of
origin; we therefore have to assume that these reservations are not
valid in the case of Greece. The second one is the permanent problem of
the credibility of the Greek statistics on unemployment. In table II-6
(at the end of part II) which is used following the OECD method, only
registered unemployment is taken into account; as a result,
unemployment for 1961 was estimated to be 80,000 people while the
census of that year revealed 215,000 unemployed (Poulopoulou-Emke,
1986, p. 255). Even under these reservations though, table II-6 shows
how registered unemployment would have evolved, had emigration to the
E.C. countries not taken place (under the assumption that all those who
emigrated would qualify for registered unemployed).
The conclusions on the reduction of unemployment due to emigration
(at least to a considerable extent) are still valid even if we use the
figures of the 1961 and 1971 censuses (which are much more reliable).
In 1961 there were 215,000 unemployed (5.9% unemployment rate), the
corresponding figures for 1971 being 113,000 people (3.49% unemployment
rate) (op. cit.).
Emigration clearly affected the Greek labour market but, as already
mentioned, it evolved almost completely independently of the evolutions
in that market. This unplanned and uncontrolled (as far as Greece is
concerned) way emigration evolved (Kominos, 1964, p. 3) left Greece, in
the early 1970s, with exactly the opposite problem it had in the
previous decade. Within a period of ten years that is, Greece had lost
its reserves of labour and was witnessing a relative shortage of labour
due to emigration (Lianos and Milonas, 1975, p. 8). This evolution was
predicted as early as the early 1960s by several economists
(Papandreou, 1962, Kominos, 1964) who were stressing the fact that the
arguments on the labour surplus were overestimating the size of this
surplus.
Table 1-6 The registered unemployment in Greece with and without
emigration to the E.C. countries (1960-74).
Year
Labour	 Registered
	 Emigrants	 Unemployed % of
	 % of
force
	 unemployed	 to the EC	 without	 regist.	 unempl.
countries
	 emigration	 unempl. without
emigrat.(1)	 (2)	 (3)
	
(4 = 2 + 3)
	 (2/1)	 (4/1)
1960 3558000 93000 25317 118317 2.61 3.32
1961 3638700 80000 35890 115890 2.19 3.18
1962 3603100 79000 57997 136997 2.19 3.80
1963 3567600 76000 72052 148052 2.13 4.14
1964 3532000 71000 78121 149121 2.01 4.22
1965 3496400 70000 85531 150531 2.00 4.30
1966 3460900 70000 51268 121268 2.02 3.50
1967 3425300 89000 14100 103100 2.59 3.00
1968 3389800 78000 22381 100381 2.30 2.96
1969 3354200 71000 61339 132339 2.11 3.94
1970 3318700 49000 67657 116657 1.47 3.51
1971 3234900 30000 41986 71986 0.92 2.22
1972 3261400 24000 28642 52642 0.73 1.61
1973 3260100 22000 14293 36293 0.67 1.11
1974 3248900 27000 10268 37268 0.83 1.14
Sources: a) ESYE, Statistical Yearbook, (various issues).
b) Hatzipanayotou, 1982.
c) Own calculations.
There were signs of this forthcoming shortage of labour since the
mid-1960s, but in the early 1970s it became clear that Greece had a
labour shortage problem (according to an estimation by Nikolinakos
(1973), this shortage was in the area of more than 20,000 workers
although Nikolinakos does not explain how this shortage was measured).
The situation by sector was the following:
-In the agricultural sector, the labour force had decreased by 13% in
the period 1961-1971 and the labour shortage in the crop periods (to a
large extent seasonal demand for part-timers) varied from 11% to 22%
(job vacancies unfilled-unemployed1employed) (op. cit).
-In the civil sector of the Greek economy the problem emerged in the
form of a shortage of unskilled labour, since the shortage of skilled
labour had been a permanent problem for Greece all through the postwar
period (KEPE, 1976, p. 5) and this one of the reasons why the Society
of Greek Industrialists was pressing for the import of unskilled labour
from less developed countries, besides the fact that they wanted cheap
foreign labour, as the Greek one was becoming more expensive.
The reversal of the migratory flow after 1974 with the fall in
emigration and the rise of repatriation changed to a great extent the
situation in the Greek labour market. Contrary to what one might expect
though, repatriation in spite of its size did not lead to a rise in
unemployment, at least not until the early 1980s even though it
coincided with the economic recession (Poulopoulou-Emke, 1986, p. 270).
This paradoxal, at first sight, phenomenon can be explained on the
ground of the preference of the returning emigrants for self-employment
(OECD, 1979). As we have seen in chapter three, most of the Greek
returning emigrants ended up in self-employment (although dependent
employment was available as an alternative in most cases); by doing so,
return emigrants did not compete with those looking for employment and
they were not added to the unemployed (Poulopoulou-Emke, 1986).
The postwar emigration and repatriation also affected the structure
of the Greek labour force; in particular, both the sectoral and the
professional (farmers, wage-earners, self- employed) composition of the
labour force were considerably changed. As derived from the data on the
characteristics of emigration and repatriation (chapter three),
emigration absorbed a considerable part of the labour force of
agriculture; given that very few of the returning emigrants returned to
agriculture, it is clear that the whole process facilitated and
accelerated the exodus from agriculture in Greece. The civil sectors of
the economy and particularly the tertiary one benefited from this
process.
2. The Impact of Immigration on the Labour Markets of
the E.C. Countries. 
For the immigration countries, immigration represents an increase of
the labour force. As we have seen in chapter five, in theory this de
facto increase of the labour force may shift the short-term supply of
labour curve to the right, with significant effects on wages (they are
kept at low levels), on profits (they are kept at high levels), on
investment and the price level (Kindleberger, 1967, p.200) which will
be further analysed in the following sections of this paragraph. Some
times, immigration is considered as a factor increasing unemployment in
the immigration countries. What really happens in many cases, is that
this "import" of labour follows the excess demand for labour in the
immigration countries which cannot be satisfied by the domestic labour
market (Bohning, 1984, p. 87). In such a case immigration does not
cause an increase in unemployment.
As already mentioned (chapter two), most of the Western European
countries at least for a part of the 1960s, faced a pressing problem of
labour shortage (Lutz, 1963, pp. 6-7) which could constrain their
economic growth.
The massive inflow of immigrants increased employment in the E.C.
countries considerably (Denison, 1967, p. 51) and especially in West
Germany where immigrants represented 7% of the labour force (Coale,
1976, p. 493).
It is sometimes over stressed that immigrants replace domestic labour
and that generally immigrants and at least some parts of the native
labour force are competitors (Reder, 1963). For West Germany in
particular, in spite of the massive inflow of immigrants, the total
annual hours of work did not change significantly (which could be
interpreted as a sign of immigrants "replacing" indigenous workers, or
simply that native workers may have been on and off working fewer
hours) (Blitz, 1977, P. 487). In fact, this observation (interpreted in
the first of the above two ways) has been the main (if not the only)
supportive one to the above argument.
Both the argument and the supportive observation are doubtful though;
first of all the observation on the stagnation of the annual hours of
work does not take into account two very important factors: a) Since
the early 1960s the trade unions in all Western European countries
pressed for and finally achieved a reduction of the weekly hours of
work (Boltho, 1982, p. 177) and b) in many cases the employment of
immigrants replaced the overtime or complementary employment of the
native labour force (Castles and Kosack, 1985, p. 57) with very
important positive effects on labour productivity, which is not even
taken into account by the aforementioned observation.
Even if one accepts that some competition over jobs (probably not
very intense in this case) has taken place, the argument of the
competition between the two groups of workers could be partially
rejected by taking into account the position of the immigrants in the
labour force of the immigration countries. In the particular case of
Greek-German migration, immigrants were employed almost exclusively as
unskilled industrial workers, undertaking in many cases the so called
heavy and unhealthy jobs competing, therefore, only with the low skill
native labour (op. cit. p. 4). By taking the last step in the ladder of
the hierarchy of professions, immigrants facilitated the climb of the
native labour force on a higher step and mainly to white collar work,
which could not be claimed by the immigrants in any case (Bohning,
1984, p. 88).
C. THE IMPACT OF MIGRATION ON THE LEVEL OF OUTPUT
AND GDP GROWTH.
L The Greek Economy. 
The analysis of this section will deal with the impact of emigration
on the evolution of GDP in Greece on a short-term basis and without
relating this impact to the medium-term effects on economic
development. What is to be examined in other words, is whether GDP in
Greece in the period of massive emigration (1960-1973) would have been
higher, had emigration not occurred.
A careful look at the relevant literature reveals that, contrary to
the case of the immigration countries where there have been many
estimations of the impact of migration on the GDP growth (see Askari,
1974, Quibria and Rivera-Batiz, 1989), there are very few (if any) such
estimations for the emigration ones; this conclusion, of course,
applies to the case of Greece too. According to the theory (chapter
one), the impact of emigration on the GDP of the emigration countries
should be examined from the demand and the supply side simultaneously.
In the case of Greece, the increase of emigration coincided with the
acceleration of GDP growth and per capita productivity; this does not
necessarily imply a positive relation between these factors. The final
conclusion can only be derived indirectly and the econometric
investigation of the previous chapter may prove to be helpful in that.
On the one hand remittances did cause an increase of aggregate demand
(although their main effect was a change in the structure of
consumption), but on the other, emigration reduced potential supply;
especially in the agricultural areas of the country (which were the
main destination of the remittances after all), they facilitated the
adoption of consumption patterns very much similar to those of the big
cities (Poulopoulou-Emke, 1986, p. 292). It has already been stressed
(chapter six) that remittances financed only to a limited extent the
purchase of domestic goods. This fact proved to be of great importance,
especially for the Greek industry which was facing the permanent
problem of the small domestic market (Negreponti-Delivani, 1983), and
did not benefit significantly from the inflow of the remittances
(Triantis, 1965, pp. 218-219), the possible exception being the
manufacturing sectors related to dwellings. On the other hand though,
the findings of the previous chapter suggest that remittances proved to
be a very significant determining factor for investment in Greece.
Most of the discussion on the impact of emigration on GDP growth in
Greece through increases in aggregate demand, often seems to be carried
out in a "normative" way of thinking. It is seldom mentioned but, often
implied by some authors (Nikolinakos, Zolotas) that what was really
expected from remittances was a compensation in terms of aggregate
demand falls due to the departure of the emigrants or even an increase
of aggregate demand relatively to the level in the absence of
emigration. In other words, a "successful" operation of the emigration-
remittances mechanism should guarantee the level and (more important)
the pattern of aggregate demand that would have been had emigration not
taken place. Ending up with an aggregate demand at the non-emigration
levels is of course very difficult in practice; ending up with the same
pattern of demand is impossible. In fact, it would imply an assumption
that potential emigrants finally deciding to stay in Greece, finding a
job and acquiring a modest income increase have exactly the same
consumption pattern as those who emigrated. The discussion in the
previous chapter though revealed that the emigrants' demand pattern was
in a sense unique and in any case, quite different from the one of
those remaining in Greece. It is therefore very unrealistic to assume
that aggregate demand patterns as well as levels with and without
emigration are in any sense comparable.
The impact of emigration on the domestic production was even more
important; the decrease in the labour force of agriculture due to
emigration was not followed by the necessary restructuring of
cultivations and the mechanisation of agriculture; as a result labour
shortages emerged in many areas, followed by a stagnation in
agricultural production (Zolotas, 1966, P. 56). The fall of
agriculture's share in the GDP from 26.1% in 1958 to 15.6% in 1981
(Poulopoulou-Emke, 1986. pp. 285-286) was not only due to the
impressive progress of industrialisation but to the relative stagnation
of agricultural production as well. During the 1960-1973 period
agriculture increased its (nominal) product by 85%, while the aggregate
increase of the nominal GDP was 245.19% (National Accounts of Greece,
various issues). One could say though, that this relative stagnation of
agriculture was to be expected given the process of industrialisation
but, on the other hand, it was amplified by emigration as well.
It took some time before the negative effects of the outflow of
labour for the GDP of manufacturing became obvious; this was due to the
low labour absortiveness of the Greek manufacturing and the fact that
to a certain extent industry can substitute labour with capital. By the
late 1960s though it became quite obvious that the Greek industry was
labour constrained. This was also due to the lack of any professional
training policy but the level in the labour pool for the industry was
indeed much lower due to emigration. In addition to that, the
unwillingness of the returning emigrants to be employed in industry
made things even more difficult.
2 The Economies of the Immigration E.C. Countries. 
As analysed in chapter one, the impact of immigration on GDP growth
can take two forms namely the "direct production effect" and the
"instantaneous welfare effect" ones. In the E.C. countries, as one
should expect, immigration coincided with GDP growth; we cannot isolate
the impact of immigration on GDP growth, but we can indicate it
indirectly according to the above two sets of effects.
The need for immigrant labour emerged when besides other things,
manufacturing had absorbed the surplus labour of agriculture and
households services. The fact that most immigrants were employed in
manufacturing (chapter three), the sector with the highest labour
productivity in the E.C. countries in the postwar period (Boltho,
1982), could lead to the conclusion that immigration increased the
average labour productivity in the E.C. countries. On the other hand
though, one could argue that immigrants tended to move to low skilled
jobs which may have low productivity; in such a case, assuming
availability of domestic labour and depending on whether the definition
of MPL is correct, marginal productivity considerations would suggest
that immigration caused an increase in the labour force and a fall in
average productivity in the immigration countries (although one could
argue that the native labour force would have done the unwanted jobs
otherwise). Besides that the immigrants' desire to maximise their
income and to ensure their future employment (almost all of them were
on one year contracts) made them work very intensively (Castles and
Kosack, 1985, pp. 396-398). Productivity growth in West Germany in
particular during the 1960s (after immigration) was estimated to be
more rapid in the sectors employing immigrants than in the ones not
employing foreign labour (Nikolinakos, 1974, p. 108). One could argue
though, that the direction of causation in this case is not at all
clear; immigrants may have contributed to this more rapid growth;
alternatively they may have been attracted by it or simply needed by
those industries. It was estimated that during period 1967-1971 in
France, foreign workers contributed by 4.6-5% to the formation of this
country's GDP.
As far as West Germany, (the main immigration country for Greece) is
concerned, it was estimated that foreign workers contributed by 0.07
percentage points to West Germany's GDP growth rate in 1970 (which was
5% that particular year (OECD, Economic Outlook) (MacMillen, 1982, p.
240 and Askari, 1974, pp. 341-345). This estimation was carried out in
the following way: - Askari used Denison's estimation on the annual
contribution of labour to GDP growth in West Germany in the 1960-1970
period (19%); he than found what percentage of the labour force
immigrants represented in that period and he simply multiplied those
two percentages (clearly assuming no impact on efficiency, capital
formation etc.). By doing this he came up with a very low estimate of
the contribution of immigration to GDP growth in the 1960-1973 period
but, he made clear that even this small contribution was higher than
the impact of free trade on GDP growth due to the formation of the E.C.
in the same period (static welfare effects of a customs union). Besides
the reservations one could have on the very strict and, in fact, quite
unrealistic	 assumptions	 these	 estimations	 are	 based	 on,	 the
aforementioned findings could be interpreted differently; in fact,
during the 1960s the growth of the labour force in West Germany in the
absence of immigration would have been extremely low or even negative
for some particular years.
The contribution of the immigrants to the level of productivity of
several strategic industrial sectors of the E.C. countries was of great
importance for these sectors. Foreign workers in the West German car
industry in the 1960s were producing one in every six cars (Bohning,
1984, pp. 24-5).
Immigrants tended to suppress wage pressures in the sector they were
employed in, and consequently, production cost in total; the
competitiveness and therefore the exports of these sectors improved.
The sectors that employed immigrants were the ones to increase their
exports the most in West Germany (Nikolinakos, 1974, pp. 83-84). The
increasing world demand for industrial goods produced by West Germany
was one of the main factors for the economic growth of this country
(Boltho, 1982); the role of immigrants in this respect is, therefore,
obvious.
The "instantaneous welfare effect" argument is in essence based on
the accumulation process. The conditions for accumulation get more
favourable, the larger the labour force and the more the wage level can
be suppressed (Nikolinakos, 1974, p. 136). Since immigration ensures
the availability of labour and suppresses wages it is in essence a
factor securing and expanding accumulation.
The inflow of immigrants and investment have a cause-effect relation.
Obviously, investment has to preexist in order to create job vacancies
for the immigrants; it has been historically indicated (for immigration
into U.S.A.) that migration follows investment with a 6-36 month time
lag (see Thomas, 1973, pp. 159-163, although the method used for this
estimation is not specified). The reverse relation (immigration causing
investment) could be established as follows: even if we, accept that
immigrants do not cause a direct increase in the demand for industrial
capital in the short-run, because there is surplus capital, the
employment of the immigrants causes an increase in increase of
profitability of investment and an increase of capacity utilisation and
therefore investment. This, of course, assumes that firms have excess
capital and are facing an increasing demand for their products and a
labour shortage; in such a case, firms will increase their production
by simply employing immigrant labour. After a certain point though,
firms will only increase their output by simultaneously increasing
their capital stock and labour force; in such a case investment would
run alongside migration. Immigrants don't even cause a considerable
individual (compared with the native population) indirect effect on
aggregate demand through their demand for consumer goods because of
their low income and their high propensity to remit. The impact of
immigration on investment is almost entirely based on the creation of
favourable expectations for profits and accumulation for the
entrepreneurs (MacMillen, 1982, p. 247). Immigration suppresses the
cost of production, increases the profit margins and this produces
favourable expectations for a further increase of profits through
investment.
The "instantaneous welfare effect" (welfare from the immigration
country's point of view) was estimated at 1.2 or 2.2% of GDP (depending
on the working assumptions) for France (1971), 1.33% of GDP for the
U.K. (1974) and between 2.5 and 3% for West Germany (average annual
rate for the period 1965-1974) (op. cit.). The methods used for these
estimations are based on very strict assumptions, but up to this point
only the methods and not the estimations themselves have been subject
to criticisms. Generally speaking the "instantaneous welfare effect" is
believed to be much smaller than the "direct production" one (a 1 to 4
relation ) (Kindleberger, 1965, pp. 237-241) but what really matters is
their sum (5.8-8.5% of GDP) which only shows the short-run impact of
immigration on the GDP growth of the E.C. countries.
D. THE IMPACT OF MIGRATION ON WAGES, THE PRICE
LEVEL AND INCOME DISTRIBUTION.
L The Greek Economy. 
We have already seen in a previous section of this chapter that, the
expansion of the emigratory flow from Greece in the 1960s left the
country with labour shortages particularly visible in some sectors and
for some professional groups. It is very difficult to specify, though,
the exact impact of these labour shortages on the wage level, the main
reason being the imperfect way the Greek labour market operates. In the
period of massive emigration (1963-1973), nominal wages increased at an
average annual rate of 11.3%, while the average annual rate of
inflation did not exceed 3.8%. Real wages, in that period, increased at
an annual rate of 8.5% (Poulopoulou-Emke, 1986); even this increase
though, lagged behind the annual labour productivity increases (which
may have been affected by emigration). These high productivity
increases could be explained in terms of the very low starting point,
the rapid shift to capital intensive methods during that period or,
both. Besides that, these productivity increases also reflect the
presence of a large labour surplus in agriculture prior to emigration,
since the departure of the emigrants did not cause a fall in output.
It is not certain whether, (even this lagging behind productivity
increases) wage increase would have taken place, had emigration and the
consequent labour shortages (described in previous sections) had not
occurred. It is also very doubtful whether the wage increases in the
period 1970-1973, when the labour shortages became pressing, could have
been so modest if there had been a parliamentary democracy and free
trade unionism in Greece; the dictatorial regime (1967-1974) had been
trying to avoid considerable price and wage increases by freezing them
both. In a sense therefore, real wages during the dictatorship did not
increase although one could argue that the emergence of a "black
market" for goods (not that obvious for labour) following the freezing
of prices during the dictatorship and the consequent price increases
really meant a fall in real wages.
The rapid real wage increases after 1975 could be attributed to a
great extent to the further reduction of the labour force in the period
1970-1974 (only in 1970 282,136 people or 8.5% of the labour force for
that year emigrated to West Germany (KEPE, 1976, p. 6) in addition to
the strengthening of the trade unions after the fall of the
dictatorship; these two factors made the further stagnation of wages
very difficult. The rapid real wage increases in the mid and late
1970s, in spite of the stagnation in productivity, simply suggests that
it took quite a while for wages to adjust to the new status of the
Greek labour market.
This increasing trend of real wages was not retarded by repatriation
because returning emigrants did not cover the unfilled job vacancies,
mainly because of their unwillingness to undertake dependent
employment; consequently, they did not contribute to the reduction of
the labour shortages, especially in some industrial branches.
This delay in wage increases in Greece, partly caused by emigration,
may have affected the functional income distribution (although there is
no evidence on that); according to the theory (Grubel and Scott, 1966,
p. 270) emigration may increase the capital-labour ratio, even if most
of the emigrants were unemployed or underemployed before emigrating,
mainly because the consequent labour shortage may lead many
industrialists to the decision to substitute capital for labour. In the
case of Greece the share of labour in the national income seems to
increase gradually in that period; (22.6%-31.6% in the 1960s, 43.3 in
1974 the remainder being the share of capital) this of course, seems to
be a very large measure to accept; what is useful though in this
estimation is the size of the change rather than the estimated shares
of labour themselves. In particular, these estimations are unreliable,
mainly because Greek statistics are unable to indicate the product of
hidden economy (Negreponti-Delivani, 1983). If one takes into account
the product of hidden economy, the picture of the functional income
distribution in Greece would change dramatically). One has to take into
account that the share of capital althrough the postwar period was kept
at a 56.7%-77.4% of national income; the average share of capital in
Greece (49%) during that period was much higher than the corresponding
one for other European emigration countries (25.1% in Italy, 33.1% in
Spain and 40.4% in Portugal) (Babanasis, 1985, p. 270). In any case
though, the exact impact of emigration on the functional income
distribution in Greece cannot be estimated.
The inflow of remittances increased the income of the emigrants'
family members who remained in Greece. The problem is that the impact
of remittances on the income of the emigrants' families and the
personal income distribution in general cannot be identified because
the income from remittances was not subject to taxation and, therefore
was not declared at all; consequently, it did not appear in the
official statistics of income and the impact of emigration on the
personal income distribution as in the case of the functional
distribution cannot be estimated.
The third aspect to be examined in this section is the impact of
emigration on inflationary pressures in Greece. The analyses on this
subject in the 1960s and early 1970s (see e.g. Kindleberger, 1965 and
1967) were dominated by Phillips curve considerations. Emigration
therefore, can cause inflation only through a considerable decrease in
the labour supply of the emigration country, and a consequent decrease
(or even elimination) of unemployment. Besides the usual reservations
about whether a Phillips curve applied in the case of Greece, one could
add that this kind of analysis examines the labour force and wage and
price increases in total, without distinguishing, that is, particular
groups of the labour force. A more appropriate framework of analysis is
therefore needed.
From the cost push side, the wage increases (even though they were
delayed as we have seen by the controls imposed by the dictatorial
regime until 1974) did have an inflationary impact which, on the other
hand, should not be exaggerated since the labour cost in Greece is a
relatively low percentage of total cost. In fact, all through the
postwar period it has been in the area of 13% of the total value added
(17% for the other Western European countries) or 34% taking
inter-industry links into account (45% for the other Western European
countries) (Lalonde and Papandreou, 1986).
As far as the demand pull side is concerned, one could argue that the
main inflationary impact of emigration in Greece came from the increase
in aggregate demand caused by the remittances relatively to the changes
in aggregate supply. This seems acceptable provided that the increase
in aggregate demand outweighed quantitatively the fall in consumption
caused by the departure of the emigrants. As analysed in the previous
chapter, remittances • had a considerable effect on aggregate demand in
general mainly because of their size. This effect was more obvious for
sectors such as dwellings and building materials.
On the other hand, very little could be said on the impact of
remittances on imported inflation; as we have seen, the impact of
remittances on imports seems to have been exaggerated in . the case of
Greece.
From a Monetarist point of view, a phenomenon such as emigration, can
cause inflation only if it influences the money supply. One should,
therefore, examine the impact of remittances on the money supply. In
the case of Greece, there is no evidence (in the reports of the Bank of
Greece as well as the relevant literature) that remittances were an
important determinant factor of the money supply. Besides that, the
monetary authorities could always sterilise the impact of remittances
on money supply, and, therefore, there is very little room for
assumptions of this sort.
As already mentioned, the Phillips curve analysis, fails to
distinguish particular professional groups. In the case of Greece, a
more "structuralistic" approach could be applied, in the sense that
emigration was unevenly distributed among different groups of the
labour force. By causing shortages of skilled labour, not because
emigrants were skilled when leaving the country, but because they were
the most likely part of the labour force to acquire skills in Greece
(because of age etc-see chapter three), emigration has accelerated wage
increases in particular sectors of the economy. Assuming that these
sectors were "leaders" in terms of determining the overall wage
structure (which is quite realistic to assume for a labour market such
as the Greek one-see chapter two), one could establish the case of
emigration causing inflation.
L The Economies of the Immigration E.C. Countries. 
Immigration in the case of the E.C. countries functioned as a "life
boat" for the labour intensive industries, as well as the less
competitive ones by providing them with the necessary labour force,
delaying at the same time considerable real wage increases (Machlup,
1978, p. 166). In fact, several authors go as far as stating that for
the immigration E.C. countries the availability of labour provided by
immigration as a "reserve army" pressed wages and prices down (OECD,
1979, p. 28) and facilitated the maintenance of high profits, at least
in the period 1960-1974 (Castles and Kosack, 1985, p. 377).
Various authors (e.g. Castles and Kosack, Paine) have stressed that
there are wage discriminations against foreign workers; what really
happens is that, since immigrants come to fill particular vacancies,
their wages are subject to limited bargaining even after they have
undertaken employment, unless of course they join trade unions
(Bohning, 1984, pp. 94-106). Immigrants' wages therefore, do not tend
to increase significantly, causing a general stagnation in the wage
level. (MacMillen, 1982, p. 248) A study for West Germany (Bain, and
Panga, 1972, p. 820) reveals that in the period 1960-1970 wages in the
industrial branches employing immigrants fell relatively to the wages
in sectors that did not employ foreign labour.
The aspect of immigration reducing pressures for wage increases has
been the main argument against immigration for the trade unions
(although racism could have been a major driving force) (Nikolinakos,
1974, p. 109) and was accepted in many cases without examining a series
of counter arguments that refute it to a great extent.
There is, first of all a question as to whether real wages could have
increased in the long run had immigration not occurred (Bohning, 1984,
pp. 110-112); one should expect that labour shortages definitely lead
to real wage increases. On the other hand though, there are certainly
mechanisms (e.g. income policies, unemployment) in capitalism for
keeping real wage growth roughly in line with productivity growth. The
scheme according to which real wages increase indefinitely due to the
relative shortage of labour in capitalism, presupposes entrepreneurs
who would increase their production and their demand for labour in
spite of the possible continuous fall of their profits and an
impressive sophistication as far as the trade unionists are concerned.
It has already been mentioned that the massive inflow of immigrants
facilitated and, to a great extent accelerated, the movement of native
workers to skilled labour posts (probably after training), providing
them with a comparative advantage in the labour market;
In conclusion we could say that:
-The inflow of immigrants in the E.C. countries did not rise enough to
reduce real wages, not even to prevent them from increasing, probably
because productivity ' increased as well (Castles and Kosack, 1985, p.
377) and this fact is indicated by their postwar evolution. In fact
during the 1970s, productivity in the developed West European countries
was increasing at a 1.9% annual rate while real wages were increasing
at a 1.6% one (Babanasis, 1985, p. 271).
-In some E.C. countries (West Germany being the best exatnple and the
U.K. the most obvious exception) immigration caused a widening of the
wage differences between skilled and unskilled workers many of which
were immigrants (Maillat, 1968, pp. 19-36 and Bohning, 1984).
Immigration had a negative effect on the increase of real wages in
the short-run that could have taken place had migration not occurred.
This way and, always for the short-run period immigration can be seen
as a redistribution mechanism in favor of profits, although labour's
share increased in many E.C. countries in the period of massive
immigration.
Until the late 1960s, the share of capital in some (mainly West
Germany) immigration E.C. countries seems to increase constantly; (from
55.8% in 1960 it reached 67.9% in 1971 for the E.C. (6)) (Babanasis,
1985, p. 272) after 1981 though, it starts to fall (63.4% in 1985) and
there are two explanations related to migration for this change:
-The first one is that the labour force is no longer increasing at a
rate allowing the stagnation of wages relatively to profits; this is
partly due to the fact that immigrants are no longer absorbed at the
past rates or, in any way, at the necessary rates for the continuation
of that income distribution pattern (Boltho, 1982).
-The second one is that the so called "maturity" of the migratory
stream bad occurred by the late 1960s (Bohning, 1984) and this means,
besides other things, that immigrants start to press effectively for
wage increases side by side with the native workers.
A final question is whether immigration had an inflationaty eitect
for the immigration countries. It should be made clear from the
beginning that the whole discussion circles around the non-monetarist
approaches to inflation because if one adopts the monetarist approach,
immigration is clearly irrelevant to inflation since it only depends on
the monetary expansion. There has been a lot of discussion on this
aspect which revolved around three main points.
a) The inflow of foreign workers by suppressing the trend for wage
increases has a dis'-inflationary effect, since it avoids cost and price
increases (Bain and Panga, 1972, p. 824). This way, even though GDP
increases due to high profits and increasing investment, this growth
does not cause increases in the price level.
b) Assuming spare capacity etc., one could argue that immigration
causes inflation just after the establishment of the immigrants because
of the increases in the demand for: i) industrial capital (machinery
etc.) through new investment for the employment of the immigrants and
ii) social capital (houses, schools, hospitals etc.) for the immigrants
and their families (Mishan and Needleman, 1968, p. 35).
c) Immigration causes inflation in the long-run due to the increasing
demand for i) industrial capital since the profitable production of
labour intensive goods (due to the low labour cost) leads to a spiral
of continuous investment and additional hiring of immigrants (Castles
and Kosack, 1985, p. 389) and ii) consumer goods for the immigrants as
their income increases as well as their remittances (Coale, 1976, p.
304).
The second of these three points is rejected, at least as far as the
E.C. countries are concerned, because i) immigrants did not cause an
additional direct demand for industrial capital since they came to fill
existing job vacancies (chapter two), besides the fact that excess
capital stock existed prior to the migration of labour and ii) all
through the 1960s immigrants were not usually accompanied by their
families and, therefore, the needs for an increase of social capital
(e.g. schools for their children, health services for their spouses)
were not significant.
As far as the other two points are concerned, namely the deflationary
function of the wage suppression in the short-run and the inflationary
one of the increases of demand in the long-run, we could say that they
function simultaneously and the final outcome on the price level was
determined by a country depending on whether the inflationary or the
deflationary pressures were stronger.
In particular, there is no evidence that immigration caused wage
increases in the short-run in any immigration country. On the other
hand, for the long-run period, it seems that there were inflationary
pressures caused by the excessive demand of the immigrants in some
countries (U.K., Switzerland), while others (West Germany, France) were
not affected at all (Castles and Kosack, 1985, pp. 392-393).
E. THE IMPACT OF IMMIGRATION ON THE BALANCE OF
PAYMENTS OF THE IMMIGRATION E.C. COUNTRIES.
The impact of immigration on the balance of payments of the E.C.
immigration countries could be investigated both as far as remittances
and as far as exports and imports are concerned.
Remittances have been an important outflow of exchange for the E.C.
countries and especially West Germany, the main immigration country; it
has been estimated that in 1972, there were 5,900 DM remitted per
foreign worker from West Germany (Blitz, 1977, p. 498).
On the other hand, one has to take into account that the surplus in
the balance of current accounts in West Germany was increasing at the
same time remittances were growing (Boltho, 1982). It is true that the
contribution of the immigrants to an increase of the balance of trade
surplus of the immigration countries (through increases in productivity
and competitiveness) cannot be isolated and, therefore expressed in
quantitative terms. But the fact that the surplus in the balance of
current accounts of the Western European immigration countries was
increasing at a higher rate than remittances (Poulopoulou-Emke, 1986),
brings into question the argument according to which a benefit for an
emigration country is an equivalent loss for an immigration country.
Table 1-7: West Germany's trade with the emigration countries in
1961 and 1972 (in mil. D.M.(1)).
Country	 1961	 1972	 % change 1961-72
exports to	 587	 2,585	 +340.4
Spain	 imports from	 697	 1,645	 +136.0
	
trade balance -110
	 +940
exports to	 505	 1,779
	 +252.3
Greece imports from
	 255	 873	 +242.4
	
trade balance +250
	 +906
exports to	 436	 1,049
	 +140.6
Portugal imports from	 135	 314	 +132.6
trade balance	 +301	 +735
exports to	 376	 1,035
	 +175.3
Turkey imports from
	 311	 594	 +91.0
trade balance
	 +65	 +441
(1) Nominal values.
Source: OECD, 1976, p. 19.
Another theoretical argument on the detrimental effects of
immigration for the immigration countries' balance of payments is that
imports from the emigration countries increase as well (MacMillen,
1982, p. 258); this happens because immigrants retain to a great extent
the consumption pattern of their country and persist in demanding the
goods produced there, which can only be imported. This argument is
complemented by the fact that imports of certain goods for the
immigrants, makes them known to the other consumers as well, causing a
further increase of imports (Mishan and Needleman, 1968, pp. 36-37).
On the other hand, there is the possible "boomerang" effect of the
remittances (remittances financing imports from the immigration
countries). Especially in the case of intra-European migration, there
has been an expansion of trade in general and between emigration and
immigration countries in particular (OECD, 1978, p. 18). The question
is, which group of countries benefited in terms of trade balance from
this expansion; table 11-7 could be very helpful as far as answering
this question is concerned. As shown in table 11-7, in the period of
massive migration West Germany's exports to the emigration countries
grew much faster than its imports from these countries. By increasing
its trade balance surplus, West Germany managed to recycle a great part
of the exchange lost from the remittances.
The most important benefit for the balance of payments of the E.C.
countries, attributable to immigration is that the presence of the
immigrants facilitated the increase of the production of exportable
goods without a considerable increase of the production cost; this way
the E.C. immigration countries gained in competitiveness and managed to
increase their exports and improve their balance of payments
(Nikolinakos, 1974, pp. 81-91).
The final conclusions on the short-run as well as the long-run
economic effects of emigration from Greece to the E.C. countries will
be discussed at the end of part II, following the analysis of chapter
eight.
CHAPTER EIGHT
"THE LONG-RUN ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF MIGRATION
FOR GREECE AND THE E.C. COUNTRIES."
1In this chapter, an attempt will be made to investigate whether
certain long-run economic effects of migration provided by the theory
are applicable to the case of emigration from Greece to the E.C.
countries. In particular, the investigation will include the
acquisition of skills (by the immigrants) argument, the loss of human
capital argument and the balanced growth one. Furthermore, the analysis
will include the investigation of the impact of emigration on
industrialisation and the position of Greece in the international
division of labour. Finally, two more aspects will be taken into
consideration, namely the regional and the demographic dimensions of
migration.
A. THE ACQUISITION OF SKILLS BY THE IMMIGRANTS
AND THE BENEFITS FOR GREECE.
One of the main hoped for long-term benefits for the emigration
countries, according to those advocating that migration is beneficial
for emigration countries, is that emigrants acquire skills in the
immigration countries and these skills are used by the emigration
countries after repatriation. In particular, the skills and knowledge
acquired by the emigrants during their employment in industrial
(mainly) firms are expected to contribute to the industrial development
of their country of origin (ICindleberger, 1967, pp. 248-250). This, of
course, only applies to temporary emigration because, obviously, in the
case of a permanent one the emigration country will not benefit from
these acquired skills. Besides that, even if emigrants return, it all
depends on when they do that since, the return of emigrants at (or even
very close to the age of retirement) will provide very few (if any)
benefits for the emigration country.
This argument is in many cases extended in the sense that emigrants
are considered as bearers of economic and social development acting as
catalysts in their countries of origin by bringing new ideas,
innovations, knowledge and skills acquired in the foreign land (Connel
et. al., 1976, pp. 132-135). Since emigration is seen as caused by the
relative underdevelopment of the emigration countries, the repatriation
of such people will facilitate the modernisation of the economy and
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society in general, leading to economic development. According to this
logic therefore, migration is a process of training people abroad, so
that their country of origin will benefit from that, provided of course
that the above conditions (emigrants return and, in fact, with many
working years ahead) are satisfied.
The above scheme is based on a series of very strict assumptions,
though, and its function requires a continuous and simultaneous
operation of factors. We could briefly analyse some of them:
a) The number of those emigrating and, therefore returning after a
while, should be in accordance with the emigration country's needs for
labour.
b) Emigrants must acquire skills and experience in particular
specialisations needed for the industrial development of their country
of origin.
c) In terms of maximising the benefits for the emigration country one
could add that the amount of time emigrants will remain in the foreign
land must be the absolute minimum necessary one for the acquisition of
skills and experience so that their home country benefits from them as
soon as possible.
d) Returning emigrants should undertake employment in particular
industrial firms (similar to the ones they were working for in the
immigration countries) in the particular region this firm is
established and with the wage rate of the emigration country.
e) The job vacancies returning emigrants are going to fill must be
created before their return.
More generally, there must be a full and efficient, planning of the
industrial development and its needs in labour and, emigration must be
included in this planning as a source of the required (in numbers and
specialisations) labour force. This point is very important especially
if one accepts that private market forces are very unlikely to provide
such gains for the emigration countries. However, it is not at all
certain that any form of planning would be able to reap these benefits;
planning for example will have to give answers to questions such as
"who creates the vacancies in point e)". If one accepts this final
condition, one then has to accept that the main (if not the only)
driving force of emigration is the desire of the emigration countries
to train their labour force. The relation between planning and
industrialisation with reference
discussed in a following section
in the first part of the th
migration was caused by the
immigration countries and the
emigration ones. We have also
to emigration of course, will be
of this chapter. We have already seen
esis, that the postwar intra-European
increasing demand for labour of the
availability of labour force in the
seen that the size of emigration and
repatriation, the kind of employment immigrants undertook and their
training evolved according to the particular needs of the immigration
countries (Bohning, 1975, pp. 263-265).
It has already started to become obvious how difficult (if not
impossible) it was for emigration countries to gain from using the
skills of the returning emigrants. In addition to that we should stress
that:
a) Almost all the immigrants in the E.C. countries were primarily
employed as unskilled workers. Very few of them managed to become
skilled or even semiskilled workers due to the limited duration of
their stay, to the unfolding of native workers who were naturally
preferred and their poor knowledge of the language (Granier and
Marciano, 1975, p. 151).
b) Very few of the immigrants managed to attend professional training
seminars; such seminars would have helped them to acquire some
specialisation. In West Germany in particular, only 4% of the foreign
workers attended such a seminar (Castles and Kosack, 1985, p. 197).
This could be attributed to the language and culture problems
immigrants are faced with and it is the main reason why the E.C.
recognising this problem, is trying to provide equal training
opportunities to the immigrants through its social policy (O'Grada,
1979, pp.87-103).
c) Very few of the returning emigrants were employed in industries
similar to the ones they were employed in the foreign land after their
return (Bohning, 1975, pp. 77-8).
In the case of Greece in particular, there were some special
characteristics:
a) The percentage of Greek immigrants undertaking a skilled worker post
was extremely low; for the Greek immigrants in West Germany this
percentage was estimated to be 7% (Shlaim and Yannopoulos, 1976, pp.
125-126, or less than 15% according to a second estimation (Kayser,
1977, p. 131).
b) Of the Greek immigrants who had acquired some skills, very few could
be used in Greece due to the lack of heavy industry there (OECD, 1967,
pp. 46-51).
c) At least in the beginning, there was no policy from Greece aiming at
attracting skilled emigrants and employing them in Greek industry
(Triantis, 1965, pp. 220-221). Even when such policies were
implemented, as in the case of trying to attract Greek scientists from
abroad, the results were very poor (Kindleberger, 1978).
d) Only 10% of the returning emigrants were employed in manufacturing
after their return (King, 1986, p. 20).
These facts made things look quite different from what the
immigration optimists predicted; the contribution of returning
emigrants to the development of the Greek economy, through their skills
acquired abroad was negligible, if any (Poulopoulou-Emke, 1986, pp.
333-336). In a sense it is possible that Greece could have gained from
this process, as we will see in the concluding chapter of the thesis,
but the necessary conditions were never fulfilled.
The whole emigration-repatriation process in the postwar period not
only failed to provide Greek industry with the necessary skilled labour
force but, in addition to that, deprived a considerable part of this
force from any perspective of industrial employment in Greece. The
enormous demand for skilled labour of the Greek industry in that period
is shown by the following fact: according to the bilateral agreements
many potential migrants were trained in Greece before leaving; 58.4% of
them found a job in the Greek industry and did not emigrate after all
(Zolotas, 1966, p. 68).
B. MIGRATION AS A MOVEMENT OF HUMAN CAPITAL.
Migration can be viewed as a transfer of valuable productive
resources (human capital) from the less developed countries to the
developed ones, assuming of course that this is the direction of the
flow. For the immigration countries the inflow of foreign workers could
be seen as "...an increase of their productive resources for which they
have not paid much. In most cases it has proved out to be that it is by
all means "cheaper" for a country to import labour than to create it."
(Reder, 1963, P. 181).
For the emigration countries, on the other hand, this outflow of
human capital could be seen as a loss, since they lose a part of their
labour force for the creation of which large amounts of money may have
been paid. These amounts represent the cost of production of the labour
force (Nikolinakos, 1973, p. 51) and include the expenditure for the
nutrition, the bringing up, the training etc. of the children until
they reach the age of entering the labour force (Zolotas, 1966, pp.
17-20).
As analysed in chapter five, the examination of labour as a form of
capital (human) contains several difficulties but this is not the main
question to be answered really. Provided that there are no other
options, the main question for the emigration countries is whether they
should maintain their labour unemployed rather than sending it abroad.
This dilemma is a very serious one and it is related to a series of
questions relatively to whether the economic policy followed by the
emigration country was the best one in terms of productively employing
the labour force in the national economy. Besides that, there is the
problem of whether emigration works as a relaxation factor as to the
problem of unemployment; such a relaxation means that the pressure for
economic policies aiming at minimising or even eliminating unemployment
is reduced. The problem of losing human capital or providing
development aid to the immigration countries is not solved (Castles and
Kosack, 1985, p. 411).
There have been many efforts to express the value of this loss (for
the emigration countries) in monetary terms; there were estimations in
the early 1970s, according to which the cost by emigrant is 5,000 US $
(1970 prices) or 8.7 years of work (in the emigration country) (op.
Cit.).
According to estimations referring to the case of Greece, the total
cost (including the costs of nutrition bringing up and education for
the state), by emigrant in the 1950s was 180,000 drachmas (in current
prices) (Lampos, 1982, p. 34), and the total cost of emigration until
the 1970s reached $ 896,478,533 US. (in current prices again)
(Nikolinakos, 1973, p. 52). What these estimations really imply could
be best understood by taking into account that per capita GDP in Greece
in 1951 was 4,713 drachmas and total GDP in 1970 was 258,000 million
224
drachmas or $ 8,600 mil. US (all in current prices) In many cases this
cost is compared to the remittances. In fact, if one accepts the above
sum as the total cost of emigration until 1970 and compares it to
remittances for the same period (347 mil US. $) one will conclude that
to a limited extent a compensation for the loss
capital, although such comparisons (remittances
losses) entail a series of problems as we will
lyremittances were on
of Greece in human
versus human capital
see. (op. cit.)
Besides the problem of reliability of these estimates, since among
other things, they do not take into account that emigration from Greece
to Western Europe was temporary and therefore the loss of human capital
is true only for the period this capital is absent, one should be very
careful with this kind of comparisons; the estimates on the loss of
human capital refer to a stock effect since it finally represents the
productive capacity foregone due to the departure of the emigrants. The
inflow of remittances is a flow effect of emigration; it is therefore
very risky to compare flow and stock effects. On the other hand though,
human capital is either estimate of past expenditure or of discounted
future income. If remittances were regarded as payments for hiring
(since we refer to temporary migration) human capital, it would seem
that they are compatible provided of course that remittances are used
for the production of human capital.
Many authors (Zolotas, Nikolinakos, Poulopoulou) argue that the loss
of labour due to emigration was a negative factor of great importance
for the Greek economy, since the shortage of labour became obvious very
soon; the counter argument that this loss was temporary because most of
the emigrants returned (repatriation) is of no value. The reason is
that emigration coincided with the effort to industrialise the Greek
economy and "...industry cannot develop, absorb labour and discourage
emigration if labour has emigrated before industry has developed"
(Triantis, 1965, p. 219)
The loss of human capital is probably the most unfavorable stock
effect for the emigration countries. It is therefore, the main argument
of those stressing that there must be some kind of compensation from
the immigration countries to the emigration ones (Bohning, 1979. pp.
409-11).
The loss of human capital issue in the case of Greece is completed if
of
of
or
the
we take into account the " brain drain" (Bhagwati, 1977, pp. 127-129
and 131-3) which increased in the postwar period. Many Greeks who
studied abroad did not return (Poulopoulou-Emke, 1986, pp. 248-50).
For the E.C. countries, the inflow of foreign workers was a free
"import" of human capital (although certain authors doubt the
importance of this import - see Krauss and Baumol, 1979) , for the
creation of which they did not pay anything to the emigration
countries. Besides that, this "import" was done at the time the E.C.
countries needed it, under the terms and for the period directly
reflecting their interests. On the other hand though, one has to take
into account that immigration implied social costs (considerable in
most cases as a matter of fact) for the labour importing E.C.
countries.
C. THE CONTRIBUTION OF MIGRATION IN THE BALANCED
ECONOMIC GROWTH OF GREECE AND THE IMMIGRATION
E.C. COUNTRIES.
One could consider migration as the result of relative (to the
immigration countries) overpopulation in the emigration countries and
relative	 (to	 the	 emigration	 countries)	 underpopulation	 in	 the
immigration ones. In terms of production functions this means a
relative shortage of capital in the emigration countries (relatively
low capital/labour ratio) and a relative surplus of capital (relatively
high capital/labour ratio) in the immigration ones, although in
Neoclassical terms, relative prices will adjust.
According to this
identical production
analysis (which is based on the assumption
functions internationally), emigration is one
surpluses
is
the ways to solve this disequilibrium expressed in
shortages of factors of production. The other way obviously,
movement of capital through foreign investment from ' the capital
abundant to the capital scarce countries.
The essence of this analysis, according to which international
capital movements are a substitute for international labour migration
has been the basis for the discussion of whether the worker should move
to the job (migration) or the job should move to the worker (foreign
investment) (Klaassen and Drew, 1973, pp. 22-25). The content of this
discussion is that, given the dangers of migration, especially for the
emigration countries, the inflow of foreign capital in these countries
could possibly be a solution for the absorption of labour and probably
a better one than migration. This analysis though, cannot be accepted
without certain reservations; the validity of this argument depends on
the criteria used.
The whole discussion circles around the problem of the attainment of
"balanced growth" both in the immigration and the emigration
countries, in the sense that surpluses as well as shortages in factors
of production are a negative factor, since they undermine the adopted
pattern of development and the effort for a continuous growth of the
GDP. There are many reservations though, concerning what has been
mentioned so far:
a) Foreign investment and migration may coincide, and this may cause
labour shortages, as was the case with Greece during the 1960s .
b) Direct foreign investment does not guarantee the full absorption of
labour since the foreign firms may adopt capital intensive methods
(even if labour is abundant and wages relatively low) and compete (in
fact close) with domestic labour intensive ones.
c) Even if foreign investment creates some new jobs, it is not certain
whether these will prove enough to absorb all the surplus labour,
especially if relatively capital intensive methods have been adopted
(point b.) and therefore demand for labour does not increase
substantially; if this is the case, a part of those unemployed will
have to emigrate (Lutz, 1963, pp. 390-1).
It should be made clear that the contribution of migration to
balanced growth cannot possibly be estimated; the only thing that can
be done is to draw some general conclusions on the level of directions
(MacMillen, 1982, pp. 248-9). As far Greece is concerned, we could say
that:
a) For a country at the intermediate stage of development ' like Greece,
emigration could successfully contribute to balanced growth, had it
been programmed and planned. b) The above has not been the case in
Greece; in fact, the impact of emigration on the balance of development
of the Greek economy could be considered as a detrimental one; this
mainly happened because emigration simply changed the nature of the
problem (from a labour surplus to a labour shortage) the Greek economy
was facing. The fact that the rigidity of the economic mechanisms in
Greece made the solution of the new problem impossible, simply meant
another
on the
a very
that its economy had moved from one disequilibrium position to
(Kindleberger, 1967).
For the immigration E.C. countries (especially West Germany),
other hand, things were quite different:
a) Their ability to absorb labour through immigration, has been
effective means for macro economic policy implementation. West Germany
in particular, maintained the absolute control
duration of stay and the kind of employment of
manipulations of immigration therefore, were very
short and the long-run. This argument does not
immigration countries such as France and the U.K.
b) Solving the problem of the relative scarcity of labour, made the
maintenance of the postwar development model of these countries
possible with the minimum possible vibrations (Kindleberger, 1967). It
is in fact very questionable whether the high growth rates of the 1960s
could have been achieved had immigration not occurred. (Boltho, 1982).
D. THE IMPACT OF EMIGRATION ON INDUSTRIALISATION AND
THE POSITION OF GREECE IN THE INTERNATIONAL DIVISION
OF LABOUR.
The outflow of labour force, as far as the emigration countries are
concerned, can theoretically initiate investment and technological
modernisation of the economy, through "an increase of the marginal
product of labour and the transition from a system of dibequilibrium
where labour is paid according to its average product, to another where
it is paid according to its marginal one" (Kindleberger, 1965, p. 250).
The essence of this point is that emigration countries are deprived
of their surplus of labour and, consequently pressures for wage
increases emerge (as we have seen in the static effects). These wage
increases will be of a permanent nature, meaning that the real wage
level will never again converge to the ones of the labour abundant
countries; a new status quo in the labour market of these countries
will emerge therefore, converging to the one of the developed labour
scarce countries. This will lead the firms in the emigration countries
of the number, the
the immigrants; these
effective both in the
apply to other E.C.
to adopt capital intensive methods, since the labour cost is higher
now. Following a Neoclassical way of thinking, one could therefore
assume that this mechanism could be expected to function positively for
the economic development of the emigration countries, since their
production methods will converge to the ones of the developed nations
(Ranis and Fei, 1961, pp. 533-65).
The conclusions of this analysis are of great importance and they
cannot be accepted unreservedly. First of all, it is very difficult to
accept that such a mechanism of convergence of the development levels
of emigration and immigration countries is in operation.
The basic condition for the operation of such a convergence mechanism
is that all the factors necessary for industrialisation are present,
because we cannot accept that the loss of a country's labour reserves
can, by itself cause industrialisation. The Neoclassical argument
(convergence) is a comparative static one, in the sense, that it does
not analyse the process through which convergence is achieved; the one
referring to industrialisation is a more dynamic one. Besides that,
Neoclassicals do not really talk about industrialisation; they only
refer to the changes in the capital-labour ratio. In addition to that
one must not forget that Neoclassical theory does not allow for
unemployment and job vacancies. The problem in this case therefore
seems to be the application of a static theory (Neoclassical) to a
dynamic phenomenon (industrialisation) and not the theory itself.
We could indicatively list some of the factors contributing to
industrialisation: the infrastructure for industrial development, 	 the
institutional framewbrk, the availability of technology and, of course
the market(s) which will absorb these industrial goods (Kindleberger,
1965, p. 251).
The existence of the factors contributing to industrialisation
though, even if the convergence mechanism has started to operate,
cannot guarantee that this convergence will be completed. ' The gap in
industrial development may appear to be reduced for a certain period of
time but, in the long run, a divergence rather than a convergence may
really take place. What is likely to happen is a convergence of the
production methods (more capital intensive ones for the emigration
countries) but no real convergence in terms of economic development in
general (Frobel et al., 1980). Besides that, emigration countries will
be deprived of their labour reserves and this is certainly a negative
factor as far as the economic convergence to the immigration ones is
concerned (Kindleberger, 1978, p. 24).
At this point another aspect should be brought into the discussion,
namely the role of planning and government intervention in general in
the industrialisation of a country. Historical evidence suggests that,
with the possible exception of Britain, industrialisation was at least
facilitated by (if not greatly attributed to) economic policies aiming
at it (Tuma, 1971, pp. 144-5 and 193-4); the cases of Germany in the
19th century and Japan, Netherlands, Spain and Italy are only some of
the examples one could come up with. In fact "...all the late comers to
industrialisation tended to depend on protection, government
intervention or total planning..." (op. cit, p. 262). These policies
have varied from simple protection from foreign competition to active
industrial policies with the state in the role of the entrepreneur at
least as far as the "strategic" industrial sectors were concerned. For
a variety of reasons analysed in chapter two, the state in Greece never
really played this role. Industrialisation in Greece was misdirected by
the state in the sense that "strategic" sectors were left to the
private capital domestic or foreign (in most cases), while less
important sectors and firms were chosen to be in the hands of the state
(either directly or through the state-owned banks). Phenomena such as
the "problematic firms" and the structural sizeable budget deficits
could be directly attributed to these policies.
If one takes into account the world economy and the position of each
country in the international division of labour, the framework of the
analysis changes as follows: assuming that an excess labour supply
always implies low wages, labour surplus countries produce labour
intensive goods because they are competitive in the production of these
goods due to their relatively low labour cost, which is their
comparative advantage after all. If these countries lose their abundant
factor of production due to emigration, they automatically lose their
comparative advantage in the production of labour intensive goods, at
least relatively to the countries that are still labour abundant.
Given that these countries can no longer compete with the labour
abundant ones, their only way out is to become competitive in the
production of capital intensive goods, since their role in the
international division of labour has by definition changed. If they do
not succeed, they will end up in a very unfavorable situation, not
being able to compete with either group of countries (Bbagwati, 1977).
The case of Greece fits exactly into the above analysis; Greece in
the first postwar decades had all the characteristics of a Newly
Industrialising Country (Tsoukalis, 1981) In particular, Greece had
abundant labour and specialised in the production of labour intensive
goods. According to Vaitsos (in Tzannatos (ed), 1986, p. 77) this was
due to the needs of the Greek people after the devastation of the war.
The increase of emigration in the 1960s was accompanied by a gradual
substitution of capital for labour primarily due to the shortage of
(skilled mainly) labour. The significant shift in the sector balance
(described in chapter two) did not mean a shift of the production to
capital intensive goods; it simply meant that the methods of production
had changed and the same (labour intensive) goods were produced with
more capital intensive methods. Thus, Greece never developed heavy
industry; what really happened was that Greece simply mechanised (in
relative terms) its existing traditional manufacturing firms. It is
indicative that during the 1960s one third of the investments were
concentrated on certain producer's groups (basically intermediate and
some capital groups) while traditional sectors accounted to one third
of capital accumulation (compared with a 50% in the 1950s) (Tzannatos,
1986, p. 77). In the units producing labour intensive goods there are
clear limits to the substitution of capital for labour, especially when
a country does not have access to high technology and, in addition has
to import its mechanical equipment or depend on foreign investment for
this purpose, as Greece did in the postwar period.
The real wage increases (higher than the increases in productivity)
in the 1970s deprived the country of the second characteristic of the
NICs, namely the low labour cost relatively to the low wage
industrialising countries of the Far East. Since 1975, it ' was already
clear that Greece could no longer be included in the group of the NICs.
Its economy was more vulnerable than ever to the penetration of the
exports of the industrialised countries (besides other reasons this was
due to the gradual tariff disarmament) and, at the same time was facing
intensive competition in its own market from the "new NICs"
(Gianitsis, 1984, pp. 163-71).
Effectively, since the mid-1970s Greece has been competing with (and
displaced by) the low wages of countries like Taiwan and Malaysia in
stagnant world markets in those (labour intensive) products. On the
other hand and, in the same period, the Greek economy has been
struggling for a new "place in the sun" in terms of a new comparative
advantage identification with a de-industrialisation (although one
could argue whether industrialisation ever really occurred) process in
progress.
These evolutions can be indicated by the fact that "...usually in
Western Europe medium and smaller size countries had a ratio of
imports/exports of manufacturing goods close to one. For the larger
ones this ratio was smaller (0.5 for W Germany and 0.8 for France). For
Greece the corresponding ratio was 2.5 in 1974 and 3.2 in 1980..."
(Vaitsos in Tzannatos, 1986, p. 80).
Even though the factors that contributed to Greece's becoming "the
NIC who didn't make it" (Tsoukalis, 1981) (neither a MC nor an
industrially developed country) are many and complex, emigration was
surely one of the most determining ones.
E. THE REGIONAL DIMENSION OF MIGRATION.
It was stressed in the first chapter of this part that the effects of
migration cannot be assumed to apply uniformly for all the regions of a
country. Migration as a selective process influences the development of
the regions of a country to a different extent and depending on whether
these regions "benefit" or "lose" due to migration (Klaassen and Drew,
1973).
According to the Neoclassical theory, external (as well as internal)
migration, under several conditions and, depending to a great extent on
who really migrates, operate as a factor narrowing . the regional
disparities in the emigration as well as in the immigration countries
(Balassa, 1975, p. 186). In this context, the neoclassical approach to
the impact of migration on regional development is based on the idea
that migration, by directly influencing labour supply (and eliminating
short-term imbalances in the labour markets) in both emigration and
immigration regions, stimulates output growth in both groups of
countries. (the theoretical framework of this mechanism has been
critically analysed in chapter one)
The most important condition for the above mechanism to operate is
that migration must evolve according to the needs regions have for
labour and, anyway, not in an uncontrolled fashion (as far as both
emigration and immigration countries are concerned), because there
always the danger of undesired labour shortages (for both groups of
countries) in the regions of emigration and surpluses in the
immigration ones. According to the Neoclassical approach though, the
market forces will always take care of this problem.
In case migration is temporary, repatriation could also influence
regional development, depending on whether emigrants return to the
regions they left from.
Table 11-8: Emigration to West Germany by Greek region.
Population	 Labour
Region	 (1)	 force(1)
Emigration
1960-73
% of Region
emigr. popul.	 labour
Thrace	 329580 137060 35670 9.3 10.8 26.0
Macedonia
	 1890700 728560 156851 41.1 8.3 21.5
Epirus	 310320 113020 45129 11.8 14.5 39.9
Thessaly	 659920 250220 33671 8.8 5.1 13.5
East Cont. 3532320 1255800 57861 15.2 1.6 4.6
Peloponnese 986920 387460 20404 5.4 2.1 5.3
Ionian Isl.	 184440 75500 8272 2.2 4.5 11.0
Aegean Isl.	 417800 146080 8646 2.3 2.1 5.9
Crete	 456640 190180 14812 3.9 3.2 7.8
Total	 8768640 3283880 381316 100.0 4.3 11.6
Male	 4280060 2369740 236313 62.0 5.5 10.0
Female	 4488580 914140 145003 38.0 3.9. 15.7
Source: Hatzipanayotou, 1977, p. 11.
li Emigration and Regional Development in Greece. 
The emigratory flow to Western Europe absorbed people from all Greek
regions but in a disproportionate way. The regional distribution of the
Greek emigrants that moved to West Germany according to the bilateral
agreement in the period 1960-1973 is shown in table 11-8. The data of
this table which can be considered representative for total emigration
from Greece, shows that the northern regions of the country (Macedonia,
Thrace, Epirus) were the main ones where emigrants were "recruited"
from (62.2% of the emigrants left from these regions); on the other
hand, only 14% of the emigrants came from the southern regions of the
country (Peloponnese and Islands). Emigrants from Epirus represented
14.5% of the population and 39.9% of the labour force of this region;
the corresponding figures for Macedonia were 8.3% and 21.5% (10.8% and
26% for Thrace).
This disproportion seems even more intensive when examining
emigration by district; in the period of massive emigration some
districts of Greece were practically deserted. In 43 out of the 52
districts of the country there was a fall in the population in that
period, partly attributed to external migration, since that period was
marked by massive internal migration as well (KEPE, 1976).
Contrary to the predictions of the Neoclassical theory, external and
internal migration seem to have caused a widening of regional
disparities in Greece (Fakiolas, 1975, p. 6). In tables II-9 and II-10
these disparities are shown in terms of the distribution of the
population and the GDP.
Emigrants remittances could have functioned as a "compensation"
mechanism for the regions deserted by the emigrants, provided they had
been distributed to the regions in some proportion with emigration. The
Greek periphery though, seems to have absorbed only 40% of the
remittances, (according to estimates based on the place those receiving
remittances where living) while its contribution to emigration was 60%
(Vergopoulos, 1976, pp. 278-9). This happened because, as we have seen,
remittances mainly financed the building or the purchase of houses in
the large cities instead of their regions of origin because of the
urbanisation trend and the fact that the rate of return from investing
in buildings in Greece is higher in the urban centres.
The negative effects of emigration in the distribution of the
population and the labour force in particular, could have been blunted
if, after the fall in emigration and the rise in repatriation,
returning emigrants had chosen to establish themselves in the regions
they left from; this was not the case though, as we have seen. Most
returning emigrants ended up in the big cities (Kayser, 1977, pp.
151-152) the whole process emigration-repatriation therefore,
intensified urbanisation, although some (probably most) of these people
would have ended living in the urban centres anyway. This happened
mainly because returning emigrants preferred to establish themselves in
areas where the standards of living were closer to the ones in the
immigration countries (King, 1986, pp. 133-135). That was the reason
the least developed regions of the country managed to attract very few
of their emigrants.
Immigration and Regional Development in the E.C. Countries. 
Immigration evolved in a programmed (by the governments in accordance
with the needs of the private sector for labour) way for most of the
E.C. countries (the U.K. being the exception), as far as the place of
establishment of the immigrants was concerned. Especially those who
moved according to the bilateral agreements went to predefined regions
and firms (Hatzipanayotou, 1977). This fact helped some immigration
countries (mainly West Germany) organise immigration according to the
needs of each region for labour. Besides this, most of the E.C.
countries could force any number of immigrants to move from one region
to another; this was the case because immigrants were signing annual
contracts with their employers after the end of which, they had either
to move (if needed) to another region where a new contract was offered,
or return to their country (op. cit.).
In table II-11 the distribution of Greek immigrants by German federal
state is shown for 1981. Greek immigrants were mainly established in
those federal states which were traditionally facing labour shortage
problems (Frobel et al, 1980).
Under these circumstances, immigration countries were provided with a
solution to the problem of short-run shortages of labour on a regional
basis, since immigrants increased the mobility of the labour force
(Nikolinakos, 1973).
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Table II-10: The distribution of population and GDP by region in
Greece.
1950 1977
Cumulatively Cumulatively
Region GDP % popul. % GDP popul. GDP % popul. % GDP popul.
Contin. 378 38.3 2287 30.0 38.3	 30.0 11664 50.8 3992 42.9 50.8 42.9
Macedon.212 21.5 1705 22.3 59.8	 52.3 1514 6.6 664 7.1 57.4 49.8
Aegean 60 6.1 529 6.9 65.9	 59.2 2148 9.3 975 10.5 66.7 60.3
Thessaly 70 7.1 624 8.2 73.0	 67.4 4407 19.2 2023 21.7 85.9 82.0
Thrace 37 3.7 337 4.4 76.7	 71.8 368 1.6 175 1.9 87.5 83.9
Ionian 3 2.5 229 3.0 79.2	 74.8 917 4.0 463 5.0 91.5 88.9
Pelopon.122 12.4 1129 14.8 91.6	 89.6 804 3.5 406 4.4 95.0 93.3
Epirus 4 3.5 331 4.3 95.1	 93.9 627 2.7 324 3.5 97.7 96.9
Crete 5 4.9 461 6.1 100	 100.0 526 2.3 291 3.1 100 100
Source:
	 Negreponti-Delivani,	 1986,	 p.	 128.
Table II-11: The
	 regional	 distribution
immigrants in	 FRG	 (1981).
of	 Greek
Region Male Female Total
Scleswig-Holstein-Hamburg 2,081 1,375 3,456 2.9
Niedersachen-Bremen 3,799 2,500 6,299 5.3
Nordrheign-Vestfalen 24,403 14,564 38,967 32.8
Hessen 7,168 4,566 11,734 9.9
Rheinland-Phalz-Saarland 1,668 839 2,507 2.1
Baden-Wuttemberg 19,214 14,141 33,355 28.0
Nordbayern 4,146 3,211 7,357 6.2
Surdbayern 7,288 5,007 12,295 10.3
Berlin	 (West) 1,660 1,267 2,927 2.5
Not classified 26 17 43
Total 71,453 47,487 118,940 100.0
Source:	 Hatzipanayotou,	 1983,	 P. 37.
Immigration proved to be a very positive factor for those regions of
the E.C. countries facing labour shortage problems. It is true that the
contribution of immigration in regional development, can by no means be
isolated from the other positive factors for regional development,
neither can it be expressed quantitatively; on the other hand, it seems
that immigration has been one of the main means of regional policy in
labour force of the immigration countries and, at the same time, the
main reassurance for the materialisation of this policy.
F. THE DEMOGRAPHIC EFFECTS OF MIGRATION.
Migration has demographic effects, since it influences both the size
and the structure of the population in the emigration and the
immigration countries.
The direct demographic effects of migration consist of a reduction of
the population of the emigration country and a consequent population
increase in the immigration one. Besides that, since migration does not
have to happen to both sexes and all ages proportionately, it can
change the sex and age structure of the population.
The direct or long-term demographic implications of migration are
derived from the direct ones but are of greater importance. The
migration of young people can cause a significant fall of the fertility
and the natural increase of the population rate in the emigration
countries (the so called "Walker effect"), the final outcome being the
aging of the population (Thomas, 1958, pp. 22-29).
1 The Demographic Effects for Greece. 
The emigration from Greece absorbed, at least in the beginning,
mainly men 20-40 years old (Mantzouranis, 1977, p. 131). In fact the
large majority (70-75%) of men emigrants were 25-31 years old, while
most women emigrants were 23-29 years old (Secretariat . General for
Greeks Living Abroad (S.G.G.L.A.), 1990, p. 67); Since the late 1960s
(and until the mid 1970s) emigration became of a more family type,
since most emigrants were accompanied by their families (Bohning 1984,
p. 61). Since 1965 and up to 1974 the number of women emigrants started
to increase (Blitz, 1977, pp. 484-486).
.s 	 •
Table 11-12: The demographic effects of emigration in Greece 1961-81.
Demographic characteristic	 Actual (R)	 Expected (E) E-R/R x 100
Average annual increase (%)
1961-1971
197 1-198 1
1961-1981
Population 0-14 years old (%)
0.431
1.406
0.739
0.906
0.897
0.851
+110.2
-14.2
+15.2
1971 25.4 24.6
-1.6
1981 23.4 23.2
-0.9
Population	 15-64 years old
1971 64.0 65.9 +3.0
1981 63.8 65.4 +2.5
Population 65+ years old (%)
1971 11.0 9.5 -13.6
1981 12.8 11.4
-10.9
Average age of labour force
1971 38.0 36.7 -3.4
1981 38.2 37.8 -1.0
Men per 100 women
1971 95.6 96.3 +0.7
1981 96.3 97.2 +0.9
Marriages per 1000 inhabitants
1970-1972 7.7 8.5 +10.4
1980-1982 6.9 7.2 +4.3
Births	 per	 1000	 inhabitants
1970-1972 16.2 17.8 +9.9
1980-1982 14.6 14.7 +0.8
Deaths	 per	 1000 inhabitants
1970-1972 8.5 7.3 -14.8
1980-1982 8.9 7.8 -11.9
Population natural increase (a/0o)
1970-1972 7.7 10.6 +37.3
1980-1982 5.7 6.9 +20.7
Labour Force (in thousands)
1971	 3,234.996 3,385.039	 +4.6
1981	 3,543.797 3,717.536	 +4.9
Source: S.G.G.L.A., 1990, p. 75.
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The emigration of young people in particular, given the size of
emigration, caused a change in the sex and age structure of the Greek
population, besides the effect on the very slow rate of population
increase in the period 1961-1971 (OECD, 1967, p. 15). The demographic
effects of emigration from Greece are shown in table 11-12 and diagram
11-3.
The rate of the increase of the population fell considerably due to
emigration. From 0.94% (average annual rate) in the period 1951-1961,
it fell to 0.44% in the period 1961-1971 (Filias, 1966, p. 437). It is
indicative that after 1974, when repatriation increased and emigration
fell, this rate reached 0.76% (KEPE, 1976, p. 6).
The fall in the number of births in Greece, started in the first
postwar years and became more pronounced after the acceleration of
emigration (op. cit.); this fact, combined with the departure of the
emigrants caused the rapid aging of the population. In the period
1961-1971 the number of the people 15-64 years old fell by 15%, while
the number of people older than 65 years were representing 12% of the
population in 1975 (they represented less than 7% in 1951 (KEPE, 1977,
pp. 15-17).
One should keep in mind though, that the exact impact of emigration
on the birth rate in Greece cannot be quantified easily; the postwar
period in Greece was marked by a general fall of the birth rate which
could be attributed to emigration only to a certain extent. A series of
factors influenced the birth rate in particular and the growth rate of
the population in general in that period; one can therefore hardly
distinguish the particular contribution of emigration to this trend. In
particular:
-the fall in birth rates in the postwar period could be attributed to
the decrease of infant mortality, as well as the application of some
sort of family planning in Greece.
-
the increasing female participation in the labour force in that period
must have had an impact on birth rates.
-the movement of people from the Greek periphery to the urban centres
of Greece (either directly through internal migration, or indirectly
through emigration and repatriation) brought a change in preferences
since the number of children per family differ considerably between
cities and the periphery (the latter being higher in the case of
Greece).
-the modest development of the welfare state in Greece in the postwar
period did not include provisions or policy measures relatively to the
dramatic fall of the birth rate and the apparent demographic problem
emerging from that, at least not until the mid-1970s.
The aging of the population was very obvious in the agricultural
areas (where emigrants mainly left from); in the late 1970s 50% of the
cultivated land was owned by people more than 65 years old.
The Demographic Effects for the E.C. Countries. 
After the end of World War II, most Western European countries
witnessed a considerable fluctuation in the number of births; after a
"baby boom" in 1947, some decline since then and until 1964, a rise in
the period 1965-1974 and a sharp decrease after 1974. This trend, of
course, does not apply to all Western European countries; in West
Germany for example the number of births fell from 17.4 per 1,000
inhabitants in 1960 to 13.4 in 1970 (Nikolinakos, 1974, p. 93). Many
Western European countries showed similar signs of demographic
stagnation, with direct effects on the age structure of the population
and, consequently the labour force; in fact the labour force in most
Western European countries decreased during the 1950s (Connel et al,
1976, p. 42).
The immigration to the E.C. countries was selective, as far as the
age of the immigrants was concerned and, this was one of the tasks for
the recruiting agencies (Castles and Kosack, 1985, p. 489). 70-75% of
the immigrants in the E. C. countries were 15-34 years old and only 3-5%
of them were more than 55 years old (United Nations, 1979, p. 103). The
temporary nature of migration to the E.C. countries facilitated the
reprovision of the immigrants' "stock" with young immigrants; as a
result, the average age of the foreign workers employed in the
immigration E.C. countries was less than 33. In the 1980s, very few of
the immigrants in the E.C. countries had reached the age of retirement;
immigrants therefore, (especially the temporary ones as the Greeks
proved to be) were net contributors to the social insurance and
pensions schemes in the immigration countries (Castles and Kosack,
1985, p. 491). The fertility rates of the immigrants were very high
relatively to the ones of the native population (op. cit.). During the
1970s 12% of the total births in West Germany were attributed to the
families of the immigrants who in fact in that period accounted for
less than 6% of the total population (United Nations, 1979, p. 131).
Immigration changed the age structure of the population in the E.C.
countries; in fact it contributed to the avoidance of the aging of
the population and, consequently the reduction of the labour force
(Secretariat General, 1990, pp. 61-85). It is indicative that the
percentage of the population less than 15 years old in West Germany
from 20.9% in 1957, reached 23.2% in 1968 (op. cit.).
Generally speaking, most of the immigrants were male; on average
there were 600 female immigrants for every thousand of male ones; this
meant that immigration changed the sex structure of the population as
well in the immigration countries (Castles and Kosack, 1985). Greek
immigrants in particular though, had the highest female participation
than any other nationality (op. cit.). The importance attributed to the
demographic effects of immigration by the E.C. countries is proved by
their efforts to assimilate socially the immigrants of the second
generation.
CONCLUSIONS OF PART II.
As we have seen in Part I, the pattern and the characteristics of
emigration from Greece to the E.C. countries reflects the postwar
development patterns and the economic performances of the countries
involved. The rapid economic growth in most E.C. countries in that
period, mainly due to an expansion of industry, absorbed all the
available sources of labour, both indigenous (e.g. females) and
exogenous (refugees). By reaching full employment without having
exhausted the limits of further expansion, these economies were faced
with the following dilemma: given the limitations of substituting
labour by capital and the relatively (to what happened in the 1980s)
slow shift to labour-saving high technology methods of production,
these countries should either "import" labour or exclusively depend on
their own labour force and tolerate substantial real wage increases.
For reasons related to their aiming at sustaining the "virtuous circle"
high profits-positive expectations- investment the latter option
appeared to be more attractive. There are always several dangers
related to expanding the labour force by "importing" labour,
particularly visible if this extra labour is no longer needed. The
policy makers of these countries seem to have been very well aware of
these dangers and this is probably why they went a step further by
redeploying complete immigration policies. The main characteristic of
these policies was that they aimed at regulated controllable and
flexible immigration- so as to maximise the gains from it without any
substantial dangers coming from commitments to emigration countries in
case of recession. All they needed therefore was countries willing to
provide labour.
Greece on the other hand, in that period was coming from a long and
quite painful reconstruction effort; the main target of the Greek
economy in that period was it's transformation from a peasant (to a
large extent) society to an industrial one (though this does not often
imply labour intensive methods of production). This hoped for
industrialisation should be expected, among other things, to absorb the
vast labour surpluses (mainly from underemployment in agriculture) to
productive employment in manufacturing. This was certainly a very
difficult task; on the other hand though, the existence of this labour
surplus was the main (if not the only) development asset Greece
possessed, since capital was anything but abundant due to the weak
industrial structure of the country and the poor investment performance
althrough the postwar period. And it was exactly this asset Greek
policy makers decided to give up.
Generally speaking, movements of labour could prove to be beneficial
both for the emigration and the immigration countries under certain
necessary conditions. We could list some of them as follows:
a) The size of migration should be such, as to cover the labour
shortages in the immigration countries, without causing though, labour
shortages in the emigration ones.
b) Emigrants remittances should finance activities (in the emigration
countries) that do not neutralise their positive impact in the balance
of payments and stimulate to a great extent, productive investment.
c) Emigrants should acquire skills useful to the emigration countries
after their repatriation.
d) The emigratory flow should be recruited in such a way as to avoid
imbalances as far as their regional development in both countries, and
demographic problems in the emigration one are concerned.
e) All measures must be taken to avoid serious social and political
implications due to migration.
Under these conditions migration could bring: "rapid economic growth
in the immigration countries, based on the adequacy of labour and a
similar effect in the emigration ones where the abolition of the
surplus labour wotild reduce or even eliminate underemployment and
unemployment. Such models of economic growth, although different (as
far as their application to emigration and immigration countries is
concerned) could be efficient (each one in its own way). In the
immigration countries, economic growth may be ensured by the
deceleration of wage increases and the increase of ' profits and
investment. In the emigration ones on the other hand, economic growth
is facilitated by the increases in wages, which cause technological
modernisation and efficient use of the factors of production n
(Kindleberger, 1965, p. 253).
There are many ways of evaluating the effects of migration. One of
them is by comparing them with the targets set by the policy makers of
the countries involved; here again, long and short-term targets should
be distinguished in accordance with short and long-term effects of
migration. In the short-term targets one could include the rapid GDP
growth, price stability, full employment, an even income distribution
and stability in the balance of payments; as a long-term one we could
consider a higher level of development.
In the early 1960s it appeared that the increase of migration was
beneficial, in the short-run, both for Greece and the E.C, countries.
Emigration was the "safety valve" of the Greek labour market, reducing
the pressures of the excessive supply of labour, while at the same
time, remittances prevented any trouble in the Greek balance of
payments. At the same time, the E.C. countries were solving their
shortage of labour problem, preventing considerable wage increases.
Given these, it seems that the benefits from migration, for a short
period of time, surpassed the costs of migration for both groups of
countries. Migration "like mercy blessed him who took and him who
gave..." (Kindleberger, 1967, p. 202).
Since the late 1960s, it started to become clear that it was no
longer feasible for both groups of countries to enjoy benefits from
migration Emigration caused labour shortages in Greece and consequently
pressures for wage increases; besides that, the consumption and the
production of domestic goods were negatively influenced. The positive
function of the remittances was partly out weighted by the increase of
imports, while their contribution to productive investment increases
was mainly true for the non-strategic (or simply priority sectors) of
Greek manufacturing; remittances on the other hand were not a real loss
for the E.C. countries, since they could partly recycle them by
increasing their exports.
For the short-term period in total therefore, the economic benefits
from immigration for the E.C. countries were indisputable and, in fact
quite substantial; it is very difficult though, to reach the same
conclusion for Greece (MacMillen, 1982, p. 263).
The analysis in chapter eight has revealed that the long-term effects
of emigration could hardly be considered as positive for the Greek
economy. Not even one of the positive effects, according to the theory
was verified and besides that, detrimental effects relative to the
regional development, as well as demographic problems emerged. (One
could add at this point the social and political problems emerging from
emigration the analysis of which is beyond the limits of this thesis)
Emigration not only failed to contribute to the development of the
Greek economy, but in addition, it undermined the perspectives of such
a development.
For the E.C. countries, on the other hand, the long-term economic
effects were particularly positive, but at the cost of social and
political implications, 	 mainly because these countries 	 failed to
predict the political and social dimension of "importing" labour.
It is not possible to have a "with and without migration" analysis so
as to end up with a precise evaluation of the effects of migration. On
the other hand, it is true that the effects of emigration for Greece
could have been less negative, or even positive, had emigration not
evolved in a complete vacuum of planning and relative policy and had
Greece been able to set even some of the "rules of the game". Given
that Greece functioned passively as a "pool of labour" from which the
E.C. countries could absorb labour according to their needs, it would
be unrealistic to expect favorable effects from emigration for Greece.
One could hardly base a development strategy on simple and
self-restrictive specialisation models such as the Hecksher-Ohlin one,
mainly because of the strict and unrealistic assumptions they are based
on. Besides that, high unemployment and underemployment impose a
constraint on any policy maker especially when "pull" factors by the
developed countries are in operation. Finally one cannot be sure as to
whether Greece would have done better in industrialising had emigration
never occurred. What is certain though is that giving up your one and
only abundant factor of production in the middle of the process it is
needed most is, if nothing else, an indication of very bad timing. The
best argument on this subject is probably the one stated by Giannitsis
(1965, p. 219) "...industry cannot develop to keep . labour from
emigrating if labour emigrates before industry develops..." The fact
that Greek policy makers went as far as calling emigration a "blessing
from God" (this phrase is attributed to the late conservative leader
and P.M. Panayiotis Kanellopoulos) and in fact signing emigration
agreements leaving all authorisation to the immigration countries
indicates lightheadedness and lack of a real development strategy. And
as if these were not enough, Greek policy makers decided to let
emigration evolve in the most unplanned and unorganised fashion.
Given all these one can easily understand why the economic gains from
immigration for the E.C. countries were so substantial while the gains
for those emigration countries which didn't have a complete emigration
policy (as Greece) were so poor and in fact, outweighed by losses. It
is quite indicative that Greece failed to make the best out of the most
promising aspect related to emigration, namely remittances, in spite of
their considerable size due (again) to the lack of a relevant policy.
CHAPTER NINE
"CONCLUDING CHAPTER - A LOOK TO THE FUTURE AND
SOME SUGGESTED POLICY MEASURES"
A. GENERAL.
The analysis so far has concentrated on what has already happened as
far as the causes and the effects of emigration from Greece to the E.C.
countries are concerned. One could, therefore, say that as long as the
movements of labour (either emigration or repatriation) have
considerably fallen in size and economic significance since the
mid-1970s the whole discussion is in the area of relatively recent
economic history rather than that of current economic issues.
Given the present size and pattern of labour flows in the E.C.
(chapter three) this is fair enough; on the other hand though, one
should write out the possibility intra-E.C. migratory flows in the
future. In other words, the fact that intra-European migratory flows
seem to be quite limited in size and economic significance today, does
not necessarily imply that they will remain so in the future.
It would, therefore, be very interesting to examine whether
significant (in size and economic effects) intra-E.C. labour flows in
general and flows from Greece to the other Community members in
particular should be expected in the future.
Forecasting the perspectives of emigration from Greece to the other
E.C. countries (or vice versa) is not an easy task. Methodologically
speaking, the main idea underlining the analysis that will follow is
that economic phenomena occur under certain circumstances; a repetition
of such phenomena therefore, should be expected only if these unique
circumstances are repeated. Any change in the circumstances will imply
a change in the nature of the economic phenomenon. In particular,
labour migration between Greece and the other E.C. countries could be
repeated if an economic and political framework very similar to the
ones in the 1960s re-appears.
As far as the economic framework in particular is concerned, the
investigation could circle around the expected developments of the
"push" and the "pull" factors which, after all, are the 'decisive ones
for migration to occur as analysed in part one.
As far as the perspectives of migration between Greece and the other
E.C. countries are concerned though, there are two additional factors
to be taken into account, namely the establishment of the single
European market by the end of 1992 (in the abolition of all barriers to
labour mobility will be achieved) and the "competition" from other
emigration countries. The first factor refers to the elimination of all
barriers to the mobility of labour within the E.C.; besides that, the
implementation of the Social Charter is an additional factor to take
into account. The second one refers to the fact that, given the number
of immigrants certain E.C. countries will be able and willing to
absorb, non-E.C. immigrants may be willing to immigrate (although they
will possibly be subject to legal barriers), competing therefore with
potential Community labour flows.
It should be made clear that, since the analysis will be speculative
and, in fact mainly based on the experience of migration in the past,
it should be seen as a reflection only relatively to the next 5 to 10
years rather than a longer period of time.
B. SOME RECENT DEVELOPMENTS ON INTRA-EUROPEAN MIGRATION
WITH PARTICULAR APPLICATION TO THE CASE OF GREECE.
1. The Current Framework. 
One could include a series of factors, economic as well as
non-economic ones in the analysis of the current framework of migration
between Greece and the other E.C. countries.
Starting by investigating the recent developments in the labour
markets of the countries involved, one could note that in the period
after the accession, unemployment in Greece has increased rapidly.
Even though data on unemployment in the country are not particularly
reliable, this evolution of unemployment is shown in table D1-1. One
should keep in mind that even in the years of the pronounced economic
recession (1975-1980) the unemployment rate in Greece never exceeded
2.5% of the labour force (Pesmatzoglou, 1980).
The unemployment rates and the job vacancies for the E.C. of are
shown in table III-2. The developments in West Germany (the main
immigration country for Greece) in particular are shown in table III-4
for the 1961-89 period. Quite indicative, as far as migration is
concerned, is the evolution of job vacancies per unemployed person
especially if one takes into account that job vacancies have been one
of the most decisive factors for immigration from Greece (chapter
four). Besides that and, as far the unemployment rates in Greece and
,	 •
the other E.C. countries are concerned one could say that: in Greece
employment in the 1980s is increasing at an annual rate of 0.26%
(small, but still positive); for the other E.C, countries the
corresponding rate is -0.56% (employment is falling) (Eurostat, 1990).
Table III-1: Unemployment in Greece (1981-1988).
Year Unemployed
(in 000s)
Unemployment rate
(unemployed/labour
	 force)
1981 149 4.0
1982 216 5.8
1983 302 7.9
1984 315 8.3
1985 303 7.8
1986 287 7.4
1987 286 7.4
1988 303 7.7
Source: I.L.O., Annual labour statistics, (various issues)
Table III-2: Unemployed (U), job vacancies (V) (in thousands) and
vacancies per unemployed (V/U) in the main E.C. immigration countries.
(1975-90).
U.K.	 F.R.G.	 France	 Belgium	 Holland
Year (U) (V) (V/U) (U) (V) (V/U) (U) (V) (V/U) (U) (V) (V/U) (U) (V) (V/U)
1975 1179 122 0.10 1074 236 0.21 839 - - 208 4 0.01 195 47 0.24
1976 1251 155 0.12 1060 235 0.22 933 123 0.13 266 4 0.01 211 47 0.22
1977 1226 210 0.17 1030 231 0.22 1071 103 0.09 307 3 0.01 203 55 0.27
1978 1140 241 0.21 993 246 0.24 1167 86 0.07 333 4 0.01 205 63 0.30
1979 1452 210 0.14 876 304 0.34 1350 88 0.06 351 5 0.01 210 68 0.32
1980 2270 241 0.10 889 308 0.34 1467 89 0.06 382 6 0.01 248 54 0.21
1981 2626 91 0.03 1272 208 0.16 1750 69 0.03 454 4 0.00 285 20 0.07
1982 2790 114 0.04 1833 105 0.05 1923 83 0.04 535 4 0.00 541 11 0.02
1983 2921 137 0.04 2258 76 0.03 1974 79 0.04 589 6 0.01 800 10 0.01
1984 3036 150 0.05 2266 88 0.03 2323 46 0.01 595 8 0.01 822 15 0.01
1985 3107 162 0.05 2304 110 0.04 2442 46 0.01 558 18 0.03 761 24 0.03
1986 2822 188 0.06 2228 154 0.06 2489 49 0.01 516 17 0.03 710 27 0.03
1987 2295 234 0.10 2229 171 0.07 2532 54 0.02 500 - 685 26 0.03
1988 1796 249 0.13 2242 189 0.08 2410 63 0.02 459 - 433
1989 1953 219 0.11 2038 251 0.12 2312 - - 419 - 390 -
Sources:	 1. I.L.O., International labour statistics, various issues.
2. 0.E.C.D., Country surveys, various issues.
3. Own calculations.
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As far as the relationship between wage level differentials and
migration is concerned, one could note that emigration continued to
decline, while differences in the average income from wages was
increasing. The relation of income from wages was 1/2.26 in 1964,
1/2.40 in 1977 and reached 1/2.47 in 1984. These conclusions,
nevertheless, have to be accompanied by the reservation that
underemployment (for which there are no recent estimations) in Greece
is not taken into account. The inclusion of underemployment might have
provided quite different conclusions.
Since 1980, the Greek government had to cope with the increasing
anxiety of certain groups (e.g. lawyers, doctors) as well as the public
opinion on the possible inflow of professionals from other E.C.
members. The relaxation of these fears was attempted by stressing the
fact that "...even though foreign professionals will be entitled to
establish themselves in Greece they will not do so because wages and
incomes are lower in Greece and they do not know the language..." (This
answer was given in 1980 by the then Prime Minister G. Rallis). The
political parties, although there was no consensus on the evaluation of
the effects of emigration, seemed to agree that emigration from Greece
had definitely ended. Nobody argued that the accession to the E.C.
would cause any (considerable in size) outflow of Greeks. In fact quite
the opposite was argued according to a very interesting (at the time,
at least since the CAP will be reformed) argument: "...since emigration
is mainly recruited from the agricultural sector, the application of
the CAP in Greece .will cause an increase of the agricultural income and
therefore, reduce emigration..." (Pesmatzoglou, 1980).
The Recent Developments on Migration in Europe. 
The rapid increase of unemployment and the consequent deterioration
of the vacancy / unemployed ratio in immigration Western European
countries (tables 111-2 and 111-4) in the 1970s and the 1980s was
followed by a deceleration of immigration and an acceleration of
repatriation. Consequently the stocks of foreign labour in most of
these countries stagnated (or fell in some cases) as one can derive
from table 111-3. In fact these developments would have been more
impressive in size, had the policies aiming at encouraging repatriation
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(West Germany probably being the best example) been more successful.
Several Western European immigration countries found out that it is
much easier to control the inflow of foreign labour than to accelerate
repatriation (Castles and Kosack, 1985, pp. 2-8).
Table 111-3: Stocks of foreign labour in selected immigration 0.E.C.D.
countries, 1974-1986. (in thousands)
Country 1974 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86
Austria 222 191 171 188 176 170 174 171 156 145 138 140 146
Belgium 278 - - 306 - 310 332 332 - 375 388 396 -
France 1260 -	 1426 1550 1518 1498 1458 1427 1503 1557 1652 - -
F.R.G. 2386 2226 2027 1977 1961 2014 2168 2081 2037 1998 1854 1823 1833
Luxemb. - 46 - 49 50 50 51 52 52 54 53 - -
Holland 163 176 180 187 196 182 188 192 185 173 166 165 168
Sweden 200 204 235 225 227 228 234 233 227 221 219 216 214
Switz.	 593 553 516 492 489 490 501 515 526 529 539 549 566
Source: Gordon and Thirlwal, 1989, p. 24.
Table 111-4: Unemployed and job vacancies unfilled (in 000s)
in West Germany. (1961-1989)
Year Unemployed Vacancies 	 vacancies per unemployed
1961 181 552 3.04
1965 148 644 4.35
1970 149 795 5.33
1975 1,074 236 0.21
1980 889 308 0.34
1985 2,304 110 0.04
1989 2,038 251 0.12
Sources: a) ILO, International labour statistics, various issues.
b) OECD, .Country surveys, various issues.
c) Own calculations.
This relative persistence of stocks of immigrants in spite of the
rise of unemployment and the fall in vacancies could be explained in
three ways: first, immigrants may have been unwilling to leave simply
because the perspectives of employment in their countries of origin
were not particularly good; second, assuming that immigrants were
(still) less "choosy", in jobs than the indigenous labour force (as was
the case in the 60s and the early 70s), one could suggest that they
could still find a job relatively easy; alternatively, those unemployed
could live on unemployment benefits by simply reducing or cutting off
remittances at a subsistence level of income. Third, one has to take
into account that although the stock of immigrants has, to a large
extent remained constant, their composition has changed; in fact during
the 1980s the stock of immigrants from the Mediterranean countries has
been greatly "replaced" by non-European ones (Gordon & Thirwal, 1985).
The 1980s were marked by the realisation (by immigration countries)
that immigration is related to a series of social and political
implications of such a variety and intensity that it was very difficult
to cope with. This realisation is best described by a phrase attributed
to Mr. W. Schaub, a German policy maker: "...we asked for labour but
got people instead ..." (quoted in Castles and Kosack, 1985) A full
analysis of these implications though, is clearly beyond the scope of
this thesis.
As we have already seen, (part one) Eastern European countries were
the first to supply labour (in the form of refugees it is true) to the
Western European ones in the postwar period. These flows however were
mainly determined (or seemed to have been determined) by political
factors only; in fact, given the particularity of movements from
Eastern to West Germany, these flows were not really treated by
economists as migratory flows in the sense that applied to immigtation
from the Mediterranean countries. The fast absorption of these people
by the labour markets of the immigration countries (particularly easy
for the Eastern Germans) with no serious economic implications in the
1950s left little room for further concern on this aspect.
In the years to follow, the fall in the number of refugees to Western
Europe supported . the relaxation relatively to the possibility of
massive migratory flows. Even when people started to leave these
countries (mainly East for Western Germany) by tens of thousands at the
end of 1989, very few (if any) people saw this as migration.
It is true that these movements decelerated in 1990, but the expected
gradual shift of most Eastern European economies to market ones may
bring another problem to the surface: the process of transformation of
planned economies (where unemployment was kept at extremely low levels)
to market ones could "release" large numbers of workers, especially if
one takes into account the relatively labour intensive methods of
production and the low competitiveness of manufacturing in most of
these countries. If one accepts that the expansionary policies which
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could absorb these workers are very unlikely for these countries (given
their debts) there seems to be only one way out: emigration to Western
Europe. Such a trend is not quite obvious yet, probably because this
transformation has hardly began yet; by the time it starts though the
"push" factors for migration to occur will probably become quite
obvious.
One has to take into account that the postwar experience suggests
that "push" factors are only the necessary condition (the "pull" ones
being the permissive) for migration to occur; it all really depends
after all on bow far the commitment and the solidarity of Western
European countries to the Eastern ones will go on this aspect, and the
immigration policies adopted at E.C. level.
A final point to be made is related to the evolution of migration as
a function of the natural increase of the population and the labour
force (OECD, 1985). The logic of this point is that, in a period of
stagnation in migration, the perspectives are greatly determined by the
population increases in the emigration and the immigration countries,
since these increases reflect the supply of labour. In table III-5 we
can see the rates of increase of the population in working age brackets
for several emigration and immigration countries for the recent years,
as well as the relevant forecasts until 2000. The basic observation for
Greece (in fact it applies to all European emigration countries except
Turkey) from this table is that the rates of increase of its population
are extremely low, even relatively to the ones for the European
emigration countries. In particular, Greece is expected to witness a
fall of its population in working age brackets after 1990. One could
therefore conclude that the population pressures on the labour markets
of Greece's former "competitors" in emigration already are more
intensive than in Greece and are expected to remain so in the near
future.
C. ON THE PERSPECTIVES OF EMIGRATION FROM GREECE
TO THE OTHER E.C. COUNTRIES.
The points made in the analysis so far suggest that three main
particular aspects should be examined in order to come up with some
conclusions on the perspectives of labour mobility between Greece and
it's Community partners; given the background and the recent
developments, one has to start by examining whether the Community
framework and the Single European Act in particular will stimulate
migratory flows between Greece and the other E.C. members. Secondly and
more importantly, the "pull" factors will have to be carefully examined
since both the theory and the empirical evidence have indicated their
importance; the same could be argued (to a lesser extent though) as far
as the "push" factors are concerned. Lastly, one could argue that since
immigration countries are the ones to decide where they should "import"
their immigrant labour from, "competition" from other potential
emigration countries, Eastern European and non-European ones as the
of should be takenanalysis the previous section suggested, seriously
into consideration.
countries. (annual changes)
Table	 111-6:	 Population	 in	 working	 age	 brackets	 in	 the	 0.E.C.D.
Country	 1	 Period	 1980-1985	 1985-1990	 1990-2000
Immigration countries
	 0.9	 0.5	 0.5
Non-European	 1.0	 0.7	 0.8
Australia	 1.7	 1.4	 1.1
Canada	 1.1	 0.8	 0.8
U.S.A.	 1.0	 0.6	 0.8
European	 0.7	 0.1	 -0.1
Belgium	 1.0	 0.3	 -0.1
France	 0.8	 0.4	 0.2
F.R.G.	 0.6	 -0.6	 0.1
Netherlands	 1.2	 0.6	 0.1
Sweden	 0.1	 0.2	 0.1
Switzerland	 0.7	 0.1	 0.2
Emigration countries
	 1.4	 1.0	 0.7
Finland	 0.5	 0.1	 0.1
Greece	 0.8	 0.5	 -0.1
Italy	 0.8	 0.3	 -0.2
Portugal	 -0.7	 0.5	 0.3
Spain	 1.0	 0.9	 0.4
Turkey	 2.9	 2.4	 2.2
Yugoslavia	 1.3	 0.7	 0.3
Source: 0.E.C.D., 1985, p. 65.
1.The Community Framework. 
According to the E.C. regulation 1612/68, the free mobility of labour
is a means for the improvement of the living and working conditions of
the workers. At this particular point and, for the first time, free
labour mobility is referred as a special target, separate from the
other targets analysed in the E.C. treaties. Until then, free labour
mobility was simply considered as a means for the attainment of
continuous development (Gianopoulos, 1979, p. 152) As already
mentioned, the E.C. never aimed at organising massive migratory flows,
but to create a larger geographical area in which employment
opportunities arise for those to benefit (Commission of the E. C.,
1982, p. 6)
After the accession of Greece to the E.C. (and particularly after the
end of the transitional period), the Greek labour force is a part of
the Community one and the Greek labour market has been integrated in
the wider labour market of the E.C.. Relatively to this fact there is
one main question: could the E.C. framework by itself stimulate
emigration from Greece to the other E.C. countries?
The West Germans and the French who insisted, during the negotiations
for the accession of Greece in the E.C., for the adoption of a long
transition period, as far the free labour mobility was concerned,
claimed that an immediate application of the E.C. provisions would
cause a intensification of emigration from Greece. They were
particularly afraid that this rise of emigration would emphasise the
problems the labour markets of the E.C. countries were facing. The main
analytical fault of their argument was that the conditions of the early
1960s were assumed to apply in the 1980s.
In fact, the whole discussion and the arrangement of a long
transitional period before the full application of the free labour
mobility principle in the cases of Greece Spain and Portugal seems to
have been based on an overestimation of the importance of this
principle. The free labour mobility provisions of the E.C. could not be
as "effective" as the bilateral agreements signed in the 1960s since
they do not go as far as organising and regulating movements of labour.
The minimal (negligible one could say) movements of labour between
Greece and the other E.C. countries even after the . end of the
transitional period support this argument.
The free labour mobility which is expected to be accomplished by the
end of 1992 means that, Community workers will be free to search for
employment in any member state. The principle of free labour mobility
though, cannot cause migratory flows by itself, since it cannot
overcome basic obstacles such as the distance, the different language
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and the social assimilation of the immigrants. Its main problem though,
is that it cannot ensure employment for the immigrants, contrary to the
bilateral agreements which were ensuring a specific vacancy for those
emigrating. The abolition of the barriers (negative integration),
therefore, can only permit rather than cause migration by itself if it
is not accompanied by positive integration measures such as a common
employment and a common social security policy. Such policies, coping
with the problem of unemployment for the E.C. as a whole do not seem to
be a realistic perspective today in spite of the relatively recent
"social charter".
These conclusions support the argument that what the Community's
representatives had in mind during the negotiations for the accession
of Greece in the E.C. was Spain in the short-run and Turkey in the
long-run. The adoption of the seven year transitional period for the
free labour mobility served only as the basis for similar arrangements
in the future (GDI, 1979, p. 121).
The "Push" and "Pull" Factors Element. 
The analysis in the first part of the thesis indicated that
emigration from Greece to the E.C. countries in the 1960s and the early
1970s was the "product" of a combination of "push" and "pull" factors,
the latter been the decisive ones. We should therefore examine whether
these factors are present or whether they could be present in the
future.
The econometric investigation of the determining factors of
emigration from Greece to West Germany (which was assumed to be more or
less applicable to the other E.C. immigration countries) in the period
1960-1984, produced the following two models (see chapter four):
-the "push" factor one
Mr = 40.24 + 0.8 Mt-i - 0.57 APCgrc-f - 30.0 Rr + Ut
(3.97)	 (6.77)	 (-2.98)	 (-2.38)
-and the "pull" factor one
Mr = - 36.61 + 0.21 Mr-f + 0.13 JVUfrgt + 2.60 MUt + Ut where:
(-3.60) (2.10)	 (6.07)	 (2.55)
Mt and Mt-i : emigration from Greece to FRG in periods t and t-1
respectively,
APCgr1-1 : Greek agricultural productivity per capita in period t-1,
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Rt	 : Repatriation to Greece from West Germany in period t,
JVUfrgt : Job vacancies unfilled in West Germany in period t,
MUt	 : Unemployment rate of Greeks in West Germany in period t and
Ut	 : Error term.
Besides that, the investigation revealed the superiority of the
"pull" factors model. Assuming emigration in the future will be
determined by the factors indicated by these two models and in fact,
within the same (more or less) framework of relationships (signs,
coefficients, etc.), one could note the following points:
-emigration from and repatriation to Greece have been diminishing in
the recent years to such an extent that, they could hardly be assumed
to influence migratory flows in the future; moreover, if one interprets
these two variables as influencing emigration in a "word of mouth"
fashion, their recent developments seem to suggest that they are not
likely to stimulate emigration in the future. One could argue that Mt4
suggests that emigration could be seen as a self-perpetuating process
in a sense; even if this is the case though, something else will have
to "pull the trigger" for emigration to re-appear before it gains a
self-accelerating momentum.
-the same conclusion, more or less, could be applied to MUt; the "pull"
factors model indicated that the more immigrants there are in a certain
country and the higher their unemployment rate is, the more likely it
will be for some new immigrants to come in to replace them.
Furthermore, this conclusion was only valid because emigration was
evolving, to a great extent, under the bilateral agreements which do
not apply any more. Given that it is very unlikely to have such
agreements in the future and the experience since the mid-1970s, one
could hardly expect that immigrants loosing their jobs will be
substituted by immigrants of the same origin. In fact, the experience
so far suggests that, even if substitution is needed, (that is when the
vacancy is not "lost") indigenous labour or non-European immigrants are
the ones to fill it.
-as far as APC0-1 is concerned the following points could be made:
During the negotiations for the accession of Greece to the E.C., there
was a large discussion on the possible effects from the application of
the C.A.P. in Greek agriculture. This discussion was extended on
emigration according to the following argument: The application of the
260
C.A.P. will increase the productivity of the Greek agriculture through
an increase of the irrigated areas and investment in infrastructure
(co-financed by the Community budget). This increase of productivity
would "free" many people from agriculture; these people would possibly
search for employment in the foreign land (GDI, 1979, pp. 120-121).
This analysis though, did not take into account the Greek agricultural
development model which is based on labour intensive cultivation
methods. It did not also take into account that a great part of the
Greek agricultural labour force consists of people more than 55 years
old and these people would withdraw from employment anyway (Zolotas,
1978). The agricultural labour reserves of Greece, therefore, were not
so significant and they could not justify perspectives of exodus to the
other E.C. countries what so ever. Besides that, the increase of the
agricultural income due to the participation in the C.A.P. would be a
negative factor for emigration, as mentioned (Pesmatzoglou, 1980)
-the existence of a large number of job vacancies unfilled (much higher
than unemployment in the case of West Germany in the 1960s) in the
immigration countries, has probably been the main driving force of
migration in the past; given that, in the context of the two
aforementioned models, no other factor seems to be likely to influence
future migration in a positive way, one should carefully examine the
perspectives of the labour markets of the immigration countries and the
perspectives of job vacancies unfilled (not coverable by indigenous
labour) in particular. As far as Germany is concerned, in particular,
one should take into account that the unification of the two Germanies
has solved the problem of labour shortages West Germany might have had
for many years to come.
The experience of the late 1970s and 1980s suggests that in the
immigration E.C. countries, demand for labour has been constrained by a
series of factors and mainly by the stagnation of investment. In spite
of the fact that some signs of economic recovery have been seen since
the early 1980s, it is very doubtful whether this recovery will ever
lead to a complete absorption of unemployment and, even more doubtful
whether an import of immigrant labour will be ever needed. The pattern
of economic development in the 1980s was quite different from the one
in the 1960s; the economic policies most E.C. countries followed,
mainly aimed at fighting inflation and increasing GDP rather than
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reducing unemployment or even preventing it from increasing.
Industry was of crucial importance for the economic growth in the
1960s for most immigration E.C. countries; the recent experience is
that industry is becoming more capital intensive (and therefore less
and less able to absorb labour for a given increase in output) and its
dominance is in question because of the rapid expansion of the tertiary
sector. A process of de-industrialisation, in the sense that services
are increasing their contribution both in the GDP formation and
employment at the expense of manufacture, is in progress in the
industrially developed E.C. countries (Molle, 1978, Negreponti-
Delivani, 1989).
The aforementioned observation is very interesting relatively to the
perspectives of migration; as we have seen, the greatest part of the
immigrants, in the period of economic prosperity, was absorbed by
manufacturing. It is very unlikely for the tertiary sector in the E.C.
countries to absorb Greek immigrants for two main reasons: First it
would be unrealistic to expect hiring of Greek immigrants in the public
sector of the other E.C. countries; besides that employment in the
tertiary sector in one country requires at least a good knowledge of
the language the culture etc. of this country which the immigrants
usually do not posses.
One should take into account that the Greek labour market has not
been particularly prosperous in the last few years, and significant
improvements should not be expected given the austerity policies which
will be in force at least until 1992; unemployment is continuously
increasing (although. the unemployment rate is the lowest in the E.C. of
12) and the GDP growth rate that would eliminate unemployment (6% per
annum) does not seem attainable (Lalonde and Papandreou, 1986,
Kioulafas and Zaragas, 1990). On the other hand though, the fact that
unemployment in the traditional immigration E.C. countries is even
higher, is surely a constraint for any future movement of labour. The
wage level in Greece after a period of convergence to the ones of the
other E.C. countries, has stagnated in constant prices in the last few
years (Kioulafas and Zaragas, 1990, pp. 270-274); wage differentials
could be an incentive for emigration but, as we have seen, it has never
been a decisive factor in the case of emigration from Greece to the
E.C. countries. Besides that, since the end of the transitional period
(1987) no significant emigration from Greece to the other E.C.
countries has been witnessed, although nominal wages in Greece (and
Portugal) are the lowest in the Community (about 45 per cent of the
ones in the U.K.) (Ermisch, 1991, P. 100). Another point which supports
the above is that, generally speaking, empirical evidence suggests that
wage differences have not caused an increase in intra-E.C. migration
(op cit. p. 101). This could be mainly attributed to the fact that
trade in commodities has tended to substitute for movements in factors
of production and particularly labour migration .
The above forecasts are certainly of a general nature and one should
examine the demand and the supply of labour for different levels of
skills and specialisations. The possibilities for emigration are
extremely limited for the Greek workers employed in sectors facing
labour shortages. There is a structural shortage of skilled workers in
sectors	 like	 clothing,
	 footwear,
	 paper,	 plastics,	 construction
materials, electrical equipment, fireproofs, ship-repairing and car
assembling. The sectors of plastics, construction materials and
fireproofs face a problem of labour shortage, even for unskilled
workers (Hassid, 1980, p. 307). Given Greece's shortages in skilled
labour, free labour mobility could only mean an emigration of unskilled
labour. The employees of firms related to similar ones in the E.C.
countries and the highly skilled staff members of certain industries
(drug industry) might show a higher mobility.
In conclusion, one could say that, only an impressive increase in the
demand for unskilled labour in the E.C. countries might attract Greek
immigrants (as was .the case in the past). If such an increased demand
for unskilled labour is unlikely to occur, it is also very unlikely
that massive migration will be repeated, at least as far as the next
five to ten years are concerned.
The aforementioned conclusions on the perspectives of emigration from
Greece could be further supported by some additional considerations. In
particular, the "economic maturity" approach is very helpful for the
analysis of this subject; according to that, the traditional
industrially developed regions of the Community have reached a point of
saturation and, consequently they cannot attract investment in
manufacturing, nor can they absorb labour. If economic expansion is to
be expected from the "periphery" of the Community (Negreponti-Delivani,
1986) and not by the "Western European Megalopolis" (Vanhove and
Klaassen, 1979, P. 50), the pattern of movements of labour in the E.C.
cannot be the same as it was in the 1960s and the 1970s. Besides that,
the fact that the traditional industrial regions seem unable to grow
and absorb labour at the rates of the past, raises the question of
whether labour should move to the job or the job to labour (Vanhove and
Klaassen, 1979). In the past, it was the labour that moved where the
jobs were offered; exactly the opposite could be an option and, in fact
a more realistic one under the present circumstances, although it
requires a different type of industrial policy as compared with the
past. Generally speaking, a repetition of emigration to the E.C.
countries would mean an exportation of unemployment to "customers" that
have enough of their own. In spite of the progressive
internationalisation of the economy, unemployment is still a problem
each country has to solve on its own.
Another, important factor to be taken into account is the recent
unification of the two Germanies; first of all it should be made clear
that, given this fact, Eastern Germany (or what used to be Eastern
Germany) can no longer be examined in the context of expected migration
from the Eastern European countries (next section), since the Eastern
German labour force is now simply a part of the (unified) German one.
In the 1960s and early 1970s West Germany has been the main labour
importing E.C. country. One could therefore assume that Germany should
be the more likely labour importer in the future in case migration
re-appears; given that the expected transformation of the Eastern
German economy to a market one, is probably going to release labour
which will be added to German unemployment, fill a large number of the
job vacancies, or (most probably) both, the re-appearance of excess
demand for immigrant labour even in case of a "boom" (as in the 1960s)
seems more unlikely now than before the unification.
Countries could, under certain conditions (the main one being the
shortage of labour in the more developed E.C. countries) find
themselves in the 1960s situation; in this case new arrangements will
be needed (since bilateral agreements are not permitted according to
the E.C. law) for the organisation of the migratory flows. Such a
perspective though, is not realistic for two main reasons. The first
one is that, even if the Western European economy enters a period of
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prolonged economic growth, it is very unlikely that the economic
environment of the 1955-1973 period will be attained. The second one is
that, given the experience of the postwar labour movements and their
serious social, political (as well as economic for the emigration
countries) long-term implications no E.C. country would decide to
repeat the venture.
As far as emigration from the other E.C. countries to Greece is
concerned we could say that: the wage level in Greece is much lower
than that in most E.C. countries and this is the main disincentive for
someone wishing to search for employment in Greece (although wages
differentials have never been the decisive factor for intra-E.C.
migration as we have seen). This fact makes emigration to Greece almost
impossible, even in case nothing changes in the E.C. labour market.
Besides this, there are other factors making emigration to Greece
impossible; the weekly hours of work are more, and the social policy
benefits poorer compared to the other E.C. countries (Giannopoulos,
1979, p. 181). The same, more or less conclusions, are valid for the
case of professionals and scientists as well; here again the relatively
low incomes in Greece are the main disincentive for emigration.
An additional factor to take into account is the implementation of
the Social Charter. The application of the provisions of the Social
Charter is expected to put pressure on poorer member-states (such as
Greece) to increase their social benefits. Assuming that no other
public expenditure is reduced, financing this increase in social
benefits will probably require an increase in taxation and especially
payroll taxes (Ermisch, 1991, p. 98). Such an increase in taxation will
probably lead to a reduction in real wages making the emigration from
other E.C. countries to Greece even more unlikely. On the other hand,
one could say that such a development would increase the possibility of
migration from Greece to the richer E.C. countries, the main
reservation being again whether wage differentials will . cause such
migratory flows in the future.
3. "Competition" from Other Potential Emigration Countries. 
Since the appearance of the economic recession in the 1970s,
Mediterranean immigrants in the E.C. countries have, to a large extent,
been replaced by non-European immigrants who have proved to be
"tougher" to the pressures for repatriation. One of the main reasons
for this has been the fact that the "push" factors in their countries
of origin have been much more intensive than the ones operating in the
Mediterranean countries. In fact this "non-European immigration" seems
to be of a permanent rather than of a temporary nature. These
Non-European emigration countries, therefore, may prove to be
competitors to the Mediterranean ones (including Greece) in case demand
for labour (and therefore vacancies) increase in the immigration E.C.
countries. One could argue that in such a case Community immigrants
will have an advantage due to the E.C. provisions. On the other hand
though, this advantage may be outweighed by two facts: first immigrants
from non-European countries may accept jobs European immigrants would
not accept. Secondly they may accept jobs at very low wages. One must
not forget that it is exactly these two facts that have caused the
recent persistence of this kind of immigration in many E.C. countries
including Greece. (see migratory "paradox" in chapter three).
In addition to that, competition should be expected from Eastern
Europe as shown in the previous section of this chapter. In fact this
competition may prove to be more intensive due to the sensitivity and
the commitment of E.C. members to these countries, not to mention the
possibility of accession of (some or even all) of these countries to
the E.C. which may simply be a matter of time.
In fact traditional emigration countries such as Greece having joined
the E.C. may find themselves in defense in case the pressures for
accepting immigrants from these countries are intensified. Greece in
particular has had such an experience very recently (December 1990)
when ethnic Greeks as well as Albanians entered the country by
thousands as refugees.
D. SUGGESTED POLICY MEASURES.
Greece, as a traditional labour "exporter" and an E.C. member since
1981, is presently faced with two problems: The first one is how to
cope with arguably possible (small in size as it seems) outflows of
labour and, at the same time a more possible inflow of E.C. and
non-E.C. workers after the abolition of the barriers to free labour
mobility and the recent developments in Eastern Europe. The second one
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has to do with those who have already emigrated and still live abroad.
Contrary to what was happening in the first postwar decades, Greece
appears to be in a defensive position as far as migration is concerned,
since its labour will have to be protected from the competition which
will be caused by the possible inflow of E.C. and (especially) non-E.C.
workers. Since this protection cannot be carried out by imposing
restrictions on the inflow of E.C. nationals, the only way out could be
the improvement of the competitiveness of the Greek labour force. Such
an improvement could be only achieved through the modernisation of
education and professional training, which is a long-run and in fact a
very difficult task.
As far as professional training for the creation of skilled labour is
concerned in particular, this could be facilitated by migration under
several conditions. Greek workers could be trained in particular
Western European industries, in specific numbers and with their
employment in Greece ensured after their return; such an arrangement
would be very beneficial for Greece and many of the negative effects of
emigration analysed in the second part of the thesis would have been
avoided.
Relatively to the second issue, concerning the Greeks already living
abroad and the E.C. countries in particular, we could conclude that: in
spite of the continuous reduction of the number of the Greek immigrants
in the E.C. countries since 1975 (due to the fall of emigration and the
rise of repatriation), there are still more than 350,000 Greeks living
in E.C. countries other than Greece. The lack of emigration policy from
Greece cut off these people from the economic, political and social
life of their home country; given the trend of the Greek immigrants in
the E.C. countries to return to Greece sooner or later (usually after
their retirement), the problem of their assimilation is raised once
more. Relatively to this problem we could propose some indicative
policy measures:
1. Measures for the Political and Social Reassimilation
of the Emigrants.
a) Eliminating all the obstacles which, in effect, deprive the
emigrants of their right to vote in the elections and therefore
participate in the political life of their home country; this could be
arranged by allowing them to vote in the Greek embassies of the
immigration countries.
b) Continuous support of the Greek communities of the foreign
countries, the Greek schools and, generally speaking, all the bearers
and the actions which contribute to the preservation of the links
between Greece and Greek emigrants.
c) All measures aiming at improving the education level and the
information of the emigrants.
2. Measures for the Economic Reassimilation of the Emigrants. 
a) Even if we accept that emigration was necessary because of the
inability of the Greek economy to absorb a part of its labour force and
given the temporary character of emigration to the E.C. countries,
Greece should use, professionally, all the returning emigrants. Besides
this fact, Greece should follow a policy aiming at attracting the
emigrants to repatriation; at a first stage this process should evolve
selectively in the sense that skilled industrial workers should be
attracted, by offering them satisfactory wages and ensuring their
employment.
b) As we have seen, remittances depend, to a certain extent, on the
long-term interest rates the Bank of Greece sets for the emigrants;
this fact gives the Bank of Greece a certain flexibility as far as
maximising the remittances and the benefits in terms of foreign
currency inflows.
c) The problem of making the best out of the remittances from Greece's
point of view is • perhaps more difficult than the one of their
maximisation. Making the best use of these remittances through
financing productive investments has problems in spite of the favorable
treatment of the emigrants by the state in terms of incentives (Law
1262/82). This could be attributed to the lack of relative information
of the emigrants and furthermore to the problems to transform an
industrial worker in West Germany to an investor in Greece; in fact
this entrepreneurial skills problem is considered to be quite important
in the case of Greece (Secretariat General, 1990, pp. 221-2). Besides
the need for a continuous and full information of the emigrants on the
perspectives of particular investment projects, the state should
encourage cooperative and other schemes that join the savings of the
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emigrants to entrepreneurial	 capital,	 especially	 in the Greek
periphery. In addition	 to	 these,	 the	 establishment of	 a special
institution for the	 promotion	 of	 investment	 initiatives by	 emigrants
could facilitate, to a great extent the channeling of emigrants savings
to productive investment (Secretariat General, 1990, pp. 225-226).
The aforementioned indicative policy measures represent only some
general directives of an emigration policy; in every case they could be
specified in order to maximise the efficiency of the venture. It seems
rather peculiar to propose policy measures on emigration thirty years
or so after the beginning of large scale emigration to the E.C.
countries and fifteen years after the reversal of the flow and the
intensification of repatriation; this unforgivable delay on the
adoption of even primary measures forming an emigration policy, was one
of the main causes of the negative effects of emigration for Greece.
This fact and furthermore the new institutional framework of the E.C.,
simply mean that the issue of emigration requires a very careful
treatment in order to avoid problems in the development of the Greek
economy.
The postwar emigration to the E.C. countries has been a factor of
great importance for the Greek economy; the existence of a large number
of Greek immigrants in the E.C. countries even today and the
perspectives after the accession of Greece and 1992 provide a constant
interest to the subject. Any serious analysis of the Greek economy both
historically and perspectively should not neglect to recognise the
dynamism of the phenomenon and to propose relative policy measures.
E. EPILOGUE.
In the first two parts of the thesis the causes and the effects of
labour movements from Greece to the E.C. countries were accounted and
analysed; in the third part, on the other hand, an effort was made to
forecast the perspectives of such movements given the accession of
Greece to the E.C., and the recent developments in Europe.
The analysis indicated that the role of state intervention was
decisive in the postwar intra-European emigration; in the industrially
developed E.C. countries the state itself undertook to provide labour
for industry and, in fact, in an official way through the bilateral
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agreements. The other party, the countries with a relative labour
surplus like Greece that is, saw these agreements as a policy measure
for the reduction of unemployment and underemployment. Both the
characteristics and the effects of these labour movements clearly
reflect the bargaining position and the ability to implement economic
policy of the two parties. It has been stressed that the negative
effects of emigration for Greece could have been minimised, had Greece
adopted even a primary emigration policy which would ensure a less
passive attitude relatively to the problem.
The final conclusions of these thesis could be described in two main
points:
-Thirty years after the beginning of massive emigration from Greece to
the industrially developed E.C. countries and in the light of the facts
analysed in the previous sections of this chapter a repetition of such
migratory flows (in size and importance) between Greece and it's E.C.
partners seem quite unlikely unless if the unique circumstances of the
early 1960s re-appear.
-The analysis so far has made quite clear that the role of planning and
state intervention is of crucial importance in the case of movements of
labour, especially when these movements are of considerable size. In
fact the experience of Greece clearly suggests that migration should
not be left to the market forces. After all it was Adam Smith the
"father" of non-interventionism who said that labour is the most
difficult commodity to transport.
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